Cable 1974BEIRUT11970 · October 2, 1974 · SECRET

Beirut, October 2, 1974

Muddle Through Until 1976: The Embassy's October 1974 Lebanon Post-Mortem

Filed October 2, 1974, SECRET. Ambassador Godley's 15-month evaluation of the Solh government and his outlook for Lebanon. The country would 'muddle through' until the 1976 elections, the Embassy predicted. Six months later the civil war began.

Based on cable 1974BEIRUT11970 SECRET → UNCLASSIFIED

The morning after the Solh cabinet collapsed, Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley filed a long SECRET assessment of the 15-month Solh government and his outlook for what would follow. Solh's major accomplishment, the cable said, was to survive — by avoiding every difficult decision and bringing administrative action to a near-standstill. The cable catalogs what Solh's passivity enabled: PLO arms imports from Syria (including SA-7 missiles) with no corresponding improvement in the Lebanese Army; rising lawlessness and Iraqi-Libyan hired assassins operating in Beirut; Christian militias arming after the Turkish partition of Cyprus; the emergence of Musa as-Sadr as the political voice of Shia grievance; economic growth concentrated entirely in Beirut real estate while the south was ignored; only 11.8 percent of state revenue coming from income tax, because no one dared enforce tax laws on the well-to-do. The Embassy's prediction: Lebanon would muddle through until the 1976 elections because no force in the country saw advantage in destroying a system whose fragility was known to all. The prediction was wrong. Civil war broke out six months later, in April 1975.

What this document reveals

The Solh government's major accomplishment was to survive by avoiding difficult decisions for 15 months, bringing Lebanese governance to “almost total inaction” in the final eight months.
President Frangieh, originally reputed as a tough law-and-order leader, had degenerated into a Zghorta-focused clan politician, using GOL police and administrative apparatus to harass adversaries — including foreign businessmen.
The fedayeen “state within a state” had imported SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles from Syria, specifically designed to degrade Lebanese Air Force operations — while parliamentary inertia prevented strengthening the Lebanese Army.
Nearly 350,000 Palestinians in Lebanon — roughly 12-13% of the population — were seen by most Lebanese (including many Muslims) as a threat to the multi-confessional balance and Lebanon's continued existence as a state.
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 had accelerated Christian militia armament in Lebanon — the Maronite conclusion from Cyprus was that demographic Muslim pressure, if unopposed militarily, could produce partition.
Iraq and Libya were running hired assassins and bullies inside Lebanon, alongside press incitement and street agitation — an integrated destabilization campaign confirming the Embassy's May 1974 forecast.
Imam Musa as-Sadr, backed by Syrian weapons and money and supported financially by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, had emerged in 1974 as a rising Shia political force directly challenging the feudal Assad leadership.
Only 11.8 percent of GOL revenue came from income tax. No one in the Lebanese political class dared enforce tax laws on the well-to-do — documenting the self-exempting fiscal character of the pre-war Lebanese elite.
The Embassy's core thesis: “no political element really wants a strong, ergo effective government” — Lebanese political weakness was not failure but design, because each fragment was better off under a weak state than a strong one.
The Embassy's prediction: Lebanon would “muddle through until 1976”. The civil war broke out in April 1975.

Chronology

What happened, in sequence

Jun 21, 1973

Solh takes office

Takieddine Solh forms his cabinet — the post-May 1973 stabilization government meant to bind up inter-confessional and Lebanese-Palestinian wounds.

Jan 25, 1974

A-11 Embassy assessment

Embassy Beirut airgram A-11 assesses Solh government's achievements as decidedly meager. This October 1974 cable is an update to that earlier analysis.

Mar 1974

Sadr's Movement of the Deprived

Imam Musa as-Sadr launches the Movement of the Deprived (Harakat al-Mahrumin) at a Baalbek rally — the political vehicle that would become Amal.

May 31, 1974

Syrian-Israeli disengagement

Golan disengagement agreement brokered by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy.

Jul 3–4, 1974

Arab Defense Council meeting

Kuwait proposes LL 50 million each for PLO and GOL; Lebanese delegation rejects (cable 1974BEIRUT07889).

Jul 20, 1974

Turkish invasion of Cyprus

Operation Atilla partitions Cyprus along ethno-religious lines. Accelerates Christian militia arming in Lebanon.

Sep 1974

Solh cabinet collapses

The Solh government finally falls after 15 months in office.

Oct 2, 1974

This cable

Ambassador Godley files this SECRET three-section assessment of the Solh years and Lebanon's outlook.

Apr 13, 1975

Civil war begins

The Ain el-Rummaneh bus attack triggers open militia conflict. The Embassy's October 1974 prediction of “muddle through until 1976” is falsified six months after being filed.

Key figures

Who was involved

Takieddine Solh

Prime Minister of Lebanon, June 1973 – September 1974

A Sunni Muslim politician from one of Lebanon's prominent Sunni families, Solh formed his government in the aftermath of the May 1973 Lebanese Army-fedayeen clash. The Embassy's October 1974 verdict: his major accomplishment was to survive by avoiding every difficult decision. Solh's diplomatic achievement at the July 1974 Arab Defense Council — documented in cable 1974BEIRUT07889 — was exceptional against the backdrop of his general cabinet passivity. His government collapsed September 1974. He would return briefly as PM in 1980.

Suleiman Frangieh

President of Lebanon, 1970–1976

A Maronite Christian clan leader from Zghorta in northern Lebanon, elected in 1970 on a reputation for toughness. This cable documents the Embassy's October 1974 assessment that Frangieh's reputation had collapsed: he was preoccupied with petty Zghorta family politics and was using the state's police apparatus to harass his adversaries. Six months after this cable, Lebanon was at war. Frangieh served out his term; his Marada Movement would be one of the armed factions of the civil war.

Musa as-Sadr

Iranian-Lebanese Shia cleric; founder of the Movement of the Deprived (1974)

The cable identifies Sadr in October 1974 as a rising force who would “certainly make a bid to supplant the existing feudal Shiite political leadership.” Six months earlier, at a Baalbek rally, he had launched the Movement of the Deprived; three months after this cable, Amal would be formally founded as its armed wing. Sadr disappeared in Libya in August 1978, presumed murdered. The October 1974 cable’s assessment of his significance was prescient: by the late 1970s, Amal was the dominant Shia political force in Lebanon.

Kamal Jumblatt

Druze leader; founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (1949)

The cable identifies Jumblatt in October 1974 as the only Lebanese political figure with a coherent programmatic alternative to the existing system — the “socialist” exception among Lebanese politicians with no reform program. Jumblatt would lead the Lebanese National Movement through the civil war's first phase and be assassinated in March 1977, widely attributed to Syrian agents.

G. McMurtrie Godley

U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, 1974-1976

Godley had arrived in Beirut in late June 1974. This October 2 cable — his third major policy assessment in his first months on the ground — represents his considered view after 100 days in post. His “muddle through until 1976” prediction would become famous as an example of how even careful diplomatic analysis can miss catastrophic discontinuities. Godley would serve as Ambassador during the first 18 months of the civil war before being recalled in late 1976.

The Record

A post-mortem for a government that did nothing

On the morning of October 2, 1974, the day after the Solh cabinet’s final collapse, Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley filed a 17,000-character SECRET cable evaluating the 15-month Solh government and predicting what would come next. Godley had been in post just over three months. His cable was a considered, structurally organized document transmitted in three sections, tagged PINT (Political/Internal), PINS (Political/Internal Security), LE (Lebanon), and XF (Arab Affairs).

The verdict on Solh’s government was simple: its “major accomplishment was to survive while avoiding or postponing difficult decisions as long as possible.” Over the cabinet’s final eight months, the Embassy observed, this strategy had hardened into “almost total inaction.” No legislative action, no executive decree, no administrative fiat had produced a positive achievement since the beginning of 1974. The one minor exception — a bill increasing ministerial and parliamentary pensions — was not reassuring.

