Forty-eight hours in

By noon on April 15, 1975 — less than 48 hours after April 13 — the U.S. Embassy estimated 80 to 90 people dead throughout Lebanon. The Health Ministry was calling for blood donors and ordering medical staff to report immediately. The major portion of the capital’s population, the cable records, remained hunkered down in their homes.

This cable, filed at the IMMEDIATE level in two sections, is the Embassy’s most detailed situational account of the crisis’s first 48 hours. It documents events in Beirut, in Tripoli, and in villages near Sidon. What happened outside Beirut does not appear in the standard account of these events.

What the cable documents outside Beirut

In Tripoli, Lebanon’s second city, two major demonstrations occurred on April 14. At least two people were killed and seven wounded. Three Christian churches were bombed that evening. The headquarters of the National Liberal Party — Camille Chamoun’s organization — was sacked.

Near Sidon, three villages in the Mieh Mieh region — the cable specifies they were Christian, and explicitly not Phalangist — were rocketed from nearby refugee camps. According to what the cable describes as a usually reliable Lebanese source, when the villagers did not return fire, armed forces advanced into the villages. At one village, the father and brother of a Lebanese security official were seized and shot.

The Embassy presents this as a single-source account and offers no characterization beyond the documentary record. The event appears in paragraph 11 of this cable, filed before 2:00 PM on April 15, 1975, on record at the State Department. It does not appear in the standard account of these days.

The Embassy’s own casualty assessment

Paragraph 9 of this cable contains a specific assessment: Fatah is claiming its forces are showing real restraint in the face of Phalange “provocations.” The Embassy states: “We are unable to confirm this claim, but it is quite possibly true, since the head count to date appears to be in favor of the Phalange.”

This is the U.S. Embassy’s own assessment, on the record, at noon on April 15. The casualty balance, in the Embassy’s judgment, ran against the Palestinian and Muslim side, not against the Kataeb. This appears in this cable. It has not been cited in the standard account of the Lebanese Civil War’s first days.

Arafat’s absence

Paragraph 7 records that Arab League Secretary-General Riad was meeting directly with Abu Iyad (Fatah’s security chief) and Nayif Hawatmeh (PDFLP leader) on April 15. Arafat “was not present” and had “remained aloof from consultations.” Latest reports placed him in Damascus.

Read alongside the subsequent cable (1975BEIRUT04860), which records an unconfirmed report that Arafat had been favoring a ceasefire for 36 hours while Abu Iyad opposed it, these two cables together document that Abu Iyad was the effective PLO decision-maker in Beirut during the critical period of April 14–15 — with Arafat geographically and apparently politically absent from the negotiations.

The Embassy’s forward-looking warning

The cable closes paragraph 9 with a direct assessment of what would happen if the PLO chose to escalate: residents of Beirut and other parts of the country “will probably have little choice but to batten hatches and try to hold on.” The Embassy notes it had been reporting for “several years” that Palestinian armed forces were positioned in the capital for “sustained urban warfare and terrorism.”

This assessment, documented before the civil war had fully begun, is what the Embassy understood the stakes to be on April 15, 1975. What it was warning about would not materialize — that escalation — for another year.