Cable 1975BEIRUT04860 · April 16, 1975 · CONFIDENTIAL

Beirut, April 16, 1975

The Ceasefire That Almost Wasn’t

This cable, filed April 16, 1975, documents the ceasefire negotiations that followed April 13. It records two specific developments that do not appear in the standard account of these events: a documented asymmetry in the demands made of each side, and an unconfirmed report of a command dispute within PLO leadership over whether to accept a ceasefire at all.

Based on cable 1975BEIRUT04860 CONFIDENTIAL → UNCLASSIFIED

Three days after April 13, 1975, the U.S. Embassy filed this situation report as of 10:00 AM on April 16. It records negotiations that had produced a nominal ceasefire. It also records two specific developments that the standard account of these events does not carry: first, that the Kataeb delivered two suspects to Lebanese government authorities as agreed, after which the PLO stated that seven — not two — were sought; and second, an unconfirmed report that PLO Chairman Arafat had favored a ceasefire for 36 hours before returning to Beirut, having been opposed during that period by his designated deputy in the city.

What this document reveals

This cable records that the Kataeb delivered two suspects to Lebanese authorities on the night of April 15, as agreed. It then records that the PLO stated seven suspects were sought. This asymmetry — between what was delivered and what was subsequently demanded — appears in this cable. It does not appear in the standard account of the April 15–16 ceasefire negotiations.
This cable contains an unconfirmed Embassy report that Arafat had favored a ceasefire for 36 hours before returning to Beirut, but had been opposed by Abu Iyad — Fatah’s security chief and Arafat’s designated deputy in the city. If accurate, the ceasefire delay had an internal rather than external cause. This report appears in this Embassy cable. It is not in the standard account of these events.
A Palestinian “rejection front” reportedly asserted its forces would not accept reconciliation with the Kataeb. The Embassy recorded this as “somewhat more serious” than the disagreement over the number of suspects, as an obstacle to ceasefire enforcement.
By April 16 — three days after April 13 — the Embassy estimated 100 to 120 dead throughout Lebanon. This figure, documented in this cable, establishes the speed at which the April 13 incidents had produced country-wide armed conflict.
Religious and community leaders from multiple Lebanese communities — Maronite League, Higher Islamic Council, and the National Organization (Muslim) — met on April 15 and agreed the militia conflict “must not be allowed to engage Muslim and Christian communities.” This inter-communal effort is documented in this cable.

Chronology

What happened, in sequence

Morning, Apr 14, 1975

Arafat departs for Damascus

The cable records that Arafat left Beirut for Damascus on April 14, leaving Abu Iyad in charge of PLO operations. An unconfirmed Embassy report states Abu Iyad then opposed a ceasefire for 36 hours.

12:00 Z, Apr 15, 1975

First ceasefire attempt fails

A truce reportedly scheduled for 1200Z on April 15 did not hold. The Embassy records this directly.

21:30 Z, Apr 15, 1975

Two suspects delivered

Kataeb leader Gemayel, at President Frangieh’s request, delivers two Phalangists implicated in April 13 to Lebanese government security officers.

23:15 Z, Apr 15, 1975

PM Solh announces arrests

Prime Minister Solh officially announces the arrests. The PLO then states seven — not two — suspects are sought.

Midnight, Apr 15–16, 1975

Ceasefire goes into effect

Ceasefire reportedly takes effect at 1000Z April 15 (midnight local). Fighting continues. The Embassy notes both sides have “rejectionist” elements prepared to fight on.

Morning, Apr 16, 1975

Arafat returns, estimates 24hrs

Arafat reportedly returns to Beirut. A U.S. correspondent informs the Embassy he estimates 24 hours for the ceasefire to take effect.

11:25 Z, Apr 16, 1975

This cable filed

The Embassy dispatches this situation report. Total dead: 100–120 throughout Lebanon. Fighting continues.

Key figures

Who was involved

Mahmoud Riad

Arab League Secretary-General

The Egyptian diplomat credited by Lebanese media with brokering the ceasefire modus vivendi. His direct involvement within 72 hours of April 13 reflects the Arab League’s immediate recognition of the crisis’s regional stakes.

