SECRET
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05387 01 OF 03 261342Z 42
ACTION NEA-09
INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SS-15 PM-03 NSC-05 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00
SCCT-01 SY-05 USSS-00 IO-10 AF-06 PRS-01 USIA-06 ACDA-05 OMB-01 /087 W
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061958 P R 261155Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4082
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USCINCEUR
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BEIRUT 5387
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, PLO
SUBJECT: SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON FOLLOWING RECENT PHALANGIST-FEDAYEEN CLASHES
REFS: (A) BEIRUT 5000; (B) USDAO BEIRUT 0236 APR 75
SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH APRIL 16 CEASEFIRE BETWEEN LOCAL PHALANGIST FORCES AND FEDAYEEN IS HOLDING SO FAR, NO SOLUTION COMPATIBLE WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND AIMS OF PARTIES HAS BEEN FOUND. BASIC ISSUE IS PALESTINIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS, AND MOST ONE CAN THUS EXPECT IS MODUS VIVENDI BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. CONSEQUENTLY, ALL ELEMENTS FOR CONTINUED TENSION, INSTABILITY AND FURTHER STRIFE REMAIN. CONTINUED CALM DEPENDS ON ABILITY BOTH LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP TO CONTROL EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WITHIN THEIR RANKS, AND EFFORTS ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE TO THAT END. APPOINTMENT OF A STRONG PRIME MINISTER (WHICH IS PROBABLY A VAIN HOPE) WOULD ALSO AID IMMEASURABLY IN CALMING SITUATION BY RESTORING SOME DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE AMONG ALL ELEMENTS IN GOL'S ABILITY AND DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN CIVIL ORDER. END SUMMARY.
1. IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF LAST WEEK'S PHALANGIST-FEDAYEEN CLASHES IN LEBANON WAS IN MOST ESSENTIAL RESPECTS ACCIDENTAL, ALTHOUGH PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR ON BOTH SIDES CONTRIBUTED. FIERCE EMOTIONS AND VIOLENT REPERCUSSIONS WHICH IT UNLEASHED, HOWEVER, WERE BY NO MEANS UNFORESEEABLE. PAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAD WITNESSED GRADUAL RISE IN TENSIONS HERE, MARKED BY (A) UPSURGE IN CONFESSIONAL AND ANTI-PALESTINIAN FEELING GROWING OUT OF MARCH DISTURBANCES AND FEDAYEEN ENCROACHMENTS IN SIDON, (B) VISIBLE DIMINUTION IN GOL'S ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO RESIST SUCH ENCROACHMENTS, (C) HEIGHTENED FEAR OF IMPENDING ISRAELI REPRISALS FOLLOWING MARCH 5 FATAH TERRORIST RAID ON TEL AVIV, (D) WAXING WAR OF WORDS BETWEEN PHALANGIST LEADERS AND SUNNI MOSLEM, LEFTIST, PALESTINIAN AND "OPPOSITION" SPOKESMEN RE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, AND (E) GENERAL UNCERTAINTY RE COURSE OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS CONNECTED WITH ME SETTLEMENT EFFORT. AS RESULT, SIGNIFICANT SEGMENT OF LEBANESE CHRISTIAN POPULATION HAD BECOME MORE NERVOUS AND INCLINED TO TAKE MATTERS FORCIBLY INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. AT SAME TIME, FEDAYEEN AND THEIR LEBANESE SYMPATHIZERS HAD BECOME MORE DISPOSED TO REACT VIOLENTLY AGAINST ANY MOVE (REAL OR IMAGINED) THAT MIGHT LEAD TO PLACING GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON.