What passivity enabled

The more serious analytical work of the cable was not in cataloging Solh’s non-achievements but in tracing what that passivity had enabled to happen.

The fedayeen “state within a state” had continuously strengthened, importing arms from Syria clandestinely — including, the cable specifically records, SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles designed to hamper Lebanese Air Force operations. The Lebanese Army, by contrast, had not been materially strengthened despite the LL 2.2 billion five-year defense program that Defense Minister Maalouf had announced at the July 1974 Arab Defense Council meeting documented in cable 1974BEIRUT07889. Parliamentary inertia — one of the four structural factors the cable would later identify — had prevented the Army’s build-up. The asymmetry was expanding: the non-state armed presence was accumulating anti-aircraft capability; the state was not accumulating offensive capability to match.

The Cyprus effect

The July 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus — Operation Atilla, which partitioned the island along ethno-religious lines — had a direct Lebanese demonstration effect the cable documents specifically. Maronite Christian assessment of the Cyprus partition was that demographic Muslim pressure, if unopposed militarily, could produce territorial division of a small Mediterranean confessionally-divided state. Christian militia groups were enlarging and arming — “albeit light,” the cable notes, reflecting the October 1974 state of the process. Three months after Cyprus, the Lebanese Christian militia preparation that would feed directly into 1975-76 civil war armament had already begun.

Iraqi and Libyan destabilization

Foreign state actors were operating inside Lebanon with hired violence. The cable names Iraq and Libya specifically and catalogs their methods: press incitement, propaganda wars, street agitation, and “hired assassins or bullies” targeting their real or imagined opponents inside Lebanon. Cable 1974BEIRUT05740, five months earlier, had forecast precisely this dynamic: radical Arab states would work to destabilize moderate Arab actors to derail the post-October 1973 Middle East settlement architecture. The October 1974 cable documents the forecast coming true.

Musa as-Sadr

The most prescient single passage of the cable is its October 1974 assessment of the rising Shia Imam Musa as-Sadr. Sadr had launched the Movement of the Deprived (Harakat al-Mahrumin) at a Baalbek rally just seven months before the cable was filed, in March 1974. The Embassy’s assessment in October: Sadr had “turned long-ignored Shi’a grievances into a political force to be reckoned with,” was “being wooed assiduously by all non-Sunni elements,” and would “certainly make a bid to supplant” the feudal Shia leadership of Parliamentary Speaker Kamel al-Assad. The cable is specific about his financial backing: Syrian weapons, money and influence, supplemented by Saudi and Gulf support.

Within three months of this cable, the armed wing of Sadr’s movement — Amal — would be formally founded. Within five years, Amal would be the dominant Shia political-military force in southern Lebanon. Within a decade, Hezbollah would emerge as a more radical Shia successor. The October 1974 cable’s identification of Sadr as the figure to watch, three months after his public debut, is among the most analytically acute predictions in the Embassy’s 1970s Lebanon reporting.

The fiscal state

One statistic in the cable is particularly revealing about the structural character of the pre-war Lebanese state. Only 11.8 percent of GOL revenue, the cable reports, came from income tax — and no one in the political class dared to enforce existing tax laws on the well-to-do. A state that cannot tax its wealthy, where the political class includes the wealthy, is a state whose elite has effectively self-exempted from the fiscal foundation of the state’s capacity to act. The Embassy’s observation captures a structural feature of Lebanese political economy that persists into the 21st century.

The Embassy’s thesis

The cable’s core analytical claim is in its 11th and 12th paragraphs: “No political element really wants a strong, ergo effective government.” The Embassy’s reasoning was that Lebanese political fragmentation made every organized group better off under a weak state than a strong one. A weak state could not impose programs that disadvantaged any group. A strong state would have to choose — and choosing would break the equilibrium. The weakness of Lebanese governance, on this reading, was not failure but design.

From this analysis flowed the cable’s prediction: Lebanon would “muddle through” at least until the 1976 presidential election, because all major forces recognized that the existing structure was fragile and therefore had incentives to preserve it rather than destroy it. “Checks and balances which have traditionally characterized Lebanon’s peculiar ‘house-of-cards’ structure,” the cable concluded, “are so delicate that most Lebanese realize any attempt to tinker with part of that structure would bring the whole system tumbling down.”

The prediction and its failure

The prediction was wrong. Civil war broke out on April 13, 1975 — six months after this cable was filed. The presidential election did happen in 1976, but in May of that year, 13 months after civil war had begun, and Elias Sarkis took office from Frangieh in September 1976 in a country that had been at war since the previous April.

Why did the prediction fail? The cable’s reasoning was structurally sound as a theory of stability under normal conditions. But it underestimated three specific factors it had itself documented:

First, the armed asymmetry. The fedayeen state-within-a-state, acquiring SA-7 missiles and expanding camp fortifications while the Lebanese Army stagnated, was not equilibrium-preserving. It was equilibrium-destabilizing. A non-state actor with growing military capability is a force that can be activated by external triggers, and in April 1975 it was.

Second, the Christian militia arming that Cyprus had triggered. The October 1974 “albeit light” Christian militia arming was a preparation phase. Six months later, Christian militia armament was heavier, more organized, and the Ain el-Rummaneh Phalangist checkpoint that fired on the April 13 Palestinian bus was a direct product of that preparation phase.

Third, the foreign destabilization. Iraqi and Libyan hired assassins and propaganda operations, and the broader radical Arab state work against the post-October 1973 diplomatic architecture, were continuing externalities that the cable treated as manageable but that in practice contributed material energy to Lebanese breakdown.

The Embassy’s core thesis — that Lebanese political actors preferred weak government and therefore would not destroy the system — was correct. But weak government was also unable to prevent the armed state-within-a-state, foreign destabilization, and militia arming that did destroy the system. The fragility the cable documented was correctly identified. The direction the fragility was tending was wrongly estimated.

Jonathan Randal’s disagreement

One specific detail of the cable is its acknowledgment that Washington Post correspondent Jonathan Randal’s reporting gave an “essentially accurate description” of Lebanese conditions — but that the Embassy disagreed with the conclusion. Randal saw the fragility and expected breakdown. The Embassy saw the fragility and expected muddle-through. Six months later, Randal was right.

The cable closes with the sentence that captures its central analytical claim: “Its structure is fragile, but realization of that fragility by most Lebanese will enable Lebanon to muddle through for some time to come.” That sentence, written in October 1974, appeared six months later to be the most inaccurate single prediction in the 1970s Embassy Beirut record. The political class’s realization of fragility, in the end, did not enable muddling through. It accelerated the breakdown as each group attempted to pre-position itself for the breakdown it now believed was coming.

Key Locations

●

Beirut — Site of the Embassy and the collapsing Solh government

●

Zghorta — President Frangieh's northern Lebanon hometown and clan base

●

Baalbek — Site of Musa as-Sadr's March 1974 Movement of the Deprived launch rally

○

AUB — American University of Beirut — center of spring 1974 student unrest

○

Cyprus — Site of the July 1974 Turkish partition that accelerated Christian militia arming

○

Damascus — Source of SA-7 missiles and other arms flowing clandestinely to fedayeen in Lebanon

Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors · View in OpenStreetMap

Primary Source

This article is based entirely on U.S. Embassy Beirut cable 1974BEIRUT11970, dispatched on October 2, 1974 and originally classified SECRET. Declassified and released by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order Systematic Review, July 5, 2006. No facts have been added, removed, or altered.