Abu Iyad

Fatah security chief, PLO deputy in Beirut

The cable records an unconfirmed report that Abu Iyad — Fatah’s intelligence and security chief — opposed a ceasefire for 36 hours while serving as Arafat’s designated deputy in Beirut. If accurate, this internal dispute accounts for the delay in implementation.

Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

Imam Musa Sadr

Lebanese Shia leader

The cable notes his possible — conflicted — involvement in mediation. Sadr’s standing as a cross-sectarian broker in Lebanese politics made him a natural participant in crisis management. He disappeared in Libya in 1978.

Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

Pierre Gemayel

Kataeb (Phalange) party leader

The cable documents Gemayel’s decision to comply with President Frangieh’s request and deliver two suspects to Lebanese authorities. The cable also notes he did not meet directly with Arab League mediator Riad; contacts were handled through Frangieh.

U.S. Department of State. Public domain.

G. McMurtrie Godley

U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon

The second major cable filed by Godley in the April 13 crisis, following 1975BEIRUT04749. Both dispatched at IMMEDIATE level. Godley’s assessment is cautiously optimistic about the ceasefire while noting its structural fragility.

The Record

Three days after April 13

By the morning of April 16, 1975, the U.S. Embassy estimated between 100 and 120 dead throughout Lebanon. The fighting had been underway for 72 hours. A ceasefire had been attempted once, failed, and reportedly gone into effect at midnight — with fighting still continuing as this cable was filed before noon.

Arab League Secretary-General Mahmoud Riad had come to Beirut. Community leaders from multiple religious communities had met. A local mediation committee had formed in Sidon. The Lebanese cabinet had played, in the Embassy’s assessment, “little direct role” in any of it.

The suspects: what was delivered, and what was then demanded

The cable documents a specific sequence. On the night of April 15, Kataeb leader Pierre Gemayel — acceding to a request from President Frangieh — delivered two Phalangists implicated in the April 13 incidents to Lebanese government security officers. The arrests were announced publicly by Prime Minister Solh at 11:15 PM.

The PLO then issued a statement that seven suspects were sought.

This asymmetry — two delivered, seven demanded — is documented in this cable. The cable records it without characterization: both facts appear in the same paragraph, in sequence. The Embassy does not describe the PLO demand as escalation. It records it as a fact and notes it may be a “minor snag.”

The internal dispute the standard account does not record

Paragraph 3 of this cable contains information the Embassy explicitly characterizes as unconfirmed. According to a report the Embassy received, Arafat had been in favor of a ceasefire for the preceding 36 hours — but had been opposed by Abu Iyad, the Fatah security chief Arafat had left in charge of operations in Beirut when he departed for Damascus on April 14.

The Embassy notes that if this internal conflict is accurate, it would explain both the delay in implementing the ceasefire and Arafat’s decision to return to Beirut and resume personal command.

The Embassy presents this as an unconfirmed report. It does not assert it as fact. But it documents it — as of April 16, 1975, in a cable on file at the State Department — as a plausible explanation for the ceasefire’s failure to materialize for 36 hours. This report does not appear in the standard historical account of the April 15–16 ceasefire negotiations.

The fragility the Embassy documented

Beyond the immediate political developments, the cable records structural obstacles to any ceasefire holding. On the Palestinian side: a “rejection front” had reportedly asserted its forces would not accept reconciliation with the Phalange at all. On the Kataeb side: several reports of lower-level fighters who doubted any settlement was possible and were prepared to continue fighting. The Embassy’s assessment is direct: the main sticking point would be whether moderate leadership on both sides could enforce ceasefire compliance on elements that did not want it.

The civil society response the cable also documents

The cable records, in the same situation report, that on April 15 the Maronite League, the Higher Islamic Council, and a Muslim national organization met and agreed that the militia conflict “must not be allowed to engage Muslim and Christian communities.” A local mediation committee was formed in Sidon.

These efforts — from within Lebanese civil society, across communal lines, within 48 hours of April 13 — are documented in this cable. They do not figure in the standard account of these days.

The ambassador’s assessment

“We may be in a better position to judge whether denouement is actually occurring by this afternoon.”