2. APRIL 16 CEASEFIRE FORESTALLED CONTENDING PARTIES FROM PUSHING MATTERS TO POINT OF ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION. IN CONTRAST TO PAST LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN DISTURBANCES, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO RPT NO PRETENSE THAT ANY REAL OR MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS (A LA 1969 CAIRO AGREEMENT OR STILLBORN 1973 MELKART ARRANGEMENTS) LEADING TO A "LASTING" SOLUTION OF EXISTING TENSIONS HAS BEEN FOUND. FACTORS OF INSTABILITY MENTIONED ABOVE CONTINUE AT WORK DESPITE APPARENT RETURN TO "NORMALITY" REPEATEDLY PROCLAIMED BY PRIMIN SOLH. FEDAYEEN REMAIN ACUTELY SUSPICIOUS OF ALL "PLOTS" TO "LIQUIDATE" THEIR LAST BASTION HERE, WHILE PHALANGISTS AND OTHER LEBANESE CHRISTIAN GROUPS APPEAR MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER TO SET LIMITS ON WHAT THEY REGARD AS INCREASING PALESTINIAN INTERFERENCE WITH AND ENCROACHMENTS ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY.
3. GOL POSITION: DESPITE APPEARANCE OF INTENSE GOL ACTIVITY IN TRYING TO RESTORE ORDER DURING LAST WEEK'S CLASHES THROUGH SERIES OF MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AND FRENETIC "CONSULTATIONS" WITH TOP-LEVEL LEADERS OF CONTENDING FACTIONS, IT WAS PAINFULLY CLEAR THAT GOL LEADERSHIP FOUND ITSELF INCAPABLE OF EXERTING EFFECTIVE CONTROL. (CABINET MEETINGS TENDED TO DEGENERATE INTO SHOUTING-MATCHES BETWEEN PHALANGIST AND "PROGRESSIVE" MINISTERS.) HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR TIMELY EFFORTS EXERTED BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL LEBANESE PERSONALITIES -- PARTICULARLY HENRI PHARAON, SHIITE IMAM MUSA SADR AND CERTAIN OTHER MODERATE MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS -- ASSISTED BY ARAB LEAGUE SYG MAHMOUD RIAD AND VARIOUS ARAB PRESSURES (ESPECIALLY SYRIAN), SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF FIGHTING MIGHT EASILY HAVE WIDENED.
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 BEIRUT 5387
4. GOL LEADERSHIP NATURALLY WAS (AND STILL IS) ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL WEAKNESS VIS-A-VIS FEDAYEEN AND THEIR LOCAL LEFTIST AND MOSLEM SUPPORTERS. LONGSTANDING FEAR OF BECOMING INVOLVED IN ANOTHER NIGHTMARE CONFRONTATION WITH THESE COMBINED FORCES COMPELLED GOL'S TOP CIVILIAN LEADERS TO HOLD LEBANESE ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES ALOOF FROM LAST WEEK'S CLASHES. (GIVEN SWIFT AND ALARMING UPSURGE IN INTERNAL POLITICAL AND CONFESSIONAL UNREST WHICH RESULTED FROM ARMY'S INTERVENTION IN LAST MONTH'S TROUBLES IN SIDON, WE BELIEVE THIS DECISION WAS WISE.) GOL'S UNWILLINGNESS TO PLAY STRONGER ROLE IN IMPOSING ORDER ON CONTENDING FACTIONS IN LATEST INSTANCE, HOWEVER, HAS MADE ITS WEAKNESS IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER MORE PATENT THAN EVER -- FACTOR WHICH IN FUTURE (IF STRONGER GOVT. IS NOT ESTABLISHED) IS LIKELY TO ENCOURAGE GREATER PALESTINIAN INTRANSIGENCE AND ALSO TO PROMPT RIGHT-WING CHRISTIAN GROUPS TO ACT MORE OPENLY IN DEFENSE OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS. GOL'S DEMONSTRATED WEAKNESS HAS PROBABLY ALSO DISCREDITED REPUTATION OF SOLH CABINET BEYOND REPAIR AND ALMOST CERTAINLY ROBBED IT OF ANY PROSPECT OF GOVERNING EFFECTIVELY IN FUTURE. ONLY FACTOR PERMITTING ITS CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE FOR TIME BEING IS DIFFICULTY PRES FRANGIE IS LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE IN FINDING -- IN CURRENT CLIMATE OF AROUSED CONFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL FEELINGS -- ANOTHER "OBEDIENT" SUNNI MOSLEM LEADER WILLING TO REPLACE SOLH AS PRIMIN.
