The morning of April 13, 1975

Pierre Gemayel — the founder of Lebanon’s largest Christian militia party, the Kataeb — and Camille Chamoun, a former president of Lebanon, attended mass that Sunday morning at a church in Ain el-Rummaneh, a Christian suburb of southeast Beirut. Members of Gemayel’s party militia and Lebanese government police were stationed in the area. It was, in effect, a gathering of the Maronite Christian political establishment.

8:00 AM — The first incident

A Volkswagen driven by a Palestinian — the U.S. Embassy’s cable notes he was reportedly affiliated with one of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations operating in Lebanon — approached the street where the church stood. A policeman stopped him and told him not to drive that route. An argument followed. Some witnesses told the Embassy that the driver threatened the policeman and was disarmed. Then he drove away.

This incident does not appear in most historical accounts of April 13, 1975.

9:30 AM — The attack that history omits

About ninety minutes later, a second car arrived. Inside were four armed Palestinians. They opened fire on bystanders near the church, killing three members of the Kataeb party’s militia, and drove away at speed.

Three Christian fighters were now dead. This attack — documented by the U.S. Embassy in this cable, filed within twenty hours of the events — is absent from virtually every Western journalistic and scholarly account of April 13.

11:00 AM — The bus

About ninety minutes after that, a bus carrying Palestinian passengers entered Ain el-Rummaneh. The passengers were traveling from the Shatila refugee camp in southwest Beirut to the Tel Zaartar refugee camp in the northeast — a route that, on this particular Sunday morning, took them through a neighborhood where Palestinian gunmen had just killed three men ninety minutes earlier.

The U.S. Embassy specifically noted in this cable that the bus’s presence “may have been accidental” — that the passengers may not have known they were driving through a violent situation. But the Kataeb opened fire. Twenty-six people aboard were killed.

This is the event that almost every account of April 13, 1975 treats as the sole incident of the day, and as the unprovoked act that started the Lebanese Civil War.

Destruction of Tel al-Zaatar Palestinian refugee camp, Beirut, 1976
Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp, northeast Beirut, 1976 — the bus’s destination on April 13, 1975. Sixteen months after the events described in this cable, the camp was besieged by Maronite militias and overrun on August 12, 1976. Estimates of those killed range from 1,500 to 2,000. Jean-Jacques Kurz / ICRC Archives (AV-Archives-V-P-LB-D-00003-18), 1976. Public domain.

That evening — the rockets

As news of the bus attack spread through Beirut, fighting broke out across multiple neighborhoods simultaneously. And that evening — the same day — Palestinian armed forces fired approximately fifteen rockets from the Borj al Barajneh refugee camp into Haret Hreik, a largely Christian suburb of Beirut. The apparent target was the local Kataeb party office situated in the residential neighborhood. A store belonging to a Kataeb political figure was blown up. A factory near the original church site was on fire.

This Palestinian military action against a civilian area on the evening of April 13 is absent from virtually all Western accounts of the day.

The night of April 13 — a city fractures

By nightfall, gunfire was reported across a dozen neighborhoods. Barricades went up. Two men opened fire on a Kataeb office near Beirut’s commercial center and were killed by guards. Fighting spread to within blocks of the Holiday Inn hotel in downtown Beirut — a building that would itself become a military fortress within months.

The Lebanese Army, the cable notes, appeared to be standing down. An unconfirmed report reaching the Embassy stated that Army units near the fighting had been ordered not to intervene.

The political offensive

Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was based in Beirut and moved quickly. He and other Palestinian leaders spent the night lobbying Arab governments — directly and through their ambassadors in Beirut — to pressure the Lebanese government to punish what they called Kataeb “culprits.”

The cable places that word in quotation marks. The Embassy was recording the PLO’s narrative without endorsing it — in a document that had, two paragraphs earlier, recorded the Palestinian attacks that preceded the bus massacre.

Kamal Jumblatt, the Druze leader who commanded the coalition of Lebanese leftist parties allied with the PLO, moved simultaneously on the domestic front: he called for the removal of the Kataeb’s ministers from the Lebanese cabinet.

The ambassador’s verdict

G. McMurtrie Godley, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon
G. McMurtrie Godley, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, 1974–1976. He had previously overseen CIA operations in the Congo and Laos. U.S. Department of State. Public domain.

Ambassador Godley’s cable, dispatched at the highest urgency level before noon on April 14, closes with a sentence of striking pessimism:

“To this moment, the elements of a ‘Lebanese solution’ to the crisis are not apparent.”

Lebanon had always managed its crises through negotiation among its community leaders — a system of managed compromise that kept the country’s contradictions contained. Godley was signaling, within hours of the first shots, that this system had broken down.

He was right. The war lasted fifteen years.