The cable closes without a verdict. The ceasefire might hold. It might not. The variables — the rejection front, the internal PLO dispute, the armed elements on both sides unwilling to stand down — are documented without resolution. Godley is reporting what the Embassy knows at 11:25 AM on April 16. What happens next is not in this cable.

Key Locations

●

Ain al-Rammaneh — Site of April 13 incidents; referenced in ceasefire negotiations

○

Ras Beirut — Residential and commercial area; bomb planting reported April 15/16

○

Abdel Aziz Street — Central Beirut; explosive charges planted by roving bands

○

Sinn al Fil — Northeast Beirut suburb; USIS Regional Center closed

○

Sidon — Southern coastal city; local appeasement committee formed

··

AUB Hospital — American University of Beirut Hospital; food stocks: 8 days

Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors · View in OpenStreetMap

Primary Source

This article is based entirely on U.S. Embassy Beirut cable 1975BEIRUT04860, dispatched on April 16, 1975 and originally classified CONFIDENTIAL. Declassified and released by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order Systematic Review, July 5, 2006. No facts have been added, removed, or altered.

View original on Wikileaks PlusD →

Topics

ceasefire April 1975 PLO Kataeb Beirut Arafat Arab League

CONFIDENTIAL

Origin	U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
To	Secretary of State, Washington D.C.
Date	April 16, 1975
Cable ID	1975BEIRUT04860
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL → Declassified 2006

Beirut Situation Report — 1000Z

Annotated version — all original facts and language preserved in full

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04860 161244Z

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4860

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, LE, PLO
SUBJECT: BEIRUT SITREP - 1000Z
REFS: A. BEIRUT 4845; B. BEIRUT 4844

SUMMARY: FIGHTING CONTINUES IN TROUBLE AREAS AROUND BEIRUT AS EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVELY CEASEFIRE WHICH WAS REPORTEDLY ARRANGED FOR 1000Z APR 15. WE ANTICIPATE THAT, EVEN IF EVENTUALLY EFFECTIVE, COMPLETE END TO FIGHTING WILL TAKE SOME HOURS. END SUMMARY.

1. APPARENT PROGRESS DURING AFTERNOON AND NIGHT APR 15 TOWARD IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIRE BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND PHALANGISTS PROVIDES FIRST REAL BASIS FOR HOPE THAT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN BEIRUT AND REMAINDER OF COUNTRY MAY BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. ARAB LEAGUE SYG MAHMUD RIAD IS CREDITED BY MANY LOCAL PAPERS APPEARING MORNING APR 16 WITH SUCCESS IN WORKING OUT MODUS VIVENDI BETWEEN CONTENDING ELEMENTS BUT IT APPEARS HE HAD ASSISTANCE OF LOCAL FIGURES, INCLUDING PRES FRANJIE (STILL CONVALESCING IN AUB HOSPITAL), HENRI PHARAON, AND, POSSIBLY, SHIITE LEADER IMAM MUSA SADR (REPORTS CONFLICTING). RIAD, WHO MET WITH PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE "PROGRESSIVE" PARTIES (BUT NOT RPT NOT PHALANGIST LEADER, PIERRE GEMAYEL, WITH WHOM PRES FRANJIE APPARENTLY HANDLED CONTACTS), WILL PROBABLY LEAVE BEIRUT TODAY AT ABOUT MID-DAY.

2. MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PAVING WAY FOR EFFORTS TO BRIDGE GAP BETWEEN COMBATTANTS WAS DECISION BY PHALANGE LEADER GEMAYEL TO ACCEDE TO PRES FRANJIE'S REQUEST THAT HE TURN OVER TO GOL AUTHORITIES TWO PHALANGISTS IMPLICATED IN SUNDAY'S INCIDENTS IN AIN AL RAMMANEH. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION, TWO SUSPECTS WERE DELIVERED TO GOL SECURITY OFFICERS AT 2130Z ON APR 15. PM SOLH OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED ARRESTS AT 2315Z. POSSIBLE MINOR SNAG WAS SUBSEQUENT PLO STATEMENT THAT SEVEN RPT SEVEN PHALANGISTS WERE SOUGHT, ALTHOUGH WAFA IN EARLY MORNING RELEASE REPORTEDLY CONTINUED LINE THAT GOL CONTINUES EMPLOY ITS GOOD OFFICES TO CONTAIN CRISIS. SOMEWHAT MORE SERIOUS, IN TERMS OF EFFORTS TO ENFORCE ANY CEASEFIRE, WAS REPORTEDLY PALESTINIAN "REJECTION" FRONT ASSERTION THAT ITS FORCES WOULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT RECONCILIATION WITH PHALANGE.