5. POSITION OF LEBANESE ARMY: ARMY HIGH COMMAND CONTINUES TO CHAFE UNDER WHAT IT REGARDS AS LEADERSHIP VACUUM IN GOL CIVILIAN ESTABLISHMENT, AND ARMY MORALE IS REPORTED AT LOW EBB. AT SAME TIME, ARMY LEADERSHIP IS ALSO EXTREMELY CONSCIOUS OF ITS RELATIVE WEAKNESS VIS-A-VIS FEDAYEEN (WHOSE 10,000 "REGULARS" PLUS "MILITIA" FORCES HERE ARE STRONGER NOW THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE MAY 1973), AS WELL AS OF DANGEROUSLY POLARIZING IMPACT WHICH ARMY INTERVENTION COULD HAVE HAD ON LOCAL CONFESSIONAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES. ALTHOUGH ARMY WAS PREPARED INTERVENE IF SO ORDERED (UNDER CONDITIONS REPORTED OUR 4916), SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS GENERALLY SAW WISDOM IN GOL'S RELUCTANCE TO INVOLVE ARMY. THERE IS EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT ARMY PERSONNEL SYMPATHETIC TO PHALANGE FURNISHED IT SOME HEAVY WEAPONS ITEMS AND "TECHNICAL" ASSISTANCE DURING LAST WEEK'S FIGHTING, NOT SURPRISING IN VIEW OF PAST REPORTS THAT ARMY ON OCCASION (E.G., POST-MAY 1973) COVERTLY SUPPLIED SMALL ARMS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO PHALANGE AND OTHER CHRISTIAN "MILITIA" GROUPS.
6. FEDAYEEN POSITION: WE BELIEVE PLO LEADERSHIP HAS NOT BEEN ALTOGETHER PLEASED BY LAST WEEK'S OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. (WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED THAT 'ARAFAT AND CO. ARE NO MORE EAGER THAN LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO RISK TOUCHING OFF ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD TARNISH PLO'S SO-CALLED "MODERATE" IMAGE IN MANY ARAB AND FOREIGN EYES, INVOLVE HEAVY PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES, AND DEFLATE PLO PRETENSIONS TO WAGE "ARMED STRUGGLE" AGAINST ISRAEL.) ONCE FIGHTING STARTED, HOWEVER, FEDAYEEN LEADERS OF ALL STRIPES FELT COMPELLED TO DISPLAY FIRMLY UNITED FRONT AGAINST WHAT PLO PROPAGANDA APPARATUS HAS BEEN DESCRIBING AS ANOTHER "IMPERIALIST-ZIONIST LIQUIDATION PLOT."
7. MOREOVER, IN KEEPING WITH 'ARAFAT'S USUAL RELIANCE ON SEAT-OF-PANTS OPPORTUNISM IN PLAYING INTERNAL LEBANESE DIFFICULTIES TO PALESTINIAN ADVANTAGE, PLO LEADERSHIP -- ONCE FIGHTING STARTED -- SEEMS TO HAVE VIEWED LATEST CRISIS AS ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO ENTRENCH AND FURTHER EXTEND FEDAYEEN PRESENCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION IN LEBANON (JUST AS THEY DID PREVIOUSLY IN SIDON AND ELSEWHERE IN SOUTH LEBANON). IN THIS THEY APPEAR TO HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN AREAS IMMEDIATELY EAST AND NORTH OF BEIRUT'S BURJ AL BARAJNEH REFUGEE CAMP NEAR MAIN AIRPORT ROAD. IN ADDITION, FEDAYEEN ALLIANCE WITH LOCAL "PROGRESSIVE," LEFTIST AND PAN-ARAB NATIONALIST GROUPS EMERGED FROM LAST WEEK'S CRISIS MORE FIRMLY CEMENTED THAN EVER. THIS DEVELOPMENT CAN ONLY HEIGHTEN CHRISTIAN AND LEBANESE NATIONALIST APPREHENSIONS OVER FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF SOME RADICAL CHANGE IN THIS COUNTRY'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE.