View original on Wikileaks PlusD →

Topics

1974 pre-war SECRET Solh government Frangieh Musa as-Sadr Amal Cyprus SA-7 fedayeen Christian militias Jumblatt Randal

SECRET

Origin	U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
To	Secretary of State, Washington D.C.
Date	October 2, 1974
Cable ID	1974BEIRUT11970
Classification	SECRET → Declassified 2006

Situation in Lebanon

Annotated version — all original facts and language preserved in full

SECRET
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11970 01 OF 03 021800Z 53

ACTION NEA-16
INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03
     NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15
     SAM-01 AID-20 OMB-01 EB-12 CIEP-03 TRSE-00 STR-08 CEA-02
     ACDA-19 ORM-03 SR-02 MC-02 SCCT-02 CU-05 NIC-01 DRC-01
     /213 W

--------------------- 103623
R 021645Z OCT 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 594
   DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
     AMEMBASSY CAIRO
     AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
     AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
     AMEMBASSY JIDDA
     AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
     AMEMBASSY LONDON
     AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
     AMEMBASSY PARIS
     AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
     AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
     USCINCEUR
     USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
     USINT BAGHDAD

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BEIRUT 11970

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PINS, XF, LE
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN LEBANON

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH LEBANON IS IN SORRY STATE BY AMERICAN STANDARDS, A NEW
GOVERNMENT WILL CHANGE LITTLE AND COUNTRY WILL PROBABLY MUDDLE THROUGH
AT LEAST UNTIL 1976. END SUMMARY.

1. DEMISE OF TAKIEDDINE SOLH GOVERNMENT PROMPTS US TO SUBMIT FOLLOWING
EVALUATION OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS OVER PAST 15 MONTHS, ALONG WITH ASSESSMENT
OF CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON AND PROBLEMS IT CAN BE EXPECTED TO POSE
FOR ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT. FULLER ANALYSIS WILL FOLLOW BY AIRGRAM.

2. RECORD OF SOLH GOVERNMENT: IN OUR LAST DETAILED REPORT ON SITUATION
IN LEBANON (A-11 OF JAN 25), WE LISTED SOLH GOVERNMENT'S ACHIEVEMENTS AS
DECIDELY MEAGER IN MOST ASPECTS OF LEBANON'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
ITS MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT WAS TO SURVIVE WHILE AVOIDING OR POSTPONING
DIFFICULT DECISIONS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. OVER PAST EIGHT MONTHS OF ITS
LIFE, IT CARRIED THIS APPROACH TO POINT OF ALMOST TOTAL INACTION.
THIS PASSIVITY, COUPLED WITH MODEST AMOUNT OF GOOD LUCK, ENABLED SOLH
GOVERNMENT TO WITHSTAND THREATS OF DIRECT/OVERT ARAB ASSISTANCE TO
FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON, BUT IT ALSO RULED OUT ANY EFFECTIVE PROGRESS IN
BRINGING FEDAYEEN PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON UNDER GREATER GOL
CONTROL. INTERNALLY, WITH EXCEPTION OF PASSAGE OF BILL INCREASING PENSIONS
FOR MINISTERS AND DEPUTIES, AND A SLIGHT BUT HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL LURCH
IN DIRECTION OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM (OUR A-39 OF MAR 4), SOLH GOVERNMENT
CAN JUSTLY CLAIM TO HAVE MADE NO POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS — WHETHER BY
LEGISLATIVE ACTION, EXECUTIVE DECREE, OR ADMINISTRATIVE FIAT — SINCE
BEGINNING OF 1974. IN SHORT, IT MANAGED TO MAKE ITS ALREADY NOTORIOUS
REPUTATION FOR "DO-NOTHINGNESS" EVEN MORE DESERVED THAN BEFORE.

3. PRES. FRANGIE'S ORIGINAL REPUTATION AS TOUGH, NO-NONSENSE
DECISION-MAKER AND ADVOCATE OF LAW AND ORDER SUFFERED BADLY DURING LIFE
OF SOLH CABINET. HIS RELUCTANCE USE HIS POTENTIAL POWER TO OVERCOME
PARLIAMENTARY AND CABINET INERTIA IN MAKING CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS
BECAME INCREASINGLY PRONOUNCED, AND HE SHOWED HIMSELF MORE AND MORE
PREOCCUPIED WITH PETTY FAMILY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN HIS ZGHORTAN
HOMETOWN THAN WITH NATIONAL AFFAIRS. RESULT HAS BEEN SWELLING UPSURGE IN
PUBLIC CRITICISM DIRECTED AT FRANGIE'S PERSON AND FAMILY, WHICH CAUSED
HIM PERIODICALLY TO HIT BACK AT HIS DETRACTORS IN VARIETY OF WAYS —
INCLUDING USE OF GOL ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLICE APPARATUS TO HARRASS AND
INTIMIDATE HIS ADVERSARIES (AND, IN SO DOING, ALSO FOREIGN BUSINESSMEN).

4. FIFTEEN MONTHS OF GOVERNMENTAL INERTIA AND CONTINUING PARLIAMENTARY
SOMNOLENCE HAVE NOT FAILED TO EXACERBATE LEBANON'S INCREASINGLY ACUTE
ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING GREATLY TO
PUBLIC UNCERTAINTY AND UNREST OVER DIRECTION IN WHICH COUNTRY APPEARS TO
BE HEADING. WHILE BEIRUT CONTINUES TO BE BOOM-TOWN WITH LAND VALUES
SKYROCKETING AND MODERN BUILDINGS GOING UP LIKE MUSHROOMS, LEBANON'S
BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (E.G., INFLATION, POLLUTION, INCREASED COST OF
LIVING, PRESSING DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS IN SOUTH AND ELSEWHERE, ETC.) ARE
STILL NOT BEING FACED, AND ITS MYRIAD SOCIAL PROBLEMS (E.G., LACK OF
ADEQUATE SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HOUSING) ARE BEING IGNORED ALMOST IN
TOTO. WHILE WE HEAR MORE AND MORE TALK RE RICH GETTING RICHER AND POOR
GETTING NO RELIEF, NOTHING IS BEING DONE TO CHANGE THIS OR TO COMBAT
EVER-INCREASING VENALITY THAT PREVAILS (ESPECIALLY AT HIGHEST LEVELS IN
THE CAPITAL). REPORTS OF MAJOR SCANDALS (E.G., IN TOBACCO AUTHORITY AND
BEIRUT PORT AND MUNICIPALITY) INVOLVING TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
ALTHOUGH NOT UNCOMMON IN LEBANON, HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO EROSION OF
CONFIDENCE IN COUNTRY'S HITHERTO SACROSANCT FINANCIAL-ECONOMIC
"ESTABLISHMENT". IN ADDITION, ONLY 11.8 PERCENT OF GOL REVENUE COMES FROM
INCOME TAX, BUT NO ONE APPARENTLY DARES — LEAST OF ALL THE GOL — TO
ENFORCE OBSERVANCE OF EXISTING TAX LAWS BY WELL-TO-DO AND USE THAT
REVENUE TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS GENERALLY.

5. ANOTHER AREA WHICH HAS LATELY POINTED UP GOL'S INCAPACITY TO GOVERN IS
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTOR. RELATIONS BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN REMAIN MUCH
AS THEY WERE AT BEGINNING OF 1974, WITH BOTH SIDES REMAINING WARY OF
EACH OTHER BUT WITH THEIR RESPONSIBLE LEADERS STILL ANXIOUS TO AVOID A
REPETITION (OR WORSE) OF CONFRONTATION WHICH OCCURRED IN MAY 1973. AT
SAME TIME, HOWEVER, FEDAYEEN "STATE WITHIN A STATE" HAS CONTINUOUSLY
IMPROVED ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY VIS-A-VIS LEBANESE ARMY WITH CONSTANT
CLANDESTINE IMPORTATION OF ARMS FROM SYRIA (INCLUDING SA-7 MISSILES TO
HAMPER LAF AIR ATTACKS), CONSTRUCTION OF NEW BUNKERS AND OTHER DEFENSIVE
WORKS WITHIN REFUGEE CAMPS. ALTHOUGH EFFORTS HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE BY GOL
TO INCREASE LEBANESE ARMY'S STRENGTH OVER PAST 15 MONTHS, NO SIGNIFICANT
PROGRESS HAS BEEN REALIZED SO FAR DUE TO PARLIAMENTARY INERTIA. IN ANY
EVENT, MINDFUL OF ITS PROVEN INABILITY TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN SUCCESSFULLY,
GOL LEADERSHIP REMAINS UNWILLING RISK INCURRING HEAVY HUMAN AND ECONOMIC
LOSSES AND PLACING SEVERE INTERNAL STRAINS ON LEBANESE BODY POLITIC THAT
A RENEWED CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY ENTAIL. (IN
MEANTIME, MOST LEBANESE CONTINUE TO VIEW PALESTINIAN PROBLEM AS THE MAJOR
THREAT TO LEBANON'S FUTURE SECURITY. WHILE SOME ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC
THAT EXTERNAL FORCES MAY PRODUCE SOME KIND OF SOLUTION, MOST QUESTION HOW
THIS WOULD AFFECT PALESTINIANS RESIDING IN LEBANON AND HOW LATTER COULD
BE INDUCED RETURN TO WHATEVER FORM OF PALESTINIAN "ENTITY" MIGHT EMERGE
FROM CURRENT ME SETTLEMENT EFFORT. WHILE MOST CONCERN IS CENTERED IN
CHRISTIAN QUARTERS, EVEN MANY MOSLEMS ARE PESSIMISTIC, FOR THEY SEE
CONTINUED PRESENCE OF NEARLY 350,000 PALESTINIANS IN THIS COUNTRY AS
THREAT TO MULTI-CONFESSIONAL BALANCE AND CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF LEBANON
AS THEY KNOW IT.)

6. TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, GOL'S APATHY AND/OR HELPLESSNESS — ACCOMPANIED
BY UNPRECEDENTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC MALAISE MENTIONED ABOVE, PLUS STUDENT
UNREST AND LABOR AGITATION (SEE BELOW) — HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RISING TIDE
OF OUTRIGHT LAWLESSNESS. PUBLIC THUGGERY — INCLUDING SHOOTINGS, KIDNAPPINGS,
MUGGINGS, ROADBLOCKS, AND INTIMIDATIONS CARRIED OUT BY VARIETY OF SCOFFLAW
"ARMED ELEMENTS" (NOT ALL OF THEM PALESTINIANS, BY ANY MEANS) — HAS
REACHED PROPORTIONS UNACCEPTABLE EVEN TO EASY-GOING LEBANESE. THERE HAS
ALSO BEEN MARKED INCREASE IN EFFORTS BY VARIOUS FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
(PARTICULARLY IRAQ AND LIBYA) TO FOMENT ALL SORTS OF DOMESTIC TURMOIL
THROUGH PRESS INCITEMENT, PROPAGANDA WARS, STREET AGITATION, AND USE OF
HIRED ASSASSINS OR BULLIES TO COMBAT THEIR REAL OR IMAGINED OPPONENTS
HERE. AT SAME TIME, INCIDENCE OF LETHAL FEUDS AND BRAWLS AMONG
CONFESSIONAL, FAMILY AND TRIBAL "MILITIA" GROUPS HAS RISEN. (CHRISTIAN
CONCERN, IN PARTICULAR, OVER MOSLEM "THREAT" IN AFTERMATH OF EVENTS IN
CYPRUS HAS LENT IMPETUS TO ENLARGING CHRISTIAN "MILITIA" GROUPS AND
INCREASES IN THEIR ARMAMENTS, ALBEIT LIGHT.) TENDENCY OF MANY LEBANESE TO
RESORT TO INDISCRIMINATE USE OF FIREARMS TO MARK PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
CELEBRATIONS HAS ALSO INCREASED AT GALLOPING PACE, TO POINT WHERE SOLH
GOVERNMENT'S PRONOUNCEMENTS RE ENSURING CIVIL ORDER WERE BEING GREETED
WITH OPEN RIDICULE. THIS FACTOR APPEARS TO HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN
FORMING GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SOLH GOVERNMENT HAD OUTLIVED ANY
USEFULNESS IT MIGHT ONCE HAVE ENJOYED IN BINDING UP INTER-CONFESSIONAL
AND LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN WOUNDS INFLICTED DURING TRAUMATIC DISTURBANCES
OF MAY-JUNE 1973.

7. IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SOLH GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TRADITIONAL
LEBANESE POLICY OF DOING NOTHING TO JEOPARDIZE ITS IMAGE AS AN ARAB STATE
IN GOOD STANDING. SOME FURTHER IMPROVEMENT WAS MADE IN RELATIONS WITH
SYRIA OVER PAST EIGHT MONTHS, BUT FONOFF DECISION-MAKING HAS BEEN REDUCED
TO LOWEST-COMMON DENOMINATOR IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT GOL AVOIDED "TROUBLE"
AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. (WHILE SOLH CABINET THUS ABDICATED ANY MORE FORCEFUL
ROLE IT MIGHT HAVE PLAYED IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS, GOL HAS IN PRIVATE HEARTILY
ENDORSED SECRETARY KISSINGER'S EFFORTS AIMED AT ME SETTLEMENT.) WHILE
SOLH AND HIS JUNKETING FOREIGN MINISTER CONTINUED THEIR PEREGRINATIONS
THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD AND ELSEWHERE, FONOFF HANDLED ONLY MOST ROUTINE
MATTERS AND ACCURATELY REFLECTED GOVERNMENT'S DO-NOTHING POSITION. IT
EVEN PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO SELECT A NEW FONOFF SECRETARY GENERAL. ALTHOUGH
CURRENT LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO BONN TOLD US HE HAD BEEN OFFERED AND
ACCEPTED SECGEN POSITION, IT NOW APPEARS THAT ACTING SECGEN FATTAL WILL
CONTINUE EXERCISING INTERIM FUNCTIONS.

8. ON LABOR SCENE, CONFEDERATION OF LEBANESE LABOR (CLL), WHICH HAD WRUNG
FAR MORE MATERIAL CONCESSIONS FROM SOLH GOVERNMENT THAN FROM ANY PREVIOUS
GOVERNMENT, STOOD BY PASSIVELY WHILE SOLH CABINET UNRAVELLED AND FINALLY
COLLAPSED. HOWEVER, THERE ARE DEFINITE SIGNS THAT WITH UNFULFILLED POPULAR
EXPECTATIONS RISING AND LEFTIST ACTIVITY FLOURISHING, LABOR DEMANDS WILL
BE FACTOR ATTRACTING INCREASED ATTENTION IN MONTHS TO COME. INTERESTINGLY
ENOUGH, LABOR IS THE ONE ELEMENT ON LEBANESE SCENE NOT BASED ON
CONFESSIONAL LINES, AND IT COULD WELL BECOME SPRINGBOARD FROM WHICH
FUTURE LEADERS WILL EMERGE TO REFORM (OR DESTROY) LEBANON'S TRADITIONAL
SOCIAL-POLITICAL STRUCTURE. IN ANY EVENT, CLL CAN BE EXPECTED TO AGITATE
FIERCELY FOR FURTHER ECONOMIC AND EVEN POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM GOL IN
MONTHS AHEAD.

9. SOLH GOVERNMENT WAS FACED LAST SPRING WITH CONSIDERABLE STUDENT UNREST
CENTERED PRINCIPALLY AT AUB, BUT WITH RAMIFICATIONS THROUGHOUT ENTIRE
LOCAL UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY. ALTHOUGH THERE IS REASON TO HOPE THAT FURTHER
SERIOUS STUDENT STRIKES OR DISORDERS CAN BE AVOIDED THIS FALL, POSSIBILITY
THAT THEY MAY RECUR IS GIVING GREAT CONCERN TO MOST ELEMENTS OF LEBANESE
"ESTABLISHMENT". BASIC CAUSES WOULD APPEAR REFLECT GENERAL STUDENT
RESTLESSNESS THAT WE HAVE WITNESSED WORLD-WIDE. THEY ARE AGGRAVATED IN
LEBANON, HOWEVER, BY STUDENT GRIEVANCES AGAINST DO-NOTHING GOVERNMENT,
BY ORGANIZED (AND FREQUENTLY SUBSIDIZED) PALESTINIAN AGITATION, AND BY
THEIR FEELING OF BEING LOST IN A LEADERLESS SOCIETY. MAJORITY OF LEBANESE
YOUTH IS ANTAGONISTIC TO TRADITIONAL LEBANESE SOCIO-CONFESSIONAL STRUCTURE
AND IS SEEKING NEW OUTLETS FOR THEIR ENERGIES. MANY REJECT SOCIAL
RESTRAINTS DEEMED ESSENTIAL BY OLDER GENERATIONS. MULTI-RELIGIOUS
MARRIAGES AMONG THE ELITE, ANATHEMA TO MOST OF THEIR ELDERS, ARE OCCURRING
AT EVER-INCREASING RATE, AND MANY PARENTS ARE INCAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING
IDEALS ESPOUSED BY THEIR OFFSPRING.

10. ONE NEW ELEMENT THAT HAS APPEARED ON LOCAL SCENE IS CHARISMATIC SHIITE
IMAM MUSA AS SADR, WHO HAS TURNED LONG-IGNORED SHI'A GRIEVANCES INTO A
POLITICAL FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH AND WHO IS BEING WOOED ASSIDUOUSLY
BY ALL NON-SUNNI ELEMENTS. BACKED BY SYRIAN WEAPONS, MONEY AND INFLUENCE,
AND ENJOYING DEGREE OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND GULF STATES,
IMAM HAS BECOME NOT ONLY HIS PEOPLE'S MOST POPULAR LEADER, BUT ALSO
SPOKESMAN ON BEHALF OF LEBANON'S UNDERPRIVILEGED MAJORITY AGAINST ITS
AFFLUENT MINORITY REGARDLESS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION. IT STILL TOO EARLY
TO SAY PRECISELY IN WHAT DIRECTION HIS CURRENT PROTEST CAMPAIGN WILL TAKE
HIM, BUT HE WILL CERTAINLY MAKE BID TO SUPPLANT EXISTING FEUDAL SHIITE
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP HEADED BY PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER KAMEL AL ASSAD.
IMAM'S SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS APPARENTLY HAS NOT YET LED HIM TO ESPOUSE
FAR-OUT LEFTIST CAUSES, BUT HIS CRITICISM OF GOL INERTIA HAS LED HIM TO
BE VIEWED BY MANY "ESTABLISHMENT" ELEMENTS AS A LEFTIST THREAT TO THE
EXISTING SYSTEM.

11. GOVERNMENTAL/POLITICAL OUTLOOK: AT THIS WRITING, LEBANON HAS NO
GOVERNMENT. HOW LONG THIS SITUATION WILL CONTINUE NO ONE REALLY KNOWS,
ALTHOUGH IF CABINET CRISIS IS NOT RESOLVED WITHIN NEXT FORTNIGHT IT WILL
PROBABLY BECOME PROLONGED. IN ANY EVENT, WE THINK THAT PROSPECTS FOR ANY
FUTURE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO COPE WITH PROBLEMS OUTLINED ABOVE, OR EVEN
TO IMPROVE APPRECIABLY ON ABYSMAL RECORD OF SOLH CABINET, ARE NOT BRIGHT,
GIVEN (A) ABSENCE OF LEADERSHIP OR EVEN ELEMENTARY GUIDANCE ON PART OF
PRES. FRANGIE; (B) INGRAINED TENDENCY OF COUNTRY'S "TRADITIONAL"
POLITICIANS — BOTH IN AND OUT OF POWER — TO PURSUE PERSONAL GOALS AT
EXPENSE OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES; (C) TOTAL INCAPACITY OF PARLIAMENT TO
RESPOND TO EVEN THE MOST PRESSING PUBLIC DEMANDS; AND (D) DEMONSTRATED
INABILITY OF LEBANESE SYSTEM TO REFORM ITSELF FROM WITHIN. THUS NO
POLITICAL ELEMENT REALLY WANTS A STRONG, ERGO EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT. IN
ADDITION, AS TIME DRAWS NEARER FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS IN 1976, ONE CAN EXPECT FURTHER EROSION OF GOL'S INABILITY TO
GOVERN AS POLITICIANS OF ALL STRIPES JOSTLE AND MANEUVER IN ANTICIPATION
OF FUTURE PRESIDENTIAL/PARLIAMENTARY POSSIBILITIES.

12. IN MOST COUNTRIES, FOREGOING GLOOMY PICTURE WOULD LEAD ONE TO
ANTICIPATE MAJOR POLITICO-SOCIAL UPHEAVALS. ALTHOUGH SUCH CONVULSIONS
COULD OCCUR IN LEBANON AT SOME FUTURE DATE, WE BELIEVE THAT LEBANESE
SYSTEM WILL SOMEHOW CONTINUE TO MUDDLE THROUGH FOR NEXT FEW YEARS — AT
LEAST UNTIL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1976. BASIC REASON FOR THIS BELIEF
IS LACK OF ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTRY'S DELICATE BALANCE ALONG CONFESSIONAL
AND ECONOMIC LINES. NONE OF THE MAJOR FORCES CURRENTLY COMPETING IN
LEBANON YET SEES ANY ADVANTAGE IN DESTROYING EXISTING SYSTEM WITHOUT
RUNNING SERIOUS RISK OF HAVING ITS OWN POSITION SUFFERING AS RESULT.
CRITICISM OF THE SYSTEM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY INCREASE, BUT NO ONE IS ABLE TO
OFFER ANY WORKABLE SUBSTITUTE. (WORTH NOTING THAT WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION
OF "SOCIALIST" KAMAL JUMBLATT, NOT A SINGLE LEADING POLITICAL FIGURE OR
GROUP IN LEBANON TODAY HAS DEVISED ANY COHERENT PROGRAM TO ALLEVIATE
SITUATION DESCRIBED ABOVE, NOR DOES ANYONE APPEAR TO BE THINKING AHEAD RE
POSSIBLE PROGRAMS FOR FUTURE.) CHECKS AND BALANCES WHICH HAVE
TRADITIONALLY CHARACTERIZED LEBANON'S PECULIAR "HOUSE-OF-CARDS" STRUCTURE
ARE SO DELICATE THAT MOST LEBANESE REALIZE ANY ATTEMPT TO TINKER WITH
PART OF THAT STRUCTURE WOULD BRING WHOLE SYSTEM TUMBLING DOWN.

13. THUS, WHILE RECENT PRESS REPORTS, SUCH AS WRITTEN BY JONATHAN RANDALL
AND OTHERS, GIVE ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF CONDITIONS IN
LEBANON, IT OUR OPINION THAT IN ABSENCE OF SOME HIGHLY EXTRAORDINARY
ACCIDENT OR UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENT, WE WILL NOT SOON SEE A MAJOR CHANGE
IN THIS COUNTRY. ITS STRUCTURE IS FRAGILE, BUT REALIZATION THAT FRAGILITY
BY MOST LEBANESE WILL ENABLE LEBANON TO MUDDLE THROUGH FOR SOME TIME TO
COME.

GODLEY

SECRET NNN

Originally classified SECRET · Declassified and released by U.S. Department of State under EO Systematic Review (May 28, 2004) · Now UNCLASSIFIED · Transmitted in three sections (BEIRUT 11970 01-03 of 03)

Summary
Although Lebanon is in a sorry state by American standards, a new government will change little, and the country will probably muddle through at least until 1976.^[1]

1. Purpose of this cable
The demise of the Takieddine Solh government prompts us to submit the following evaluation of its achievements over the past 15 months,^[2] along with an assessment of the current situation in Lebanon and the problems it can be expected to pose for any successor government. A fuller analysis will follow by airgram.

2. The record of the Solh government
In our last detailed report on the situation in Lebanon (A-11 of January 25), we listed the Solh government’s achievements as decidedly meager in most aspects of Lebanon’s domestic and foreign affairs. Its major accomplishment was to survive while avoiding or postponing difficult decisions as long as possible. Over the past eight months of its life, it carried this approach to the point of almost total inaction. This passivity, coupled with a modest amount of good luck, enabled the Solh government to withstand threats of direct/overt Arab assistance to the fedayeen in Lebanon,^[3] but it also ruled out any effective progress in bringing fedayeen presence and activities in Lebanon under greater GOL control.

Internally — with the exception of the passage of a bill increasing pensions for ministers and deputies, and a slight but highly controversial lurch in the direction of civil service reform (our A-39 of March 4) — the Solh government can justly claim to have made no positive achievements — whether by legislative action, executive decree, or administrative fiat — since the beginning of 1974. In short, it managed to make its already notorious reputation for “do-nothingness” even more deserved than before.

3. President Frangieh’s decline
President Frangieh’s^[4] original reputation as a tough, no-nonsense decision-maker and advocate of law and order suffered badly during the life of the Solh cabinet. His reluctance to use his potential power to overcome parliamentary and cabinet inertia in making controversial decisions became increasingly pronounced, and he showed himself more and more preoccupied with petty family and political developments in his Zghorta hometown than with national affairs.^[5]

The result has been a swelling upsurge in public criticism directed at Frangieh’s person and family, which caused him periodically to hit back at his detractors in a variety of ways — including use of the GOL administrative and police apparatus to harass and intimidate his adversaries (and, in so doing, also foreign businessmen).

4. The social and economic malaise
Fifteen months of governmental inertia and continuing parliamentary somnolence have not failed to exacerbate Lebanon’s increasingly acute economic, financial and social problems, thereby contributing greatly to public uncertainty and unrest over the direction in which the country appears to be heading. While Beirut continues to be a boom-town with land values skyrocketing and modern buildings going up like mushrooms, Lebanon’s basic economic problems (e.g., inflation, pollution, increased cost of living, pressing developmental needs in the south and elsewhere) are still not being faced, and its myriad social problems (e.g., lack of adequate social security and public housing) are being ignored almost in toto.^[6]

While we hear more and more talk of the rich getting richer and the poor getting no relief, nothing is being done to change this or to combat the ever-increasing venality that prevails (especially at the highest levels in the capital). Reports of major scandals (e.g., in the Tobacco Authority and Beirut Port and Municipality) involving top government officials, although not uncommon in Lebanon, have contributed to erosion of confidence in the country’s hitherto sacrosanct financial-economic “establishment”. In addition, only 11.8 percent of GOL revenue comes from income tax, but no one apparently dares — least of all the GOL — to enforce observance of existing tax laws by the well-to-do and use that revenue to improve economic and social conditions generally.^[7]

5. The fedayeen “state within a state”
Another area which has lately pointed up the GOL’s incapacity to govern is the internal security sector. Relations between the GOL and the fedayeen remain much as they were at the beginning of 1974, with both sides remaining wary of each other but with their responsible leaders still anxious to avoid a repetition (or worse) of the confrontation which occurred in May 1973.^[8]

At the same time, however, the fedayeen “state within a state” has continuously improved its military capability vis-à-vis the Lebanese Army with constant clandestine importation of arms from Syria (including SA-7 missiles to hamper LAF air attacks), construction of new bunkers and other defensive works within refugee camps.^[9] Although efforts have also been made by the GOL to increase the Lebanese Army’s strength over the past 15 months, no significant progress has been realized so far due to parliamentary inertia.^[10]

In any event, mindful of its proven inability to confront the fedayeen successfully, GOL leadership remains unwilling to risk incurring heavy human and economic losses and placing severe internal strains on the Lebanese body politic that a renewed confrontation with the fedayeen would almost certainly entail.

(In the meantime, most Lebanese continue to view the Palestinian problem as the major threat to Lebanon’s future security. While some are cautiously optimistic that external forces may produce some kind of solution, most question how this would affect Palestinians residing in Lebanon and how the latter could be induced to return to whatever form of Palestinian “entity” might emerge from the current ME settlement effort. While most concern is centered in Christian quarters, even many Moslems are pessimistic, for they see the continued presence of nearly 350,000 Palestinians in this country as a threat to the multi-confessional balance and the continued existence of Lebanon as they know it.)^[11]

6. Lawlessness, militias, and Cyprus
To make matters worse, the GOL’s apathy and/or helplessness — accompanied by the unprecedented socio-economic malaise mentioned above, plus student unrest and labor agitation (see below) — have contributed to a rising tide of outright lawlessness. Public thuggery — including shootings, kidnappings, muggings, roadblocks, and intimidations carried out by a variety of scofflaw “armed elements” (not all of them Palestinians, by any means) — has reached proportions unacceptable even to easy-going Lebanese.

There has also been a marked increase in efforts by various foreign governments (particularly Iraq and Libya) to foment all sorts of domestic turmoil through press incitement, propaganda wars, street agitation, and the use of hired assassins or bullies to combat their real or imagined opponents here.^[12]

At the same time, the incidence of lethal feuds and brawls among confessional, family and tribal “militia” groups has risen. (Christian concern, in particular, over a Moslem “threat” in the aftermath of events in Cyprus has lent impetus to enlarging Christian “militia” groups and increases in their armaments, albeit light.)^[13] The tendency of many Lebanese to resort to indiscriminate use of firearms to mark public and private celebrations has also increased at a galloping pace, to the point where the Solh government’s pronouncements regarding ensuring civil order were being greeted with open ridicule.

This factor appears to have played a major role in forming the general consensus that the Solh government had outlived any usefulness it might once have enjoyed in binding up inter-confessional and Lebanese-Palestinian wounds inflicted during the traumatic disturbances of May-June 1973.

7. Foreign policy
In international affairs, the Solh government continued the traditional Lebanese policy of doing nothing to jeopardize its image as an Arab state in good standing. Some further improvement was made in relations with Syria over the past eight months, but Foreign Office decision-making has been reduced to the lowest-common denominator in order to ensure that the GOL avoided “trouble” as much as possible. (While the Solh cabinet thus abdicated any more forceful role it might have played in regional affairs, the GOL has in private heartily endorsed Secretary Kissinger’s efforts aimed at a Middle East settlement.)^[14]

While Solh and his junketing Foreign Minister continued their peregrinations throughout the Arab world and elsewhere, the Foreign Office handled only the most routine matters and accurately reflected the government’s do-nothing position. It even proved impossible to select a new Foreign Office Secretary General.

8. Labor
On the labor scene, the Confederation of Lebanese Labor (CLL), which had wrung far more material concessions from the Solh government than from any previous government, stood by passively while the Solh cabinet unraveled and finally collapsed. However, there are definite signs that with unfulfilled popular expectations rising and leftist activity flourishing, labor demands will be a factor attracting increased attention in the months to come. Interestingly enough, labor is the one element on the Lebanese scene not based on confessional lines, and it could well become a springboard from which future leaders will emerge to reform (or destroy) Lebanon’s traditional social-political structure.^[15]

9. Student unrest
The Solh government was faced last spring with considerable student unrest centered principally at AUB,^[16] but with ramifications throughout the entire local university community. Basic causes appear to reflect general student restlessness that we have witnessed world-wide. They are aggravated in Lebanon, however, by student grievances against the do-nothing government, by organized (and frequently subsidized) Palestinian agitation, and by their feeling of being lost in a leaderless society.

The majority of Lebanese youth is antagonistic to the traditional Lebanese socio-confessional structure and is seeking new outlets for their energies. Many reject social restraints deemed essential by older generations. Multi-religious marriages among the elite, anathema to most of their elders, are occurring at an ever-increasing rate, and many parents are incapable of understanding the ideals espoused by their offspring.

10. Imam Musa as-Sadr
One new element that has appeared on the local scene is the charismatic Shiite Imam Musa as-Sadr, who has turned long-ignored Shi’a grievances into a political force to be reckoned with and who is being wooed assiduously by all non-Sunni elements.^[17] Backed by Syrian weapons, money and influence, and enjoying a degree of financial support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the Imam has become not only his people’s most popular leader, but also spokesman on behalf of Lebanon’s underprivileged majority against its affluent minority regardless of religious affiliation.

It is still too early to say precisely in what direction his current protest campaign will take him, but he will certainly make a bid to supplant the existing feudal Shiite political leadership headed by Parliamentary Speaker Kamel al-Assad.^[18] The Imam’s social consciousness apparently has not yet led him to espouse far-out leftist causes, but his criticism of GOL inertia has led him to be viewed by many “establishment” elements as a leftist threat to the existing system.

11. Political outlook
At this writing, Lebanon has no government. How long this situation will continue no one really knows, although if the cabinet crisis is not resolved within the next fortnight it will probably become prolonged. In any event, we think that prospects for any future Lebanese government to cope with the problems outlined above, or even to improve appreciably on the abysmal record of the Solh cabinet, are not bright, given:

(A) Absence of leadership or even elementary guidance on the part of Pres. Frangieh;

(B) Ingrained tendency of the country’s “traditional” politicians — both in and out of power — to pursue personal goals at the expense of national objectives;

(C) Total incapacity of Parliament to respond to even the most pressing public demands; and

(D) Demonstrated inability of the Lebanese system to reform itself from within.

Thus no political element really wants a strong, ergo effective government.^[19] In addition, as the time draws nearer for parliamentary and presidential elections in 1976, one can expect further erosion of the GOL’s ability to govern as politicians of all stripes jostle and maneuver in anticipation of future presidential/parliamentary possibilities.

12. The “house of cards” argument
In most countries, the foregoing gloomy picture would lead one to anticipate major politico-social upheavals. Although such convulsions could occur in Lebanon at some future date, we believe that the Lebanese system will somehow continue to muddle through for the next few years — at least until the presidential election in 1976. The basic reason for this belief is the lack of alternatives and the country’s delicate balance along confessional and economic lines.^[20]

None of the major forces currently competing in Lebanon yet sees any advantage in destroying the existing system without running a serious risk of having its own position suffer as a result. Criticism of the system will undoubtedly increase, but no one is able to offer any workable substitute. (Worth noting that, with the possible exception of “socialist” Kamal Jumblatt, not a single leading political figure or group in Lebanon today has devised any coherent program to alleviate the situation described above, nor does anyone appear to be thinking ahead regarding possible programs for the future.)^[21]

Checks and balances which have traditionally characterized Lebanon’s peculiar “house-of-cards” structure are so delicate that most Lebanese realize any attempt to tinker with part of that structure would bring the whole system tumbling down.

13. The prediction
Thus, while recent press reports, such as those written by Jonathan Randall and others,^[22] give an essentially accurate description of conditions in Lebanon, it is our opinion that in the absence of some highly extraordinary accident or unforeseen development, we will not soon see a major change in this country. Its structure is fragile, but realization of that fragility by most Lebanese will enable Lebanon to muddle through for some time to come.

GODLEY

Editorial Footnotes

[1]The summary sentence is one of the most quoted single lines from Embassy Beirut’s 1970s reporting, because its central prediction — that Lebanon would “muddle through at least until 1976” — was catastrophically wrong in its implicit optimism but mechanically correct in its specific timeline. Civil war broke out in April 1975, six months after this cable was filed. The Lebanese system did not “muddle through” until 1976; it collapsed into open civil war before the 1976 elections the cable anticipated. The cable’s reasoning — that fragility was known to all parties and therefore preservation-of-system incentives would prevail — was structurally sound as a theory of stability under normal conditions, but it underestimated the extent to which the fedayeen armed presence and the external actors documented elsewhere in this archive (Iraqi and Libyan destabilization, Syrian arms flows) had already broken the conditions under which internal Lebanese equilibrium could be maintained.

[2]The Solh government held office June 1973 – September 1974 — exactly the period covered by the Embassy’s 1973-1974 reporting in this archive. Solh took office after the May 1973 Lebanese Army-fedayeen clash documented in cables 1973BEIRUT05155, 1973BEIRUT05159, 1973BEIRUT05437, and 1973BEIRUT05437 — a confrontation whose trauma shaped Solh’s entire tenure. His defining characteristic, as the Embassy assessed here, was avoidance of decision: a conscious strategy to keep Lebanon intact by refusing to force the confrontations that might tear it apart. That strategy succeeded tactically (Lebanon survived the Solh years without renewed Army-fedayeen combat) and failed strategically (it allowed the armed forces of the state-within-a-state to grow unchecked while the Lebanese Army stagnated).

[3]The phrase refers to the Kuwaiti draft resolution at the July 1974 Arab Defense Council meeting documented in cable 1974BEIRUT07889, which proposed direct Arab League funding for the fedayeen in Lebanon on a basis equal to Lebanese state defense funding. The Solh government’s rejection of that proposal — achieved through Dib’s hardline diplomacy and Solh’s personal threat to walk out of the ADC meeting — is here recorded as the single most significant achievement of the Solh cabinet. The structural irony is that this accomplishment is also the one the Embassy cannot cite publicly, because it was documented only in SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN channels.

[4]Suleiman Frangieh (1910–1992): President of Lebanon, 1970–1976. A Maronite Christian from Zghorta in northern Lebanon, Frangieh had been elected as a compromise candidate with a reputation for toughness and law-and-order governance. This cable documents the Embassy’s assessment that his reputation had been destroyed by presidential passivity over the preceding 15 months. Six months after this cable, Lebanon would be at war, and Frangieh would preside over the first 15 months of civil conflict before being succeeded by Elias Sarkis in 1976.

[5]Zghorta: Frangieh’s hometown in northern Lebanon, center of the Frangieh family’s political and militia base. The observation that Frangieh was preoccupied with “petty family and political developments” in Zghorta rather than with national affairs is a specific critique of clan-based Lebanese political culture as practiced by the sitting President. The Marada Movement — the Frangieh family’s Zghorta-based armed faction — would become one of the significant Christian militias during the civil war that followed.

[6]The paragraph documents the defining paradox of pre-war Lebanese political economy: spectacular real estate-led economic growth in Beirut alongside total state non-provision for social needs. This pattern — concentrated private wealth with minimal redistribution through public goods — was one of the structural drivers of the social polarization the cable identifies as a political risk. The pattern was regionally variable: southern Lebanon, as the cable notes, received no developmental attention, which the contemporaneous rise of Imam Musa as-Sadr (paragraph 10) was organizing politically.

[7]11.8 percent of GOL revenue from income tax: this is a remarkable statistic. In most OECD countries at the time, income tax produced 30-50 percent of government revenue. The Lebanese fiscal state was, as this datum shows, an extractively weak state — reliant on customs duties, indirect taxes, and state monopolies (the Tobacco Authority mentioned in the preceding sentence) rather than on direct taxation of income and wealth. The cable’s observation that no one “dares” to enforce tax laws on the well-to-do captures the self-exempting character of the Lebanese elite within its own state’s fiscal system — a structural feature that persists in 21st-century Lebanese public finance.

[8]May 1973: the Lebanese Army-fedayeen confrontation of April-May 1973, in which the Lebanese Army attacked Palestinian refugee camps after the Israeli Operation Spring of Youth and then struck a negotiated agreement that the Embassy covered in detail in cables 1973BEIRUT05155, 1973BEIRUT05159, 1973BEIRUT05437, 1973BEIRUT05755_05776, and 1973BEIRUT06768. The “or worse” parenthetical in this 1974 cable foreshadows the Embassy’s expectation that a renewed GOL-fedayeen confrontation, if it came, would be more severe than 1973 — which proved accurate: the April 1975 bus ambush that triggered civil war produced far greater escalation than May 1973.

[9]SA-7 missiles: the Soviet-supplied shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile (man-portable air defense system, MANPADS). The Embassy’s documentation that SA-7 missiles were entering fedayeen stocks in Lebanon via Syria is diplomatically significant: it records, in U.S. internal reporting, that Syrian weapons transfers to the PLO in Lebanon by October 1974 included sophisticated anti-aircraft capability specifically designed to degrade the Lebanese Air Force’s ability to conduct operations over Palestinian territory inside Lebanon. The “state within a state” was acquiring, through Syrian transfers, military capability specifically designed to neutralize Lebanese state sovereignty.

[10]Parliamentary inertia preventing Army strengthening: cable 1974BEIRUT07889 documented PM-DM Maalouf announcing an LL 2.2 billion five-year defense program at the Cairo ADC meeting. This cable, three months later, documents that the program had not materially progressed because Parliament had not acted on it. The gap between announced commitments and legislative capacity is a structural feature of pre-war Lebanese governance — the government could make declarations at Arab League meetings that the legislative branch would not fund.

[11]Nearly 350,000 Palestinians in Lebanon: the specific demographic number documented by the Embassy in October 1974. Contemporary estimates ranged between 300,000 and 400,000 depending on methodology. This represented roughly 12-13% of Lebanon’s total population of approximately 2.7 million. The cable’s observation that “even many Moslems are pessimistic” about the long-term implications of this population for the multi-confessional balance is analytically important: it documents that Lebanese Muslim elites in 1974 did not universally welcome Palestinian presence as a Sunni demographic reinforcement, and that some were already assessing the population as a threat to Lebanese state continuity.

[12]Iraq and Libya foreign-sponsored destabilization, including hired assassins: the cable documents a specific Embassy finding that foreign state actors were operating hired violence inside Lebanon in October 1974. This is consistent with cable 1974BEIRUT05740’s May 1974 forecast that radical Arab states would work against the post-October 1973 diplomatic architecture by destabilizing moderate Arab actors — including Lebanon. The “press incitement, propaganda wars, street agitation, and use of hired assassins or bullies” formulation documents an integrated Iraqi-Libyan influence operation in mid-1970s Lebanon, targeting what Baghdad and Tripoli defined as their opponents.

[13]Cyprus: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, July 20, 1974 — Operation Atilla — partitioned the island along ethno-religious lines (Turkish Muslim north, Greek Christian south). The cable’s specific observation that this event drove Lebanese Christian concern about a Muslim threat, and accelerated Christian militia armament, is a direct documentation of the cross-regional demonstration effects of the Cyprus partition on Lebanese internal security dynamics. The Maronite conclusion from Cyprus was that a demographic Muslim threat, if unopposed militarily, could produce territorial partition of a small confessionally-divided Mediterranean state. Christian militia arming in late 1974 would feed directly into the Christian-Muslim militia confrontations of 1975-1976.

[14]Kissinger’s ME settlement efforts: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy had produced the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement of January 1974 and the Syrian-Israeli disengagement of May 1974. The GOL’s private endorsement of Kissinger’s efforts, documented here, reflects Lebanon’s strategic interest in regional de-escalation: a settled regional diplomatic architecture reduced the pressure on Lebanon as a base for fedayeen cross-border operations into Israel. That the endorsement was “private” — the Solh government could not publicly endorse U.S.-brokered Arab-Israeli diplomacy without being labeled in Arab rejectionist circles as insufficiently committed to the Palestinian cause — documents the routine gap between Lebanese public Arab solidarity and Lebanese private Western alignment.

[15]Labor as non-confessional: the Embassy’s assessment of Lebanese labor as the one organized societal force not structured along confessional lines is analytically important. It identifies the Confederation of Lebanese Labor (CLL) as a potential springboard for non-confessional political reform. The left-wing political parties the CLL would align with — the Lebanese Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Kamal Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party — did constitute significant elements of the Lebanese National Movement that formed during the civil war. But the civil war framework quickly reimposed confessional alignment on most political action, and the non-confessional potential the Embassy identified in 1974 was largely absorbed into the confessional civil war geography that followed.

[16]AUB: the American University of Beirut, founded by American Protestant missionaries in 1866. AUB had been the center of student unrest in spring 1974 documented here — the unrest included protests against tuition increases, strikes, and occupations. Pro-PLO student agitation, documented by the cable as “organized (and frequently subsidized) Palestinian agitation,” was a significant factor in the AUB student movement of 1973-74.

[17]Imam Musa as-Sadr (1928 – disappeared 1978): Iranian-Lebanese Twelver Shia cleric, leader of the Higher Shiite Council (from 1969) and founder in 1974 of the Movement of the Deprived — launched in March 1974, just months before this cable, at a Baalbek rally attended by tens of thousands. The cable’s October 1974 assessment of Sadr as a rising Shia political force specifically supplanting the traditional Shia feudal leadership of Kamel al-Assad is remarkably prescient: Amal (the armed wing of the Movement of the Deprived, formally founded January 1975) would within five years become the dominant Shia political-military force in southern Lebanon. Sadr disappeared in Libya in August 1978 while meeting with Qaddafi; his fate has never been definitively established, though he is generally presumed to have been murdered.

[18]Kamel al-Assad (1932–2010): Shia feudal political leader from the Jabal Amel region of southern Lebanon, Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, representative of the traditional Shiite zuama (political notables) system. Sadr’s explicit political challenge to Assad represented the generational and organizational replacement of Shia feudal politics by a clerical-populist mass movement — a transformation the cable correctly identifies in October 1974, six months after the Movement of the Deprived was launched.

[19]“No political element really wants a strong, ergo effective government”: this is one of the most analytically pointed sentences in the Embassy’s 1970s Lebanon reporting. The cable’s thesis is that Lebanese political fragmentation — confessional, familial, economic, regional — made each organized group better off under a weak national government than under a strong one capable of imposing programs that might disadvantage it. Weak government was, on this reading, not a failure of the Lebanese system but its deliberate product. The thesis is structurally sound as a political-economic analysis; its flaw, the 1975-1990 civil war would demonstrate, was that weak government was also unable to prevent the armed state-within-a-state from destabilizing the delicate balance the weak state was meant to preserve.

[20]“Muddle through until 1976”: the specific prediction that became synonymous with this cable. The 1976 presidential election did proceed (Elias Sarkis elected May 1976, succeeding Frangieh in September 1976), but under radically altered conditions — Lebanon was then 13 months into a civil war the Embassy had not anticipated in October 1974. The cable’s substantive forecast was wrong. The timeline element was mechanically correct.

[21]Kamal Jumblatt (1917–1977): Druze political leader, founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (1949), leader of the Lebanese National Movement during the civil war’s first phase. The cable’s identification of Jumblatt as the only political figure with a coherent programmatic alternative to Lebanon’s existing structure is consistent with his subsequent role as the intellectual and political driver of the National Movement’s civil war-era call for secular reform of the Lebanese system. Jumblatt was assassinated in March 1977 — widely attributed to Syrian agents, against the background of Syria’s post-1976 intervention in Lebanon on the Christian/status-quo side.

[22]Jonathan Randal: Washington Post foreign correspondent, whose Lebanon reporting in the mid-1970s was widely regarded as among the most acute Western journalism on the country’s drift toward civil war. Randal would subsequently publish Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon (1983), one of the standard English-language accounts of the civil war. The cable’s acknowledgment that Randal’s reporting gave an “essentially accurate description” of Lebanese conditions is an unusual Embassy endorsement of a journalist — but the Embassy parted company with Randal’s reporting on the conclusion: Randal saw the fragility and expected breakdown; the Embassy saw the fragility and expected muddle-through. The breakdown came.

SECRET

How to Cite

Annotated version:
Institute for Lebanon, “Situation in Lebanon” (1974BEIRUT11970), October 2, 1974. instituteforlebanon.com/cables/1974BEIRUT11970/

Original cable:
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, “Situation in Lebanon” (1974BEIRUT11970), October 2, 1974. Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD).

SECRET
Highest standard classification level
GDS
General Declassification Schedule — E.O. 11652 handling marker
PINT
TAGS code for Political/Internal
PINS
TAGS code for Political/Internal Security
GOL
Government of Lebanon
FONOFF
Foreign Office (Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
SECGEN
Secretary General — senior Foreign Office civil servant
LAF
Lebanese Armed Forces
SA-7
Soviet 9K32 Strela — shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile
FEDAYEEN
Palestinian armed militants operating in Lebanon