3. RELIABLE US CORRESPONDENT HAS INFORMED US THAT ARAFAT, WHO HAS ALLEGEDLY ARRIVED IN BEIRUT, ESTIMATED THAT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS WILL BE REQUIRED FOR CEASEFIRE TO BE EFFECTIVE. ALTHOUGH SITUATION ON PALESTINIAN SIDE UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME, WE ALSO HAVE UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT ARAFAT HAS BEEN FAVORING CEASEFIRE FOR LAST THIRTY-SIX HOURS, BUT HAS BEEN OPPOSED BY FATAH-NOTABLE ABU IYAD, WHOM ARAFAT LEFT IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS IN BEIRUT WHEN HE RETURNED APR 14 TO DAMASCUS. IF TRUE, THIS INTERNAL CONFLICT COULD ACCOUNT FOR BOTH DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIRE AND ARAFAT'S DECISION TO RESUME CHARGE LOCALLY.

4. DETAILS OF REPORTED CEASEFIRE PLAN REMAIN FRAGMENTARY. WE ORIGINALLY HEARD TRUCE WAS TO OCCUR AT 1200Z APR 15 BUT IT OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HOLD. WE ARE NOW INFORMED BY SEVERAL SOURCES THAT IT WENT INTO EFFECT AS OF 1000Z APR 15 (MIDNIGHT APR 15/16 LOCALLY) AND THAT EFFORTS NOW UNDER WAY TO GET WORD TO ISOLATED UNITS ON BOTH SIDES. MAIN STICKING POINT WILL BE ABILITY OF "MODERATE" LEADERSHIP OF BOTH PHALANGE AND PALESTINIANS TO ENFORCE THEIR POLICY ON ELEMENTS WHO MAY NOT WISH TO SEE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CRISIS. WE HAVE SEVERAL REPORTS OF LOWER LEVEL PHALANGISTS WHO DOUBT POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT AND PREPARED TO FIGHT ON. LIKEWISE, THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR QUESTIONING ABILITY AND/OR WILLINGNESS OF PALESTINIANS TO CONTROL COMPLETELY "REJECTIONISTS", WHO PROBABLY INCLUDE AMONG THEIR ALLIES NUMBER OF LOCAL MUSLIM AND LEFTIST ELEMENTS.

5. FIRING AND EXPLOSIONS PERSISTED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AND INTO THIS MORNING AFFECTING AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN SCENE OF FIERCEST FIGHTING SINCE SUNDAY. ROVING BANDS ALSO ENTERED CENTER OF TOWN AND RAS BEIRUT TO PLANT EXPLOSIVE CHARGES (MAINLY PLASTIQUE) IN ABDEL AZIZ STREET AND AT BUILDING HOUSING FORMER PRES CAMILLE CHAMOUN'S OFFICES IN VERDUN STREET. WE WOULD PLACE TOTAL DEAD TO DATE THROUGHOUT LEBANON AT BETWEEN 100 AND 120.

6. DURING APR 15, SOME EFFORTS WERE MADE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF COUNTRY TO KEEP STRIFE FROM ADOPTING CONFESSIONAL CHARACTER. MARONITE LEAGUE, HIGHER ISLAMIC COUNCIL AND NATIONAL ORG (MUSLIM) MET AND REPORTEDLY AGREED THAT "MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN MILITIAS" MUST NOT RPT NOT BE ALLOWED TO ENGAGE MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES. LOCAL "APPEASEMENT COMMITTEE" ALLEGEDLY FORMED IN SIDON UNDER LEADERSHIP OF DEPUTY BIZRI TO KEEP LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND RECONCILIATION OPEN BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS.