S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 BEIRUT 5387
8. AT VERY LEAST, FEDAYEEN AND THEIR LOCAL SUPPORTERS (PRIMARILY LEFTIST) -- BY INDULGING IN WELL-PLANNED AND SELECTIVE BOMBINGS, ROCKETINGS AND HIT-AND-RUN FORAYS IN VIRTUALLY ALL PARTS OF BEIRUT DURING LAST WEEK'S FIGHTING -- SEEMED TO BE WARNING BOTH GOL AND LEBANESE PUBLIC ALIKE THAT THEY POSSESS CAPACITY FOR UNLEASHING COMPREHENSIVE URBAN TERRORISM CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD MAKE ANY ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION WITH THEM DISASTROUS FOR LEBANON. THESE TACTICS WERE ACCOMPANIED THROUGHOUT LAST WEEK'S FIGHTING BY POINTED STATEMENTS FROM PLO SPOKESMEN TO EFFECT THAT FEDAYEEN "RESTRAINT" WAS WEARING THIN AND THAT THEIR ADVERSARIES COULD BE MADE TO SUFFER GRIEVOUSLY IF HOSTILITIES WERE TO CONTINUE OR EXPAND. ALL THIS PLUS EMERGENCE HEIGHTENED LEFTIST TERRORISM AND POLITICAL ACTION HAS LED TO GREATER UNEASE AND FOREBODING AMONG LOCAL POPULATION THAN WAS CASE AFTER PREVIOUS LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN CEASEFIRES, AND IT HAS LEFT FEDAYEEN MORE SOLIDLY ENTRENCHED BOTH MILITARILY AND AS MAJOR POLITICAL FORCE IN LEBANON.
9. PHALANGIST POSITION: DESPITE PUBLIC APPREHENSION NOTED ABOVE, PHALANGE PERFORMANCE IN RECENT CLASHES, AS NOTED REFTEL B, HAS BOOSTED ITS MORALE AND ADDED TO ITS POPULARITY AMONG MANY LEBANESE (MOSTLY CHRISTIANS, BUT ALSO SOME MEMBERS OF OTHER CONFESSIONAL GROUPS) WHO REMAIN UNHAPPY OVER STRONG POSITION ENJOYED BY FEDAYEEN IN THIS COUNTRY. HAVING DEMONSTRATED ITS READINESS TO CHALLENGE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE AND BUOYED BY ITS SUCCESS IN "HOLDING ITS OWN" IN LAST WEEK'S FIGHTING, PHALANGE CAN PROBABLY BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE DISPLAYING TOUGH ATTITUDE TOWARD PALESTINIANS AND THEIR LOCAL ALLIES IN WEEKS AHEAD -- BEHAVIOR WHICH MIGHT GRADUALLY ASSUME NEW PROVOCATIVE OVERTONES AND RESULT IN FURTHER INCIDENTS LIABLE TO CAUSE BREAKDOWN OF CURRENT CEASEFIRE. IF THAT HAPPENS, PHALANGIST LEADERSHIP ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD NOT EXPECT TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN ALONE, BUT WOULD SEEK -- AS MANY OF ITS CADRES DID IN LAST WEEK'S FIGHTING -- TO CREATE CHAOTIC SITUATION IN WHICH LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INTERVENE.
10. "HIDDEN HANDS": PRIMIN SOLH HAS REPEATEDLY CHARGED THAT ELEMENTS IN PAY OF ISRAEL AND OTHER UNSPECIFIED FOREIGN MASTERS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN TRYING -- THROUGH RANDOM TERRORIST OPERATIONS -- TO WIDEN SCOPE OF LAST WEEK'S CLASHES AND INCREASE LOCAL TENSIONS SINCE APR 16 CEASEFIRE. APPEARS TO US THAT BOTH LIBYAN AND IRAQI AGENTS WERE INDEED INVOLVED IN FOMENTING ADDITIONAL TROUBLE HERE LAST WEEK -- E.G., WE HAVE RELIABLE REPORT OF CONSIDERABLE CONTACTS HAVING BEEN CARRIED ON WITH LEADERS OF CERTAIN RADICAL LEFTIST LEBANESE FACTIONS BY LIBYAN EMBASSY, WHOSE PAYROLL FOR FUNDING DISSIDENT LOCAL ELEMENTS IS ESTIMATED BY ONE KNOWLEDGEABLE INFORMANT AT APPROXIMATELY DOLS 6 MILLION PER MONTH. WE ALSO HAVE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT MEMBERS OF SYRIAN POPULAR PARTY (PPS), LONG-TIME BITTER ADVERSARY OF PHALANGE AND HIGH ON GOL'S LIST OF POTENTIAL TROUBLEMAKERS HERE, WERE NOT ONLY INVOLVED IN LATEST FIGHTING BUT ALSO HAVE ENDEAVORED TO KEEP POT BOILING BETWEEN PHALANGE AND FEDAYEEN.
11. FUTURE PROSPECTS: CEASEFIRE HAS SO FAR HELD REASONABLY WELL, ALTHOUGH TENSION AND UNEASE AMONG POPULATION IS STILL STRONG. IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS TO RESTRAIN EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WITHIN RANKS OF BOTH SIDES, AND EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO THAT END. GENERAL PUBLIC ALARM AROUSED BY RESULTS OF LAST WEEK'S CLASHES MAY HAVE SOME RESTRAINING, IF NOT CHASTENING, EFFECT ON ALL CONCERNED WHICH MAY AID PROCESS OF MAINTAINING CURRENT CALM. APPOINTMENT OF A STRONG PRIME MINISTER WOULD HELP IMMEASURABLY IN RESTORING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOL'S ABILITY AND DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN ORDER, AND THIS WOULD BE OF IMMENSE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE IN THE PEACE-KEEPING PROCESS. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF PRES. FRANGIE'S MAKE-UP AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF DIVISIONS AMONG LEBANESE LEADERS AS RESULT OF RECENT CLASHES, THIS PROBABLY WILL NOT RPT NOT HAPPEN. IN ANY EVENT, MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT LATEST PHALANGE-PALESTINIAN CLASHES ARE BUT A MANIFESTATION OF THE MORE BASIC PROBLEM -- I.E., RELATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS IN CONTEXT OF STRONG FEDAYEEN PRESENCE HERE. CONSEQUENTLY, ALL THE ELEMENTS FOR CONTINUED TENSION, INSTABILITY AND FURTHER STRIFE REMAIN. IT NOT RPT NOT LIKELY THAT THIS MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED OR EVEN ALLEVIATED EXCEPT IN CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT, A POINT WHICH IS BEING AMPLY DEMONSTRATED BY OUR MANY CONTACTS THROUGHOUT LEBANON WHO ARE BEGGING USG TO HASTEN ME PEACEMAKING PROCESS.
GODLEY
SECRET NNN
Originally classified SECRET · Declassified under EO Systematic Review · Now UNCLASSIFIED
Summary
Although the April 16 ceasefire between local Phalangist forces and fedayeen is holding so far, no solution compatible with the conflicting interests and aims of the parties has been found. The basic issue is Palestinian–Lebanese relations, and the most one can expect is a modus vivendi between the two sides. Consequently, all elements for continued tension, instability and further strife remain. Continued calm depends on the ability of both Lebanese and Palestinian leadership to control extremist elements within their ranks, and efforts are currently being made to that end. Appointment of a strong prime minister (which is probably a vain hope) would also aid immeasurably in calming the situation by restoring some degree of confidence in the GOL’s ability and determination to maintain civil order.
1. The Immediate Cause
The immediate cause of last week’s Phalangist–fedayeen clashes in Lebanon was in most essential respects accidental, although provocative behavior on both sides contributed. The fierce emotions and violent repercussions it unleashed, however, were by no means unforeseeable.[1] The past several months had witnessed a gradual rise in tensions here, marked by (a) an upsurge in confessional and anti-Palestinian feeling growing out of the March disturbances and fedayeen encroachments in Sidon, (b) a visible diminution in the GOL’s ability and willingness to resist such encroachments, (c) heightened fear of impending Israeli reprisals following the March 5 Fatah terrorist raid on Tel Aviv,[2] (d) a waxing war of words between Phalangist leaders and Sunni Moslem, leftist, Palestinian and “opposition” spokesmen regarding various aspects of fedayeen presence in Lebanon, and (e) general uncertainty regarding the course of future developments connected with the Middle East settlement effort.
As a result, a significant segment of the Lebanese Christian population had become more nervous and inclined to take matters forcibly into their own hands. At the same time, the fedayeen and their Lebanese sympathizers had become more disposed to react violently against any move (real or imagined) that might lead to placing greater constraints on the fedayeen presence in Lebanon.
2. No Real Arrangement Found
The April 16 ceasefire forestalled the contending parties from pushing matters to the point of all-out confrontation. In contrast to past Lebanese–fedayeen disturbances, however, there has been no repeat no pretense that any real or mutually satisfactory arrangements (à la the 1969 Cairo Agreement or the stillborn 1973 Melkart arrangements)[3] leading to a “lasting” solution of existing tensions has been found. The factors of instability mentioned above continue at work despite the apparent return to “normality” repeatedly proclaimed by Prime Minister Solh. The fedayeen remain acutely suspicious of all “plots” to “liquidate” their last bastion here, while Phalangists and other Lebanese Christian groups appear more determined than ever to set limits on what they regard as increasing Palestinian interference with and encroachments on Lebanese sovereignty.
3. The GOL’s Cabinet in Shouting Matches
Despite the appearance of intense GOL activity in trying to restore order during last week’s clashes through a series of ministerial meetings and frenetic “consultations” with top-level leaders of contending factions, it was painfully clear that the GOL leadership found itself incapable of exerting effective control. Cabinet meetings tended to degenerate into shouting-matches between Phalangist and “progressive” ministers.[4] Had it not been for timely efforts exerted by non-governmental Lebanese personalities — particularly Henri Pharaon,[5] Shiite Imam Musa Sadr[6] and certain other moderate Moslem and Christian leaders — assisted by Arab League Secretary-General Mahmoud Riad and various Arab pressures (especially Syrian), the scope and intensity of the fighting might easily have widened.
4. The Army Held Aloof
The GOL leadership naturally was (and still is) acutely conscious of its military and political weakness vis-à-vis the fedayeen and their local leftist and Moslem supporters. A longstanding fear of becoming involved in another nightmare confrontation with these combined forces compelled the GOL’s top civilian leaders to hold the Lebanese Army and security forces aloof from last week’s clashes. The GOL’s unwillingness to play a stronger role in imposing order on contending factions in the latest instance, however, has made its weakness in maintaining public order more patent than ever — a factor which in future (if a stronger government is not established) is likely to encourage greater Palestinian intransigence and also to prompt right-wing Christian groups to act more openly in defense of their own interests.
The GOL’s demonstrated weakness has probably also discredited the reputation of the Solh cabinet beyond repair and almost certainly robbed it of any prospect of governing effectively in future. The only factor permitting its continuance in office for the time being is the difficulty President Frangieh is likely to experience in finding — in the current climate of aroused confessional and political feelings — another “obedient” Sunni Moslem leader willing to replace Solh as Prime Minister.
5. Fedayeen: 10,000 Regulars Plus Militia
The Army High Command continues to chafe under what it regards as a leadership vacuum in the GOL civilian establishment, and Army morale is reported at a low ebb. At the same time, Army leadership is also extremely conscious of its relative weakness vis-à-vis the fedayeen — whose 10,000 “regulars” plus “militia” forces here are stronger now than at any time since May 1973[7] — as well as of the dangerously polarizing impact which Army intervention could have had on local confessional and political attitudes.
Although the Army was prepared to intervene if so ordered, senior military officers generally saw wisdom in the GOL’s reluctance to involve the Army. There is evidence, however, that Army personnel sympathetic to the Phalange furnished it some heavy weapons items and “technical” assistance during last week’s fighting[8] — not surprising in view of past reports that the Army on occasion (e.g., post-May 1973) covertly supplied small arms and communications equipment to the Phalange and other Christian militia groups.
6. The PLO’s Calculation
We believe the PLO leadership has not been altogether pleased by last week’s outbreak of hostilities. We have consistently maintained that Arafat and co. are no more eager than Lebanese authorities to risk touching off an all-out confrontation which would tarnish the PLO’s so-called “moderate” image in many Arab and foreign eyes, involve heavy Palestinian casualties, and deflate PLO pretensions to wage “armed struggle” against Israel. Once the fighting started, however, fedayeen leaders of all stripes felt compelled to display a firmly united front against what the PLO propaganda apparatus has been describing as another “imperialist–Zionist liquidation plot.”
7. “An Opportunity to Entrench and Further Extend”
Moreover, in keeping with Arafat’s usual reliance on seat-of-pants opportunism in playing internal Lebanese difficulties to Palestinian advantage, the PLO leadership — once the fighting started — seems to have viewed the latest crisis as another opportunity to entrench and further extend fedayeen presence and freedom of action in Lebanon[9] (just as they did previously in Sidon and elsewhere in South Lebanon). In this they appear to have had some success in areas immediately east and north of Beirut’s Burj al Barajneh refugee camp near the main airport road. In addition, the fedayeen alliance with local “progressive,” leftist and pan-Arab nationalist groups emerged from last week’s crisis more firmly cemented than ever. This development can only heighten Christian and Lebanese nationalist apprehensions over future possibility of some radical change in this country’s political structure.
8. Urban Terrorism as Threat
At the very least, the fedayeen and their local supporters (primarily leftist) — by indulging in well-planned and selective bombings, rocketings and hit-and-run forays in virtually all parts of Beirut during last week’s fighting[10] — seemed to be warning both the GOL and the Lebanese public that they possess the capacity for unleashing a comprehensive urban terrorism campaign which would make any all-out confrontation with them disastrous for Lebanon. These tactics were accompanied throughout last week’s fighting by pointed statements from PLO spokesmen to the effect that fedayeen “restraint” was wearing thin and that their adversaries could be made to suffer grievously if hostilities were to continue or expand.
9. Phalange Morale Boosted
The Phalange performance in the recent clashes has boosted its morale and added to its popularity among many Lebanese (mostly Christians, but also some members of other confessional groups) who remain unhappy over the strong position enjoyed by the fedayeen in this country. Having demonstrated its readiness to challenge the fedayeen presence and buoyed by its success in “holding its own” in last week’s fighting, the Phalange can probably be expected to continue displaying a tough attitude toward Palestinians and their local allies in the weeks ahead — behavior which might gradually assume new provocative overtones and result in further incidents liable to cause a breakdown of the current ceasefire. If that happens, the Phalangist leadership almost certainly would not expect to confront the fedayeen alone, but would seek — as many of its cadres did in last week’s fighting — to create a chaotic situation in which the Lebanese Army would be required to intervene.[11]
10. “Hidden Hands”: Libya at $6 Million / Month
Prime Minister Solh has repeatedly charged that elements in the pay of Israel and other unspecified foreign masters have been active in trying — through random terrorist operations — to widen the scope of last week’s clashes and increase local tensions since the April 16 ceasefire.
It appears to us that both Libyan and Iraqi agents were indeed involved in fomenting additional trouble here last week. We have a reliable report of considerable contacts having been carried on with leaders of certain radical leftist Lebanese factions by the Libyan Embassy, whose payroll for funding dissident local elements is estimated by one knowledgeable informant at approximately $6 million per month.[12]
We also have strong indications that members of the Syrian Popular Party (PPS),[13] long-time bitter adversary of the Phalange and high on the GOL’s list of potential troublemakers here, were not only involved in the latest fighting but also have endeavored to “keep the pot boiling” between Phalange and fedayeen.
11. Future Prospects
The ceasefire has so far held reasonably well, although tension and unease among the population is still strong. The immediate problem is to restrain extremist elements within the ranks of both sides, and efforts are being made to that end. A general public alarm aroused by the results of last week’s clashes may have some restraining, if not chastening, effect on all concerned.
Unfortunately, because of President Frangieh’s make-up and the intensification of divisions among Lebanese leaders as a result of the recent clashes, appointment of a strong Prime Minister probably will not happen. In any event, it must be emphasized that the latest Phalange–Palestinian clashes are but a manifestation of the more basic problem — i.e., relations between Lebanese and Palestinians in the context of strong fedayeen presence here. Consequently, all the elements for continued tension, instability and further strife remain. It is not likely that this more fundamental problem can be solved or even alleviated except in the context of an overall Arab–Israeli peace settlement — a point which is being amply demonstrated by our many contacts throughout Lebanon who are begging the USG to hasten the Middle East peacemaking process.[14]
GODLEY