7. SOLH CABINET HAS APPEARED THUS FAR TO HAVE PLAYED LITTLE DIRECT ROLE IN EVENTS OR EFFORTS TO ARRANGE CEASEFIRE AND PM IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY ISOLATED EVEN AMONG HIS OWN MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES. SOME PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES, INCLUDING NUMBER IN CABINET, ATTEMPTED HOLD PARLIAMENTARY SESSION AT 0800Z THIS MORNING, BUT WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN QUORUM.

8. BEIRUT AIRPORT IS OPERATING THIS MORNING AT ABOUT 80 PERCENT NORMAL WITH ONE-THIRD ITS STAFF UNABLE TO REACH AREA. AIRPORT HAS NO FUEL BUT PLANES ARE REFUELING BEFORE OR AFTER BEIRUT AND CONSEQUENTLY FLIGHTS SO FAR UNAFFECTED. AUB HOSPITAL PRESENTLY HAS FOOD FOR EIGHT DAYS OPERATION.

9. ALL AMCITS ARE SAFE. USIS REGIONAL SERVICE CENTER IN SINN AL FIL AND KENNEDY CENTER ARE CLOSED AS ARE MOST BUSINESSES THROUGHOUT TOWN.

GODLEY

CONFIDENTIAL NNN

Originally classified CONFIDENTIAL · Declassified and released by U.S. Department of State under EO Systematic Review, 05 July 2006 · Now UNCLASSIFIED

Summary
Fighting continues in troubled areas around Beirut as efforts are underway to implement effectively a ceasefire reportedly arranged for 1000Z [10:00 AM GMT, or midnight local time April 15/16].^[1] We anticipate that even if eventually effective, complete end to fighting will take some hours.

1.
Apparent progress during the afternoon and night of April 15 toward implementing a ceasefire between Palestinians and Phalangists provides the first real basis for hope that the deteriorating situation in Beirut and the remainder of the country may be brought under control. Arab League Secretary-General Mahmud Riad^[2] is credited by many local papers appearing the morning of April 16 with success in working out a modus vivendi between the contending elements, but it appears he had assistance from local figures, including President Frangieh^[3] (still convalescing in the American University Hospital), Henri Pharaon,^[4] and, possibly, Shia leader Imam Musa Sadr^[5] (reports conflicting). Riad, who met with Palestinians and Lebanese “Progressive”^[6] parties — but not with Phalangist leader Pierre Gemayel, with whom President Frangieh apparently handled contacts — will probably leave Beirut today around midday.

2.
The major development paving the way for efforts to bridge the gap between the combatants was the decision by Phalange leader Gemayel to accede to President Frangieh’s request that he turn over to GOL authorities two Phalangists implicated in Sunday’s incidents in Ain al-Rammaneh.^[7] According to our information, the two suspects were delivered to GOL security officers at 2130Z on April 15. Prime Minister Solh officially announced the arrests at 2315Z.

A possible complication was the subsequent PLO statement that seven — not two — Phalangists were sought,^[8] although WAFA^[9] in an early morning release reportedly continued the line that the GOL continues to employ its good offices to contain the crisis. Somewhat more serious, in terms of efforts to enforce any ceasefire, was a reportedly Palestinian “rejection front”^[10] assertion that its forces would not accept reconciliation with the Phalange.

3.
A reliable U.S. correspondent has informed us that Arafat, who has allegedly arrived in Beirut, estimated that twenty-four hours will be required for the ceasefire to be effective. Although the situation on the Palestinian side remains unclear, we also have an unconfirmed report that Arafat has been favoring a ceasefire for the last thirty-six hours but has been opposed by Fatah notable Abu Iyad,^[11] whom Arafat left in charge of operations in Beirut when he returned to Damascus on April 14. If true, this internal conflict could account for both the delay in implementing the ceasefire and Arafat’s decision to resume charge locally.^[12]

4.
Details of the reported ceasefire plan remain fragmentary. We originally heard the truce was to occur at 1200Z April 15 but it obviously did not hold. We are now informed by several sources that it went into effect as of 1000Z April 15 (midnight April 15/16 locally) and that efforts are now underway to get word to isolated units on both sides. The main sticking point will be the ability of “moderate” leadership on both sides — Phalange and Palestinian — to enforce their policy on elements that may not wish to see a peaceful resolution of the crisis. We have several reports of lower-level Phalangists who doubt the possibility of settlement and are prepared to fight on. Likewise, there are grounds for questioning the ability and/or willingness of the Palestinians to control completely the “rejectionists,” who probably include among their allies a number of local Muslim and leftist elements.

5.
Firing and explosions persisted throughout the night and into this morning, affecting areas that have been the scene of the fiercest fighting since Sunday. Roving bands also entered the center of town and Ras Beirut to plant explosive charges (mainly plastique) in Abdel Aziz Street and at a building housing former President Chamoun’s offices on Verdun Street. We would place the total dead to date throughout Lebanon at between 100 and 120.^[13]

6.
During April 15, some efforts were made in various parts of the country to keep the strife from adopting a confessional [sectarian] character. The Maronite League, Higher Islamic Council, and National Organization (Muslim) met and reportedly agreed that a “misunderstanding between militias” must not be allowed to engage Muslim and Christian communities. A local “appeasement committee” was allegedly formed in Sidon under the leadership of Deputy Bizri^[14] to keep lines of communication and reconciliation open between Muslims and Christians.

7.
The Solh Cabinet has appeared thus far to have played little direct role in events or efforts to arrange the ceasefire, and the Prime Minister is becoming increasingly isolated even among his own ministerial colleagues.^[15] Some parliamentary deputies, including a number in the cabinet, attempted to hold a parliamentary session at 0800Z this morning, but were unable to obtain a quorum.

8.
Beirut airport is operating this morning at about 80 percent of normal, with one-third of its staff unable to reach the area. The airport has no fuel, but planes are refueling before or after Beirut and consequently flights are so far unaffected. AUB Hospital presently has food for eight days of operation.^[16]

9.
All American citizens [AMCITS] are safe. The USIS Regional Service Center in Sinn al Fil and the Kennedy Center are closed, as are most businesses throughout town.

GODLEY^[17]

Editorial Footnotes

[1]SITREP: Situation Report. A standardized diplomatic and military cable format providing a current assessment of conditions at a specific time. SITREP cables are filed at intervals during active crises to provide continuous situational awareness to Washington. The time designation "1000Z" refers to 10:00 AM Greenwich Mean Time, which was midnight local Beirut time on April 15/16, 1975.

[2]Mahmoud Riad (1917–1992): Egyptian diplomat who served as Secretary-General of the Arab League from 1972 to 1979. Riad’s direct involvement in the Beirut negotiations within 72 hours of the April 13 incidents reflects the Arab League’s immediate recognition of the crisis’s regional implications. His presence also indicates that Egypt—then the dominant force in Arab League affairs under Sadat’s government—considered rapid containment a priority.

[3]President Suleiman Frangieh (1910–1992), still hospitalized following gall bladder surgery on April 12—the day before the April 13 incidents. The cable notes he was handling contacts with Gemayel personally while convalescing, suggesting his political involvement did not require his physical presence in the executive offices.

[4]Henri Pharaon (1902–1993): Lebanese politician, businessman, and diplomat who served as Lebanon’s Foreign Minister 1944–1945 and as a long-standing figure in Lebanese elite politics and inter-communal mediation. His involvement reflects the traditional Lebanese mechanism of managing political crises through established community notables with cross-sectarian relationships.

[5]Imam Musa Sadr (1928–disappeared 1978): Iranian-born Lebanese Shia cleric who founded the Amal movement and gave the Lebanese Shia community unprecedented political visibility in the 1970s. Sadr was known as a cross-sectarian broker in Lebanese politics and had relationships across communal lines. His reported—though conflicted—involvement in the ceasefire mediation reflects his standing. Sadr disappeared during a visit to Libya in August 1978 under circumstances that remain unresolved.

[6]The cable’s use of quotation marks around “Progressive” mirrors standard Embassy practice when reproducing a political self-designation without endorsing it. The Lebanese National Movement (LNM)—the coalition of leftist, pan-Arab, and Nasserist parties allied with the PLO—used “progressive” as its preferred self-description. Riad’s meeting structure—with Palestinians and LNM parties but not with Gemayel directly—reflects the political asymmetry of the negotiations: one side was at the table; the other communicated through President Frangieh.

[7]The delivery of two suspects by the Kataeb to Lebanese government authorities represents a significant compliance with a state request. Gemayel’s decision to accede to Frangieh’s request—handing over Phalangists implicated in the April 13 bus attack—is documented in this cable at paragraph 2. The subsequent PLO demand for seven suspects is documented in the same paragraph. This documentary gap—between what was delivered and what was subsequently demanded—appears in this cable. It is not prominent in the standard historical account of the April 15–16 ceasefire negotiations.

[8]The PLO’s public statement that seven Phalangists were sought—after two had been delivered—is recorded in this cable without characterization. The cable does not attribute motive; it records the statement and its timing relative to the deliveries.

[9]WAFA: Wikalat Anba’a Filastiniyya (Palestine News Agency), the PLO’s official wire service, established in 1972. The cable references a WAFA release describing the Lebanese government as “employing its good offices”—official PLO public communication framing the Lebanese state’s role in containment-oriented terms, distinct from the simultaneous private demand for additional suspects.

[10]The “rejection front” referenced in this cable denotes Palestinian factions that rejected negotiated accommodation with the Kataeb under any terms. The cable identifies this as “somewhat more serious” than the seven-suspect demand in terms of ceasefire enforcement. The existence of elements within the Palestinian political constellation in Beirut that opposed any accommodation with the Kataeb—documented here in April 1975—would become more consequential as the conflict deepened.

[11]Abu Iyad: nom de guerre of Salah Khalaf (1933–1991), founding member of Fatah and head of its intelligence and security apparatus. The cable records—as unconfirmed—that Abu Iyad had opposed a ceasefire for 36 hours while serving as Arafat’s designated deputy in Beirut, and that this opposition may account for the delay in implementation. Abu Iyad was assassinated in Tunis in January 1991 by a gunman linked to the Abu Nidal Organization.

[12]This paragraph contains information that this cable characterizes as “unconfirmed”: that Arafat had favored a ceasefire for 36 hours before returning to Beirut, but was opposed during that period by Abu Iyad. The Embassy presents this as one possible explanation for the ceasefire delay. If accurate, it documents an internal command dispute within PLO leadership in Beirut—with Arafat on one side and his security chief on the other—during the critical 36-hour window when the ceasefire failed to materialize. This report appears in this cable. It does not appear in the standard historical account of the April 15–16 ceasefire negotiations.

[13]By the morning of April 16—three days after April 13—the U.S. Embassy estimated 100 to 120 dead throughout Lebanon. This figure contextualizes the speed of escalation from the initial incidents of April 13 to a country-wide armed conflict requiring Arab League mediation within 72 hours.

[14]Deputy Bizri: likely a reference to a member of the Lebanese parliament from the Sidon area. The formation of a local “appeasement committee” in Sidon—documented here—represents civil society and political efforts from within Lebanon, across communal lines, to prevent the Beirut violence from triggering sectarian conflict in other cities.

[15]The cable’s assessment that Prime Minister Rashid Solh is “becoming increasingly isolated even among his own ministerial colleagues” and that the cabinet has played “little direct role” in ceasefire efforts documents the functional collapse of Lebanese government authority in the crisis’s first 72 hours. The state’s role was mediated by community notables and the Arab League rather than by its own executive institutions.

[16]The Embassy’s specific notation that AUB (American University of Beirut) Hospital had food stocks for eight days indicates it was tracking civilian institutional capacity as a crisis indicator—the kind of granular situational data that SITREP cables provide.

[17]G. McMurtrie Godley (1917–1999), U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon 1974–1976. This is the second major cable filed by Godley in the April 13 crisis, following 1975BEIRUT04749 (filed April 14). Both were dispatched at the IMMEDIATE level, indicating continuous high-priority reporting throughout the crisis. The consistency of Godley’s assessment—cautiously optimistic about the ceasefire while noting its fragility—is characteristic of his reporting style throughout this period.

CONFIDENTIAL

How to Cite

Annotated version:
Institute for Lebanon, “Beirut Situation Report — 1000Z” (1975BEIRUT04860), April 16, 1975. instituteforlebanon.com/cables/1975BEIRUT04860/

Original cable:
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, “Beirut Situation Report — 1000Z” (1975BEIRUT04860), April 16, 1975. Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD).