Cable 1973BEIRUT05437 · May 12, 1973 · SECRET

Beirut, May 12, 1973

The Verdict, Two Years Early: What the Embassy Said Lebanon Would Become

Filed May 12, 1973 — more than two years before the civil war — this three-section SECRET cable is the U.S. Embassy's comprehensive assessment of Lebanon's politico-military situation after the May crisis. It lays out three possible outcomes, judges the best one unlikely, predicts a face-saving compromise that changes nothing, and closes with five words that proved correct: 'seeds of another explosion would remain.'

Based on cable 1973BEIRUT05437 SECRET → UNCLASSIFIED

On May 12, 1973, five days after the Lebanese Army had deployed aircraft and tanks against Palestinian camps in Beirut, the U.S. Embassy filed a three-section SECRET assessment of where Lebanon stood and where it was going. The assessment covered the army's performance (good, but constrained to 6,000 combat troops), the fedayeen's strength (15,000 fighters, strategically positioned), the political situation (Sunni leaders unwilling to publicly support Frangieh on the Palestinian issue), Syria's role (decisive, minimal commitment, maximum leverage), and the three possible outcomes. The Embassy judged the best outcome — real demilitarization of the camps — unlikely. It judged the most likely outcome a face-saving compromise that would leave the underlying conditions unchanged. And it predicted, precisely, what that compromise would produce: 'seeds of another explosion.' The civil war began twenty-three months later.

What this document reveals

Filed May 12, 1973: the Embassy predicted that the most likely outcome of the crisis was a face-saving compromise that would not fundamentally change the fedayeen position, and that it would leave behind 'seeds of another explosion.' The civil war began April 13, 1975.
The Embassy assessed that Arafat threatened Saeb Salam with dispersing fedayeen fighters from camps into Muslim residential neighborhoods — making them impossible to dislodge without devastating the neighborhoods and producing the sectarian split that paralyzed the Lebanese state.
The Lebanese Army had a maximum of 6,000 combat troops against an estimated 15,000 fedayeen fighters (5,000 regulars, 10,000 militia) — a ratio of 2.5 to 1. This arithmetic, embedded in a SECRET cable, is the foundational fact of Lebanon's inability to enforce any Palestinian-related agreement.
Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) told Lebanese Army negotiators on May 10: he would 'never stand for a repetition of what happened to the fedayeen in Jordan in 1970.' The Embassy added: 'So do we.' The assessment of Option A — real demilitarization — was therefore: unlikely.
Syria, without committing more than a few hundred fighters, was able to multiply fedayeen fighting capability, harass Lebanese military airfields, and hold the threat of direct intervention over Lebanon's head. The Embassy documented this as structural, not situational.

Chronology

What happened, in sequence

Apr 9–10, 1973

Israeli Beirut raid

IDF commandos land in Beirut and assassinate three senior PLO leaders in their apartments (Operation Spring of Youth). Lebanon's inability to protect its own sovereignty triggers the Palestinian escalation that led to the May crisis.

May 7–8, 1973

The May crisis

Palestinian factions attack Lebanese Army positions; army deploys aircraft and tanks against camps. PM Hafez resigns and withdraws resignation. Cables 1973BEIRUT05155 and 1973BEIRUT05159.

May 10, 1973

Khalaf's warning

PLO's Abu Iyad tells the Mixed Commission he will 'never stand for a repetition of what happened to the fedayeen in Jordan in 1970.' The Embassy takes this as definitive: real demilitarization is off the table.

May 12, 1973

This assessment

The Embassy files this three-section SECRET cable. Most likely outcome: a Lebanese solution that saves face but changes nothing. 'Seeds of another explosion would remain.'

May 17–18, 1973

Melkart Protocol

Fedayeen make 'unilateral promises' to the Lebanese Army on border pullback, heavy weapons, camp access. Sa'iqa does not sign. Documented in cables 1973BEIRUT05755 and 1973BEIRUT05776.

Key figures

Who was involved

Suleiman Frangieh

President of Lebanon

The cable portrays Frangieh as determined but structurally constrained: unwilling to risk a confessional split, unable to neutralize the Syrian threat, commanding an army of 6,000 against 15,000 fedayeen. 'He is a proud man who has staked a lot.' The Embassy's assessment is that his position is not achievable given the forces arrayed against it.

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad)

PLO intelligence chief, Fatah co-founder

His May 10 statement to the Mixed Commission — that he would 'never stand for a repetition of Jordan 1970' — is one of the most important facts in this cable. The Embassy treated it as authoritative: real demilitarization of camps was off the table. Khalaf was the PLO's intelligence chief and the principal organizer of Black September operations. He was assassinated in Tunis in 1991.

Saeb Salam

Former Prime Minister, senior Sunni political figure

The cable documents Salam as 'helpful to Frangieh' but unable to publicly endorse the Lebanese state's position on Palestinian armed activity. More strikingly, it documents Arafat threatening him directly with fedayeen dispersal into Muslim residential neighborhoods — using the confessional split as a weapon against Sunni political leaders who might otherwise have supported Frangieh.

The Record

May 12, 1973: Five Days After

Five days after the Lebanese Army had deployed aircraft and tanks against Palestinian camps in Beirut, the U.S. Embassy filed this assessment. Not a situation report. Not a cable about a specific meeting or event. A comprehensive verdict on what had happened, what it meant, and what would come next.

It was classified SECRET with a Limited Distribution handling restriction. It ran to three sections transmitted as separate cables. It was explicitly not passed to Cairo. And it closed with a sentence that proved, twenty-three months later, to be exactly correct.

The arithmetic that constrained everything

Beneath the political analysis, the cable rests on two numbers. The Lebanese Army had a maximum of 6,000 actual combat troops. The fedayeen had an estimated 15,000 — 5,000 regulars and 10,000 militia, mostly in the camps. Against a ratio of 2.5 to 1, armed with anti-tank rockets, Katyusha rockets, and fortified camps, the fedayeen could not be dislodged by force without a military commitment Lebanon did not have and without political consequences Lebanon could not absorb.

The Embassy knew this. Frangieh knew this. The army knew this. And the fedayeen knew it too. The May 10 statement by Salah Khalaf — Abu Iyad, the PLO's intelligence chief — to the Mixed Commission made the fedayeen position explicit: he would "never stand for a repetition of what happened to the fedayeen in Jordan in 1970 when they demilitarized camps." The Embassy's gloss on this was two words: "So do we." Real demilitarization was therefore assessed as unlikely.

The threat that paralyzed Sunni politics

The cable contains a detail about Arafat and Saeb Salam that is not in the standard account of May 1973. During the fighting, the Embassy received reliable reports that Arafat threatened Salam — a former Prime Minister and one of Lebanon's most prominent Sunni figures — with moving the fedayeen from the camps into Beirut's Muslim neighborhoods and making a stand there, house by house.

The threat was militarily credible and politically unanswerable. The Lebanese Army could not engage fedayeen dispersed through Beirut's Muslim residential areas without devastating those neighborhoods. And while only a minority of the Sunni population would be expected to actively take up arms alongside the fedayeen, the Embassy judged the population would not resist their presence — meaning the army would have "virtually impossible problems getting the fedayeen out." Arafat had found the precise leverage point that paralyzed Lebanese state action: the threat of a confessional split so severe that it was more dangerous than the alternative.

The three scenarios

The cable lays out three possible outcomes with unusual analytical precision for diplomatic reporting, and then rates each. Option A — real demilitarization of camps — is judged unlikely, for the reasons above. Option B — Frangieh backing down to something close to the status quo — is described as hard for a proud man who has staked his presidency on the outcome, but is implicitly the most politically available path. Option C — a new confrontation — depends on factors Frangieh doesn't currently have: stronger political support, a neutralized Syrian threat.

The assessment's conclusion is that Option B is where events are heading — not because it's good, but because it's what the constraints allow. And it would leave "conditions for another serious explosion at some future date."

Syria's structural role

The cable's sixth paragraph is one of the most precise assessments of Syrian leverage in pre-war Lebanon in the documentary record. Without committing more than a few hundred Sa'iqa fighters — possibly fewer — and without deploying regular army units, Syria had been able to multiply the fedayeen's fighting effectiveness, harass Lebanese military airfields, and hold the threat of massive intervention over Lebanon's head. The Lebanese Army was counting on Israel as a deterrent against Syrian regular intervention; but neither Frangieh nor the army could assume that deterrent would hold, because there were "signals from the Syrians that it might happen" and "no hard assurances against it from any quarter."

Syria's then-posture — "content to await developments and display a visage of sweet reasonableness" — is the Embassy's description of the aftermath: having applied maximum pressure during the crisis, Damascus was now performing moderation. The cable documents this performance without the illusion that it represented a change of intent.

The verdict

The cable's final paragraph is worth quoting in full:

"Most likely outcome is some sort of 'Lebanese solution' which will save some face but which is not likely to fundamentally change the position of the fedayeen in Lebanon. It would save Lebanon for the time being from potential catastrophe but seeds of another explosion would remain."

Filed May 12, 1973. The Lebanese Civil War began April 13, 1975. The Melkart Protocol — the agreement reached six days after this cable — changed nothing structurally, as the companion cables (1973BEIRUT05755-05776) document in real time. The "seeds" the Embassy identified in May 1973 grew for twenty-three months before they produced the explosion.

This cable is the record of someone who saw it coming and wrote it down.

Key Locations

●

Sabra camp — Site of Lebanese Army tactical operations May 8; referenced in army performance assessment

○

South Bekaa — Area of fedayeen infiltration from Syria; army artillery operations; Lebanese troops redeployed to Beirut from here

○

Arkub — Southern border area; mentioned in army operations assessment; fedayeen border control zone

○

Sidon — City where fedayeen and leftist Lebanese allies held de facto control with army steering clear

○

Tyre — Southern city where fedayeen held de facto control during the May crisis

Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors · View in OpenStreetMap

Primary Source

This article is based entirely on U.S. Embassy Beirut cable 1973BEIRUT05437, dispatched on May 12, 1973 and originally classified SECRET. Declassified and released by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order Systematic Review, July 5, 2006. No facts have been added, removed, or altered.

View original on Wikileaks PlusD →

Topics

1973 pre-war SECRET LIMDIS fedayeen Lebanese Army Syria confessional Frangieh Abu Iyad Salah Khalaf assessment

SECRET

Origin	U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
To	Secretary of State, Washington D.C.
Date	May 12, 1973
Cable ID	1973BEIRUT05437
Classification	SECRET → Declassified 2006

Situation in Lebanon

Annotated version — all original facts and language preserved in full

SECRET
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05437 01 OF 03 121524Z

ACTION NEA-06
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 IO-03 PM-03 L-02 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01
     NSC-10 NSCE-00 PRS-01 OPR-01 SSO-00 EUR-10 AF-04 RSR-01 /067 W

046998 R 121307Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2096
   DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
     AMEMBASSY LONDON
     AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
     AMEMBASSY JIDDA
     AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
     AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
     AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
     USCINCEUR
     USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
     AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T   SECTION 1 OF 3   BEIRUT 5437
LIMDIS
DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJ: SITUATION IN LEBANON

BEGIN SUMMARY: SITUATION HERE IS AS WE HAVE REPORTED FLUID AND CONFUSED.
NEVERTHELESS WE THINK OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT AND PAST AS BEST WE CAN
MAKE IT, SET OUT, WILL BE USEFUL IN CONSIDERING FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF LEBANESE
CRISIS. DESPITE CONTINUED CALM AND PROGRESSIVE RETURN TO NORMALCY, OUR
ASSESSMENT OF LONGER-TERM POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION IS NOT RPT NOT GOOD
ALTHOUGH IT COULD IMPROVE SHOULD CERTAIN FACTORS EVOLVE IN FAVOR OF GOL. REPORTS
WE RECEIVE FROM PRESIDENCY INDICATE CONTINUED OPTIMISM AND DETERMINATION TO
IMPROVE CONSIDERABLY ON BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN WHICH EXISTED
PRIOR TO BEIRUT RAID. HOWEVER, PRECISE IDEAS ON HOW TO GET THERE ARE JUST
BEGINNING TO EMERGE AND IT MAY BE THAT GOL WILL FIND IT LACKS POLITICAL AND
MILITARY FORCE REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE. INTERNAL POLITICAL
SITUATION HAS BEEN RELATIVELY GOOD AND CONFESSIONAL SPLIT HAS NOT OCCURRED
ALTHOUGH THIS IS MATTER OF DEEP AND CONTINUING CONCERN. HOWEVER SUNNI MOSLEM
LEADERS THUS FAR UNWILLING ACTUALLY SUPPORT FRANGIE IN IMPOSING CONTROL ON
FEDAYEEN AND MOSLEM QUARTERS OF MAJOR CITIES OFFER POTENTIAL REFUGE AS WELL AS
SOME SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN. ECONOMIC DAMAGE AND DISCOMFORT SUFFERED FOR
CONTINUATION SEEMS TO BE GENERATING POPULAR PRESSURE FOR EARLY SETTLEMENT ON
ALMOST ANY TERMS SO LONG AS CALM RESTORED. MUCH OF ARMY'S FIGHTING FORCE TIED
UP IN MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER BEIRUT, ALTHOUGH ARMY HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS
FIGHTING ABILITY, COHESION AND COURAGE AND HAS HURT FEDAYEEN IN SOME AREAS.
FEDAYEEN HAVE QUIETED DOWN AND ARE NEGOTIATING WITH ARMY. HOWEVER, THEY ARE IN
POSITION OF RELATIVE STRENGTH BECAUSE THEIR COMBINED REGULAR AND MILITIA COMBAT
ELEMENTS ARE MORE NUMEROUS THAN ARMY COMBAT TROOPS AND ARE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED
IN BIG CITIES AS WELL AS IN COUNTRYSIDE, WHILE THREAT OF SYRIAN ACTION CONTINUES
TO HANG HEAVY OVER HEAD OF LEBANESE. ARAB REACTION HAS BEEN MIXED BUT EVEN MOST
HELPFUL ARAB STATES (EGYPT AND KUWAIT) ARE AIMING FOR CEASE-FIRE ALONG LINES
STATUS QUO RATHER THAN STRONGER GOL POSITION. THERE IS NO VISIBLE SOURCE OF
STRONG EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR FRANGIE. SUM OF ABOVE FACTORS INDICATES LIKELIHOOD
OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WILL BRING ONLY LIMITED IMPROVEMENT IN GOL-FEDAYEEN
RELATIONSHIP BUT WHICH WILL LEAVE BEHIND CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO LEBANESE
ECONOMY, SOME DAMAGE TO STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT (I.E., FRANGIE) AND MORALE OF
ARMY, AND SEEDS OF ANOTHER EXPLOSION LATER ON. LESS LIKELY COMBINATION OF
REDUCED SYRIAN THREAT, RALLYING OF STRONGER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR
FRANGIE'S POSITION, AND ALL-OUT ACTION BY ARMY COULD PRODUCE MORE FAVORABLE
LONG-TERM OUTCOME. END SUMMARY.

1. REPORTS FROM PRESIDENCY (DIB, TONY FRANGIE, FONMIN ABOU HAMAD) AND FOREIGN
OFFICE (SADDAQA) INDICATE THAT PRES FRANGIE REMAINS DETERMINED TO TRY TO
ENFORCE GOL CONTROL (SOVEREIGNTY) OVER FEDAYEEN TO MUCH GREATER DEGREE THAN
SINCE 1969. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT PRECISE IDEAS ON SHAPE OF NEW OVERALL
UNDERSTANDING WITH FEDAYEEN AND HOW TO ARRIVE AT ONE ARE JUST BEGINNING TO BE
WORKED OUT (SEE SEPTEL). WE UNDERSTAND FRANGIE INSISTING UPON MINIMUM OF
QUASI-DEMILITARIZATION OF CAMPS IN BEIRUT AREA AND HAVING FEDAYEEN ANSWER TO
LEBANESE JUSTICE FOR CIVIL OFFENSES. FRANGIE IS USING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND
CONSULTATIONS WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN EFFORT TO BOLSTER
POPULAR AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR HIS POSITION. MIXED ARMY-FEDAYEEN COMMISSION
MEETING REGULARLY BUT ITS TALKS CONFINED TO SPECIFICS OF MAINTAINING CEASE-FIRE
RATHER THAN WORK ON OVERALL SETTLEMENT. ARMY IS AT LEAST AS DETERMINED AS
FRANGIE TO IMPOSE CONTROLS ON FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER IT NOT CLEAR WHAT WILL EMERGE,
ESPECIALLY SINCE GOL-FEDAYEEN NEGOTIATIONS ARE INEVITABLY INFLUENCED BY INTERNAL
POLITICO-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND BY EXTERNAL FACTORS SUCH AS ATTITUDE AND ACTIONS
OF ARAB STATES AND MAJOR POWERS.

2. INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IS, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGING
IN THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO OPEN SPLIT OF LEBANESE POPULATION ALONG CONFESSIONAL
LINES AND SUNNI MOSLEM LEADERS ARE GENERALLY MODERATE RATHER THAN EXTREMIST IN
THEIR ATTITUDES. FORMER PRIME MINISTER SAEB SALAM HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO FRANGIE
AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER RACHID KARAME HAS BEEN NOT AS BAD AS HE MIGHT HAVE
BEEN, ALTERNATING ANTI-GOL POSTURING (E.G., URGING HAFEZ TO RESIGN AS PRIME
MINISTER) WITH EFFORTS TO CALM SUNNI MOSLEMS AND PREVENT OPEN SPLIT. HOWEVER,
NONE OF SUNNI MOSLEM LEADERS HAS COME OUT CLEARLY IN SUPPORT OF FRANGIE'S
POSITION RE NEED TO IMPOSE GREATER GOL CONTROL ON FEDAYEEN, INCLUDING CAMPS.
AND WHILE MOSLEM QUARTERS OF BEIRUT, TRIPOLI, SIDON AND TYRE HAVE GENERALLY
REMAINED CALM, ARMS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO POTENTIALLY PRO-FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS IN
ALL THESE CITIES; AND IN LARGE PARTS OF SIDON AND TYRE FEDAYEEN AND THEIR SUNNI
AND LEFTIST LEBANESE SUPPORTERS HAVE HELD DE FACTO CONTROL WITH ARMY AND POLICE
STEERING CLEAR. ABSENCE OF SUNNI MOSLEM PRIME MINISTER IS BOTH INDICATIVE OF
ABSENCE OF IMPORTANT SUNNI MOSLEM SUPPORT AND ONE OF THE REASONS FOR IT.

(SECTION 2 OF 3)

LACK OF SUCH SUPPORT OBVIOUSLY HAS SOME INHIBITING EFFECT ON PRES FRANGIE AND
ARMY WHO FEAR THAT PRESSING FEDAYEEN TOO HARD COULD PROVOKE CONFESSIONAL SPLIT
AND CIVIL STRIFE. IT ALSO ENCOURAGES FEDAYEEN TO HOLD OUT FOR BETTER TERMS IN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOL. (WE HAVE RELIABLE REPORTS THAT AT ONE TIME DURING HEAT
OF FIGHTING ARAFAT THREATENED SAEB SALAM WITH MOVING FEDAYEEN IN BEIRUT AREA
FROM CAMPS INTO MOSLEM QUARTER AND MAKING STAND THERE IN INDIVIDUAL HOMES. THIS
IS WITHIN CAPABILITY OF FEDAYEEN, AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT SUNNIS OF BEIRUT OR
OTHER CITIES WOULD OFFER ANY RESISTANCE EVEN THOUGH ONLY MINORITY OF THEM COULD
BE EXPECTED ACTUALLY TO TAKE UP ARMS. LEBANESE ARMY WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE
VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE PROBLEMS OF GETTING FEDAYEEN OUT.) THERE ARE SOME POLITICAL
FIGURES (AS WELL AS PRESIDENT) WORKING TO RALLY ACTIVE SUNNI MOSLEM SUPPORT FOR
FRANGIE'S POSITION BUT IT HAS NOT YET APPEARED. ON OTHER HAND, CHRISTIAN
POPULATION CLEARLY IN SOLID SUPPORT OF GOL AS ONE WOULD EXPECT. PHALANGE HAVE
TAKEN UP ARMS IN SOME SECTORS AND SAME IN SOME INTERIOR REGIONS AND VILLAGES.
SHIA MOSLEM LEADERS ARE ALSO SUPPORTING FRANGIE POSITION.

3. ECONOMIC SITUATION IS BEGINNING TO BITE. LOSS OF REVENUE TO INDIVIDUALS DUE
TO NON-WORK AND CURFEW PLUS ABSENCE OF SOME FOODSTUFFS AND OTHER GOODS DUE TO
PORT CLOSURE IS ALREADY HURTING, AS IS LOSS OF BUSINESS AND PROFITS TO LEBANON'S
POWERFUL BUSINESS COMMUNITY. LOSS OF REVENUE TO GOL (DIMINISHED TAXES AND
DUTIES) AND TO COUNTRY GENERALLY DUE TO LONGER-TERM FALL-OFF OF BUSINESS AND
TOURISM IS ANOTHER CONSIDERATION, AS IS PERSONAL DISCOMFORT FROM CURFEW AND, IN
SOME CASES, FROM ACTUAL BATTLE DAMAGE. GIVEN LEBANESE MENTALITY, THESE FACTORS
CANNOT HELP BUT GENERATE PRESSURE FOR EARLY SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
GOL AND FEDAYEEN ON ALMOST ANY TERMS SO LONG AS CALM AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
ARE RESTORED SOON -- IRRESPECTIVE OF LONGER-TERM PROBLEMS WHICH REMAIN
UNRESOLVED. RETURN TO BUSINESS-AS-USUAL CAN TAKE PLACE WITHOUT SETTLING
FEDAYEEN PROBLEM, BUT IT WILL MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR ARMY TO CONTROL
MOVEMENT OF FEDAYEEN, RESUPPLY OF CAMPS, ETC., AND COULD ALSO MAKE GOL MORE
APPREHENSIVE OF RISKING ANOTHER SHOWDOWN WITH FEDAYEEN FOR FEAR OF ADVERSE
PUBLIC REACTION.

4. OUR OVERALL ESTIMATE OF ARMY'S PERFORMANCE TO DATE IS GOOD -- BETTER EVEN
THAN EXPECTED IN SUCH FIELDS AS AIR OPERATIONS, USE OF ARMOR AND INFANTRY IN
CERTAIN TACTICAL OPERATIONS SUCH AS ATTACK ON OUTSKIRTS SABRA CAMP MAY 8, AND
USE OF ARTILLERY IN BEIRUT AREA AND SOUTH BEKAA/ARKUB. HOWEVER, ARMY IS NOT
OPERATING ON BASIS OF ANY OPERATION PLAN NOR ANY AGREED STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR
MASTERING FEDAYEEN, AND IT HAS BEEN HELD IN TIGHT CONTROL BY PRESIDENT FRANGIE
WHO HAS THUS FAR NOT ORDERED ARMY TO TRY AND OVERTAKE CAMPS BY FORCE, PROBABLY
BECAUSE HE BELIEVES FEDAYEEN WILL EVENTUALLY CONCEDE MINIMAL DEMANDS WITHOUT
SUCH DRASTIC MOVE AND/OR BECAUSE HE FEARS THAT DIRECT ATTACK ON CAMPS COULD
PROVOKE FULL-SCALE CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, CONFESSIONAL
SPLIT, AND INCREASED SYRIAN INTERVENTION. ALSO, AS REPORTED, ARMY SHELLING AND
BOMBING OF CAMP AREAS HAS BEEN HELD TO MINIMUM AND DIRECTED AT SPECIFIC TARGETS
AND AVOIDANCE OF POPULATED AREAS. LIMITED ACTION BY ARMY HAS SUCCEEDED IN
AVOIDING NATION-WIDE CLASH WITH FEDAYEEN AND HAS CONFINED FIGHT WITH FEDAYEEN
IN BEIRUT MOSTLY TO AREAS IN AND IMMEDIATELY AROUND CAMPS RATHER THAN HAVING IT
DEGENERATE INTO FULL-SCALE URBAN GUERILLA ACTION. BEIRUT HAS BEEN BROUGHT UNDER
CONTROL AND FEDAYEEN EFFECTIVELY CONFINED TO CAMPS BUT AT COST OF FREEZING LARGE
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ARMY COMBAT UNITS IN BEIRUT AREA AND ALLOWING FEDAYEEN TO
FURTHER FORTIFY CAMPS. THE ARMY HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO BRING ABOUT HALF OF ITS
FORCES IN THE SOUTH INTO BEIRUT, DENUDING THAT SECTION OF COUNTRY TO A POINT
WHERE FEDAYEEN MAY SOON ENJOY GREATER MOBILITY AND FREEDOM OF ACTION (ON THE
LEBANESE SIDE) THAN FOR MANY MONTHS. THE ARMY HAS ALSO BEEN OBLIGED TO "FREEZE"
A NUMBER OF TROOPS IN BORDER AREAS FAR FROM THE MAJOR CITIES IN ORDER TO TRY
AND PREVENT TROOP INFILTRATION FROM SYRIA AND MOVEMENT OF ARMS AND MEN FROM
REMOTE AREAS INTO THE MAJOR CITIES AND REFUGEE CAMPS. ARMY HAS BEEN PARTIALLY
SUCCESSFUL ON BOTH COUNTS BUT ADDITIONAL FEDAYEEN HAVE MOVED FROM SYRIA INTO
REMOTE AREAS OF LEBANON AND SOME ARMS HAVE REACHED THE MAJOR CITIES AND CAMPS.
A MAJOR LIMITATION ON CAPABILITY OF ARMY IS THAT IT HAS MAXIMUM OF 6,000 ACTUAL
COMBAT TROOPS.

5. THE ESTIMATE OF FEDAYEEN STRENGTH IN LEBANON WE HAVE BEEN USING FOR SOME
TIME IS ABOUT 5,000 ARMED "REGULARS" PLUS PERHAPS ANOTHER 10,000 "MILITIA"
(MOSTLY IN THE CAMPS). REGARDLESS OF WHETHER ONE TAKES ISRAEL'S OR LEBANESE
ESTIMATE OF NUMBERS OF FEDAYEEN REGULARS WHO CROSSED INTO LEBANON DURING PAST
TEN DAYS, THE NUMBER OF REGULARS HAS INCREASED. MOREOVER, THERE ARE OTHER
SIZEABLE REGULAR CAMPS IN BEIRUT AREA. RECENT FIGHTING HAS PROVEN CORRECT PRIOR
SUSPICIONS THAT THEY (AND MILITIA) ARE HEAVILY ARMED, INCLUDING EFFECTIVE
ANTI-TANK ROCKETS, KATUSHA, HEAVY AND LIGHT MORTARS AND MACHINE GUNS. CAMPS
ARE ALSO FORTIFIED TO VARYING DEGREES AGAINST ASSAULT. FEDAYEEN (REGULARS AND
MILITIA) HAVE ALSO PROVEN THEY ARE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR GROUND UNDER FIRE
(ALTHOUGH NOT DIRECT ASSAULT) IN CAMPS. ALTHOUGH SOME OF CAMPS (AND FEDAYEEN
IN THEM) SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE. DURING FIGHTING FEDAYEEN DEMONSTRATED
CAPABILITY FOR WIDESPREAD URBAN GUERILLA AND TERROR ACTION EVEN THOUGH IT WAS
LIMITED IN PRACTICE. SAME APPLIES FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES
(E.G., SIDON AND TYRE) AND IN COUNTRYSIDE (E.G., AMBUSH BETWEEN SIDON AND TYRE)
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE ONLY LIMITED INSTANCES OF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS OUTSIDE BEIRUT
EXCEPT FOR ACTION IN SYRIAN BORDER AREAS. ONE FEDAYEEN WEAKNESS MAY BE SHORTAGE
OF AMMUNITION AFTER EXTENDED FIGHTING.

(SECTION 3 OF 3)

6. SYRIAN ROLE, AS WE HAVE ALL BEEN AWARE FOR MANY YEARS, IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE
IN DETERMINING RELATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE ARMY. OVER
PAST TEN DAYS, APPARENTLY WITHOUT COMMITTING MORE THAN A COUPLE OF HUNDRED SAIQA
(IF THAT) AND FEW IF ANY REGULAR UNITS, SYRIA WAS ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY FUEL
FIGHTING ABILITY OF FEDAYEEN, HARASS ARMY INSTALLATIONS AND OUTPOSTS NEAR BORDER
AREA (E.G., TWO MILITARY AIRFIELDS), AND HOLD OVER GOL HEAD THREAT OF MORE
MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF FEDAYEEN AND EVEN, SHOULD ALL-OUT FIGHT DEVELOP, SYRIAN
REGULAR UNITS. THIS LATTER PROSPECT DISCOUNTED SOMEWHAT BY LEBANESE ARMY WHO
COUNTING ON ISRAEL BUT NEITHER ARMY NOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE COULD ASSUME IT WOULD
NOT HAPPEN SINCE THERE WERE NO HARD ASSURANCES AGAINST IT FROM ANY QUARTER AND
THERE WERE SIGNALS FROM SYRIANS THAT IT MIGHT HAPPEN. MAIN POINT TO BEAR IN
MIND, HOWEVER, IS THAT EVEN WITHOUT COMMITTING REGULARS SYRIA HAS SHOWN
CAPABILITY OF ADDING CONSIDERABLY TO MILITARY CAPABILITY OF FEDAYEEN. SYRIA ALSO
HAS CAPABILITY OF ADDING TO POLITICAL THREAT POSED BY PRO-FEDAYEEN AND/OR
LEFTIST LEBANESE ELEMENTS BY ITS PROPAGANDA AND ITS POLITICAL AGITATION AMONG
MAJOR CITIES. OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IS SYRIAN SMUGGLING OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION.
JUDGING FROM WHAT WE KNOW HERE AND WHAT IDF HAS REPORTED VIA DAO TEL AVIV,
SYRIANS SEEM TO HAVE PLENTY OF FEDAYEEN UNITS IN RESERVE SHOULD FIGHTING START
UP AGAIN. FOR PRESENT, HOWEVER, THEY SEEM CONTENT TO AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS AND
DISPLAY VISAGE OF SWEET REASONABLENESS.

7. ROLE OF OTHER ARAB STATES HAS, AS REPORTED FROM HERE AND OTHER POSTS, VARIED
WIDELY. IRAQ AND ALGERIA WERE AT LEAST AS NASTY AS SYRIA IN TERMS OF PROPAGANDA,
ALTHOUGH ALGERIANS WERE LESS PROVOCATIVE IN TERMS OF AMBASSADOR YAZID'S
BEHAVIOUR ON THE GROUND. EGYPT AND MAHMOUD RIAD SO FAR APPEAR TO HAVE PLAYED
USEFUL ROLE IN RESTRAINING SYRIANS AS DID KUWAIT. OTHER ARAB STATES WERE MORE
OR LESS NEUTRAL. HOWEVER, WITH EXCEPTION OF JORDAN, NONE OF THEM, AS BEST WE
CAN DETERMINE, HAVE BEEN WILLING TO TAKE STAND IN EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
BACKING FRANGIE'S DEMAND FOR TIGHTER CONTROLS OVER FEDAYEEN AND, AS FIGHTING
CONTINUED, ARAB POSITION (INCLUDING EGYPT) VIS-A-VIS GOL TENDED TO WEAKEN.

8. ROLE OF OUTSIDE POWERS WAS NOT A MAJOR FACTOR ALTHOUGH FRANCE AND UNITED
STATES PROVIDED SOME MORAL ENCOURAGEMENT TO FRANGIE WHILE USSR WAS DISCREETLY
SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN. ROLE OF LATTER COULD BE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT IN THAT IT
COULD HAVE PLAYED AND CAN STILL PLAY EFFECTIVE POSITIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING
FRANGIE VIS-A-VIS SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN BUT SO FAR CLEARLY DISINCLINED TO DO SO.
FOR OBVIOUS POLITICAL REASONS GOL DID NOT ASK FOR DIRECT AID FROM US OR FRENCH
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT IT WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT WE COULD
DO TO HELP DETER SYRIANS.

9. SOME TIME IN NEAR FUTURE, PROBABLY MATTER OF FEW WEEKS BUT POSSIBLY SOONER,
SITUATION SUMMARIZED ABOVE WILL VERY LIKELY LEAD TO: (A) FEDAYEEN ACCEPTANCE
(PROBABLY TACIT) OF FRANGIE'S MINIMAL DEMANDS; OR (B) FRANGIE WITHDRAWAL
(PROBABLY TACIT) OF DEMANDS AND ACCEPTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP WITH FEDAYEEN FAIRLY
CLOSE TO STATUS QUO ANTE; OR (C) NEW CONFRONTATION BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND FRANGIE
AND ARMY.

A. OPTION A) IT IS OUR PRESENT JUDGMENT THAT FEDAYEEN WILL NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT
ANY REAL DEMILITARIZATION OF CAMPS, EVEN REMOVAL OF HEAVY ARMS WHICH SEEMS BE
ROCK-BOTTOM MINIMUM DEMAND OF FRANGIE. (SALAH KHALAF TOLD ARMY REPS ON MIXED
COMMISSION ON MAY 10 HE WOULD NEVER STAND FOR REPETITION OF WHAT HAPPENED TO
FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN IN 1970 WHEN THEY DEMILITARIZED CAMPS. ARMY BELIEVES THIS
ACCURATELY REFLECTS REAL POSITION OF FEDAYEEN. SO DO WE.) THEREFORE OPTION A)
ABOVE SEEMS TO US UNLIKELY.

B. OPTION B) THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR FRANGIE SINCE HE IS PROUD MAN WHO HAS
STAKED A LOT ON IMPOSING AT LEAST MINIMAL GOL SOVEREIGNTY OVER FEDAYEEN,
INCLUDING CAMPS. MOREOVER, ARMY IS PRESSING HARD FOR AT LEAST THIS MUCH
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES THEY HAVE SUFFERED -- AND THIS MUCH INSURANCE AGAINST
FURTHER ISRAELI INCURSIONS PROVOKED BY FEDAYEEN. SEVERAL SENIOR OFFICERS AND
MANY JUNIOR OFFICERS REPORTEDLY UNHAPPY OVER RESTRAINTS PLACED ON ARMY OVER
PAST TEN DAYS. SHOULD FRANGIE BE FORCED BACK DOWN IT COULD HURT MORALE OF ARMY
AS WELL AS PRESTIGE OF PRESIDENT. ECONOMIC LOSSES WOULD BE FOR NAUGHT. MOREOVER
CONDITIONS WOULD EXIST FOR ANOTHER SERIOUS EXPLOSION AT SOME FUTURE DATE BETWEEN
GOL AND FEDAYEEN, POSSIBLY AS RESULT OF ANOTHER ISRAELI RAID.

C. OPTION C) THIS IS UP TO FRANGIE WHOSE PRIDE AND NATIONALISM COULD CAUSE HIM
TO MAKE DECISION EVEN THOUGH ODDS SEEMED NOT TO BE IN HIS FAVOR. HOWEVER, WE
ARE INCLINED TO DOUBT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE SUCH RISK UNLESS HE SUCCEEDS
IN PLANS TO RALLY STRONGER POLITICAL SUPPORT THAN HE HAD OVER PAST TEN DAYS,
AND UNLESS HE CAN EXPECT GREATER DEGREE OF NEUTRALIZATION OF SYRIAN FACTOR THAN
WAS CASE OVER PAST TEN DAYS.

10. IN CONCLUSION, PRINCIPAL FACTORS WHICH PRESIDENT MUST CONSIDER IN CHARTING
COURSE OF ACTION ARE (A) AVOIDANCE OF CONFESSIONAL SPLIT, (B) POSITION OF SYRIA
(AND EGYPT) AND (C) CAPACITY OF HIS SMALL ARMY. WITH THESE FACTS IN MIND, WE
BELIEVE, UNLESS DISSIDENT FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS MANAGE TO FORCE RESUMPTION OF
FIGHTING -- AND THIS IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY -- MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS SOME
SORT OF "LEBANESE SOLUTION" WHICH WILL SAVE SOME FACE BUT WHICH IS NOT LIKELY
TO FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE POSITION OF FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. IT WOULD SAVE LEBANON
FOR THE TIME BEING FROM POTENTIAL CATASTROPHE BUT SEEDS OF ANOTHER EXPLOSION
WOULD REMAIN. THIS, OF COURSE, PREDICATED ON ABSENCE OF ANY ISRAELI RAIDS ON
LEBANON DURING CRISIS.

HOUGHTON

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

SECRET NMAFVVZCZ

Originally classified SECRET / LIMDIS · Declassified and released by U.S. Department of State under EO Systematic Review · Now UNCLASSIFIED · Three sections transmitted as separate cables (BEIRUT 5437 01-03 of 03)

Summary
The situation here is, as we have reported, fluid and confused. Nevertheless, we think an overall assessment of the present and recent past — as best we can make it — will be useful in considering the future implications of the Lebanese crisis. Despite continued calm and progressive return to normalcy, our assessment of the longer-term politico-military situation is not good, although it could improve should certain factors evolve in favor of the GOL.^[1]

Reports we receive from the Presidency indicate continued optimism and determination to improve considerably on the balance of power between the GOL and the fedayeen^[2] which existed prior to the Beirut raid.^[3] However, precise ideas on how to get there are just beginning to emerge, and it may be that the GOL will find it lacks the political and military force required to accomplish this objective.

Internal political situation has been relatively good and confessional split has not occurred, although this is a matter of deep and continuing concern. However, Sunni Muslim leaders are thus far unwilling actually to support Frangieh in imposing control on fedayeen, and Muslim quarters of major cities offer potential refuge as well as some support for fedayeen.

Economic damage and discomfort are generating popular pressure for early settlement on almost any terms so long as calm is restored. Much of the army’s fighting force is tied up in maintaining control over Beirut, although the army has demonstrated its fighting ability, cohesion and courage, and has hurt the fedayeen in some areas. Fedayeen have quieted down and are negotiating with the army. However, they are in a position of relative strength because their combined regular and militia combat elements are more numerous than army combat troops, and are strategically located in big cities as well as in the countryside, while the threat of Syrian action continues to hang heavily over the head of Lebanon.

Arab reaction has been mixed, but even the most helpful Arab states (Egypt and Kuwait) are aiming for a ceasefire along status quo lines rather than a stronger GOL position. There is no visible source of strong external support for Frangieh. The sum of the above factors indicates a likelihood of a compromise solution which will bring only limited improvement in the GOL-fedayeen relationship, but which will leave behind considerable damage to the Lebanese economy, some damage to the strength of the government and morale of the army, and seeds of another explosion later on.^[4]

A less likely combination — reduced Syrian threat, rallying of stronger internal and external support for Frangieh’s position, and all-out action by the army — could produce a more favorable long-term outcome.

1. Frangieh’s position and the negotiations
Reports from the Presidency (Dib, Tony Frangie,^[5] Foreign Minister Abou Hamad) and the Foreign Office (Saddaqa) indicate that President Frangieh^[6] remains determined to enforce GOL control (sovereignty) over the fedayeen to a much greater degree than since 1969. However, precise ideas on the shape of a new overall understanding and how to arrive at one are just beginning to be worked out. We understand Frangieh is insisting upon, at a minimum, quasi-demilitarization of camps in the Beirut area and having fedayeen answer to Lebanese justice for civil offenses. Frangieh is using the National Assembly and consultations with various political and religious leaders in an effort to bolster popular and political support for his position. The Mixed Army-Fedayeen Commission^[7] is meeting regularly, but its talks are confined to specifics of maintaining the ceasefire rather than work on an overall settlement.

2. Internal political situation
The internal political situation is somewhat encouraging in that there has been no open split of the Lebanese population along confessional lines,^[8] and Sunni Muslim leaders are generally moderate rather than extremist in their attitudes. Former Prime Minister Saeb Salam^[9] has been helpful to Frangieh, and former Prime Minister Rachid Karame has been “not as bad as he might have been,” alternating anti-GOL posturing (e.g., urging Hafez to resign as Prime Minister) with efforts to calm Sunni Muslims and prevent an open split. However, none of the Sunni Muslim leaders has come out clearly in support of Frangieh’s position regarding the need to impose greater GOL control on the fedayeen, including the camps.

While Muslim quarters of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre have generally remained calm, arms were distributed to potentially pro-fedayeen elements in all these cities; and in large parts of Sidon and Tyre, fedayeen and their Sunni and leftist Lebanese supporters have held de facto control with army and police steering clear. The absence of a Sunni Muslim Prime Minister is both indicative of absent Sunni support and one of the reasons for it.

Lack of such support obviously has some inhibiting effect on Frangieh and the army, who fear that pressing the fedayeen too hard could provoke a confessional split and civil strife. It also encourages the fedayeen to hold out for better terms. (We have reliable reports that at one time during the heat of fighting, Arafat threatened Saeb Salam with moving fedayeen in the Beirut area from the camps into the Muslim quarter and making a stand there in individual homes.^[10] This is within the capability of the fedayeen, and it is doubtful that Sunnis of Beirut or other cities would offer any resistance, even though only a minority of them could be expected actually to take up arms. The Lebanese Army would, of course, have virtually impossible problems getting the fedayeen out.)

On the other hand, the Christian population is clearly in solid support of the GOL, as one would expect. The Phalange have taken up arms in some sectors and the same is true in some interior regions and villages. Shia Muslim leaders are also supporting the Frangieh position.

3. Economic situation
The economic situation is beginning to bite. Loss of revenue to individuals due to non-work and curfew, plus absence of some foodstuffs and goods due to port closure, is already hurting, as is loss of business and profits to Lebanon’s powerful business community.^[11] Given Lebanese mentality, these factors cannot help but generate pressure for an early settlement on almost any terms, so long as calm and commercial activity are restored soon — irrespective of longer-term problems which remain unresolved. A return to business-as-usual can take place without settling the fedayeen problem, but it will make it much more difficult for the army to control fedayeen movement and resupply of camps, and could also make the GOL more apprehensive of risking another showdown with the fedayeen for fear of adverse public reaction.

4. Army performance and limitations
Our overall estimate of the army’s performance to date is good — better even than expected in such fields as air operations, use of armor and infantry in certain tactical operations (such as the attack on the outskirts of Sabra camp on May 8), and use of artillery in the Beirut area and South Bekaa/Arkub.^[12] However, the army is not operating on the basis of any operation plan nor any agreed strategic concept for mastering the fedayeen, and it has been held in tight control by President Frangieh, who has thus far not ordered the army to overtake camps by force — probably because he believes the fedayeen will eventually concede minimal demands without such a drastic move, and/or because he fears a direct attack on the camps could provoke a full-scale confrontation throughout the country, a confessional split, and increased Syrian intervention.

A major limitation on the army’s capability is that it has a maximum of 6,000 actual combat troops.^[13]

5. Fedayeen strength
The estimate of fedayeen strength in Lebanon we have been using for some time is about 5,000 armed “regulars” plus perhaps another 10,000 “militia” (mostly in the camps).^[14] Regardless of the exact numbers, the regulars have increased during the past ten days. The recent fighting has proven correct prior suspicions that the fedayeen (and militia) are heavily armed, including effective anti-tank rockets, Katyusha rockets, heavy and light mortars, and machine guns. Camps are also fortified to varying degrees against assault. During the fighting, fedayeen demonstrated capability for widespread urban guerrilla and terror action even though it was limited in practice. One fedayeen weakness may be a shortage of ammunition after extended fighting.

6. The Syrian role
The Syrian role, as we have all been aware for many years, is of vital importance in determining the relative military strength of the fedayeen and the Lebanese Army.^[15] Over the past ten days, apparently without committing more than a couple of hundred Sa’iqa (if that) and few if any regular units, Syria was able to effectively fuel the fighting ability of the fedayeen, harass army installations and outposts near the border area (e.g., two military airfields), and hold over GOL’s head the threat of more massive infiltration of fedayeen and even, should all-out fight develop, Syrian regular units. The Lebanese Army is counting on Israel as a deterrent, but neither the army nor President Frangieh could assume Syrian intervention would not happen, since there were no hard assurances against it from any quarter and there were signals from the Syrians that it might happen. Of vital importance is Syrian smuggling of arms and ammunition. For the present, however, Syria seems content to await developments and display a “visage of sweet reasonableness.”^[16]

7. Arab states
Iraq and Algeria were at least as hostile as Syria in terms of propaganda. Egypt and Arab League Secretary General Mahmoud Riad appear to have played a useful role in restraining the Syrians, as did Kuwait. Other Arab states were more or less neutral. However, with the exception of Jordan, none of them have been willing to take a stand backing Frangieh’s demand for tighter controls over the fedayeen; and as fighting continued, the Arab position (including Egypt) vis-à-vis the GOL tended to weaken.^[17]

8. Outside powers
The role of outside powers was not a major factor, although France and the United States provided some moral encouragement to Frangieh, while the USSR was discreetly supporting the fedayeen.^[18] The USSR’s role could be considered important in that it could have played, and can still play, an effective positive role in supporting Frangieh vis-à-vis the Syrians and fedayeen, but is so far clearly disinclined to do so. For obvious political reasons, the GOL did not ask for direct aid from the U.S. or France, although there were indications it was interested in knowing what we could do to help deter the Syrians.

9. Three scenarios
Some time in the near future — probably a matter of a few weeks, but possibly sooner — the situation summarized above will very likely lead to one of three outcomes:

Option A — Fedayeen acceptance (probably tacit) of Frangieh’s minimal demands: It is our present judgment that the fedayeen will not accept any real demilitarization of camps, even removal of heavy arms, which seems to be the rock-bottom minimum demand of Frangieh. Salah Khalaf^[19] told army representatives on the Mixed Commission on May 10 he would never stand for a repetition of what happened to the fedayeen in Jordan in 1970, when they demilitarized camps. The army believes this accurately reflects the real position of the fedayeen. So do we. Therefore Option A seems to us unlikely.

Option B — Frangieh withdrawal (probably tacit) of demands and acceptance of a relationship with the fedayeen fairly close to the status quo ante: This would be difficult for Frangieh, since he is a proud man who has staked a lot on imposing at least minimal GOL sovereignty. Moreover, the army is pressing hard for at least this much compensation for the losses they have suffered, and this much insurance against further Israeli incursions provoked by the fedayeen. Several senior officers and many junior officers are reportedly unhappy over restraints placed on the army over the past ten days. Should Frangieh be forced to back down, it could hurt army morale as well as the President’s prestige. Conditions would exist for another serious explosion at some future date, possibly as a result of another Israeli raid.

Option C — New confrontation between the fedayeen and Frangieh and the army: This is up to Frangieh, whose pride and nationalism could cause him to make a decision even though the odds seemed not to be in his favor. However, we are inclined to doubt he would be willing to take such a risk unless he succeeds in plans to rally stronger political support than he had over the past ten days, and unless he can expect a greater degree of neutralization of the Syrian factor.

10. Conclusion
The principal factors which the President must consider are: (A) avoidance of confessional split, (B) position of Syria (and Egypt) and (C) the capacity of his small army. With these facts in mind, we believe — unless dissident fedayeen elements manage to force a resumption of fighting, which remains a distinct possibility — the most likely outcome is some sort of “Lebanese solution” which will save some face but which is not likely to fundamentally change the position of the fedayeen in Lebanon. It would save Lebanon for the time being from potential catastrophe, but the seeds of another explosion would remain. This, of course, is predicated on the absence of any Israeli raids on Lebanon during the crisis.^[20]

HOUGHTON

Editorial Footnotes

[1]This cable is classified SECRET with a LIMDIS (Limited Distribution) handling restriction — the first SECRET-classified cable in this archive. The LIMDIS restriction limits distribution beyond the standard addressee list; the cable was explicitly not passed to Cairo (noted at the end of each section). This more restricted distribution reflects the analytical sensitivity of what follows: a frank, comprehensive assessment of Lebanon's likely political trajectory.

[2]Fedayeen (Arabic: فدائيين, "those who sacrifice themselves"): Palestinian armed fighters. In the Lebanese context of May 1973, the term refers collectively to the armed members of PLO constituent organizations operating from bases in Lebanese refugee camps under the framework of the 1969 Cairo Agreement. By May 1973, their combined regular and militia forces in Lebanon significantly outnumbered the Lebanese Army's available combat troops, as this cable documents.

[3]"The Beirut raid": a reference to the April 9–10, 1973 Israeli commando operation in Beirut (Operation Spring of Youth), in which elite IDF units landed by sea and assassinated three senior PLO leaders in their Beirut apartments: Muhammad Yusuf al-Najjar (Abu Yusuf), Kamal Adwan, and Kamal Nasser. The operation demonstrated the Lebanese state's inability to protect either its own sovereignty or the Palestinian leadership operating on Lebanese soil — and was a proximate cause of the Palestinian armed escalation documented in the May 1973 crisis cables.

[4]"Seeds of another explosion later on": filed May 12, 1973. The next major Lebanese-Palestinian confrontation occurred in April 1975. This prediction, embedded in the cable's summary, is one of the most consequential sentences in this archive.

[5]Tony Frangie (Toni Frangieh, 1942–1978): eldest son of President Suleiman Frangieh, serving as a presidential aide and an informal Embassy contact. He appears in multiple cables in this archive serving as a conduit between the Lebanese Presidency and U.S. diplomats. He was assassinated on June 13, 1978, along with his wife, daughter, and bodyguards, in a raid on his home at Ehden ordered by Bashir Gemayel — one of the most consequential acts of intra-Maronite violence of the civil war.

[6]President Suleiman Frangieh (1910–1992): President of Lebanon 1970–1976, a Maronite from the Zgharta region of northern Lebanon. The cable's frank assessment — "he is a proud man who has staked a lot" — captures the personal dimension of the political crisis: Frangieh had committed his presidency to imposing sovereignty over the fedayeen, and a climb-down would be personally as well as politically costly. The cable documents both his determination and the structural constraints preventing him from achieving his stated objective.

[7]Mixed Army-Fedayeen Commission: the joint body established during the May 1973 crisis for negotiations between the Lebanese Army and PLO constituent organizations. The cable notes the Commission is confined to maintaining the ceasefire rather than addressing the underlying relationship — a diplomatic holding pattern that the subsequent cables (1973BEIRUT05755-05776) document yielding the fedayeen "unilateral promises" of May 17, 1973, which became the Melkart Protocol.

[8]The "confessional split" concern runs through the entire May 1973 cable series as the central constraint on Lebanese state action. The Lebanese political system was built on a carefully managed balance of Maronite, Sunni, and Shia interests (the 1943 National Pact); any military action by the Lebanese Army against Palestinian fighters risked being perceived as a Maronite attack on Muslim and Arab solidarity, fracturing the internal political consensus. This fear effectively capped the army's freedom of action and gave the fedayeen structural protection beyond their own military capability.

[9]Saeb Salam (1905–2000): Sunni Muslim politician from one of Beirut's most prominent families, former Prime Minister multiple times. The cable's description — Salam "has been helpful to Frangieh" despite being a former PM who had resigned the premiership specifically over the Lebanese Army's response to Palestinian armed activity — illustrates the complexity of Sunni political positioning: supporting the state in private while unable to support it publicly on the Palestinian issue.

[10]"Arafat threatened Saeb Salam with moving fedayeen from camps into the Muslim quarter": this threat — documented here as a reliable Embassy report — is one of the most analytically significant facts in this cable. It establishes that Arafat explicitly used the prospect of fedayeen dispersal into civilian Muslim neighborhoods as diplomatic leverage against Lebanese Sunni political leaders. If fedayeen were dispersed through Beirut's Muslim quarters, the Lebanese Army could not engage them without devastating those neighborhoods and producing the confessional split that both Frangieh and Lebanon's Sunni leaders were working to avoid. Arafat's threat was therefore militarily credible and politically unanswerable.

[11]The Lebanese economy in 1973 was heavily dependent on tourism, banking, and transit trade — all of which were acutely sensitive to political instability and security disruption. The cable's observation that economic pressure would generate demand for a settlement "on almost any terms" proved accurate: the Melkart Protocol of May 17, 1973, was reached partly because the Lebanese business community and public were unwilling to absorb the costs of continued confrontation. The cable explicitly notes this dynamic as one that would compromise long-term security outcomes.

[12]"Attack on the outskirts of Sabra camp, May 8": a specific operation cited as an example of the army's tactical competence. This attack occurred the same night that cable 1973BEIRUT05159 reported the Lebanese Army had deployed aircraft and tanks against the camps — meaning the May 8 ground action against Sabra was part of the same military operation sequence. This cable, filed May 12, is offering a retrospective assessment of those operations.

[13]"Maximum of 6,000 actual combat troops": this figure — embedded in a SECRET cable — represents the U.S. Embassy's assessment of Lebanon's effective military capacity in May 1973. Against an estimated 15,000 fedayeen (5,000 regulars plus 10,000 militia), the arithmetic was stark. The Embassy's assessment that the army lacked the capacity to overtake all fedayeen-held camps by force was not a political judgment — it was a quantitative one.

[14]"5,000 armed regulars plus perhaps another 10,000 militia": the Embassy's fedayeen strength estimate in May 1973 — 15,000 total armed combatants — exceeds the Lebanese Army's 6,000 combat troops by 2.5 to 1. This numerical imbalance is the military foundation of the cable's assessment that the fedayeen were in "a position of relative strength." It is also the foundational fact underlying Lebanon's inability to enforce the Cairo Agreement, the Melkart Protocol, or any subsequent agreement: the party being asked to comply had more guns than the party doing the asking.

[15]"As we have all been aware for many years": the phrasing — addressing other U.S. government agencies in a SECRET cable — signals that what follows is not new intelligence but a consolidated frank assessment of something already known within the national security community. The Syrian role in multiplying Lebanese fedayeen military capacity, documented here in quantitative terms, was systemic and sustained.

[16]"Display a visage of sweet reasonableness": the Embassy's sardonic characterization of Syria's post-crisis posture — having fueled the fedayeen fighting ability and threatened direct military intervention, Damascus now presented itself as a constructive regional actor. This pattern — Syrian destabilization followed by Syrian "mediation" — would recur throughout the Lebanese crisis. Khaddam's performance in the pre-fight diplomatic exchanges (documented in cables 1973STATE086221 and 1973BEIRUT05159) exemplifies exactly this dynamic.

[17]"The Arab position (including Egypt) vis-à-vis the GOL tended to weaken as fighting continued": this is a candid assessment of the limits of Egyptian moderation. Egypt had played a "useful role in restraining Syrians" earlier in the crisis (per the May 7 cable), but as fighting continued, Arab solidarity with the Palestinian cause reasserted itself. The U.S. Embassy is documenting in May 1973 the structural constraint that would remain constant through 1975: Lebanon was fighting for its sovereignty against forces that Arab solidarity, however ambivalent, could not ultimately be mobilized to oppose.

[18]"USSR was discreetly supporting the fedayeen": the embedding of Soviet support within a SECRET assessment — "discreetly," "not a major factor," but capable of playing "an effective positive role" that it was "clearly disinclined" to play — documents the Embassy's understanding of Soviet interests in Lebanon. The USSR had leverage over Damascus, over leftist Lebanese parties (the Lebanese Communist Party is specifically cited), and over fedayeen factions. Its choice to apply that leverage in support of fedayeen positions rather than Lebanese state authority was a policy choice, documented here.

[19]Salah Khalaf (1933–1991), known by his nom de guerre Abu Iyad: one of the founding members of Fatah and a close associate of Arafat, Khalaf served as the PLO's intelligence chief and was the principal organizer of Black September Organization operations including the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. His statement to the Lebanese Army Mixed Commission on May 10, 1973 — that he "would never stand for a repetition of what happened to the fedayeen in Jordan in 1970 when they demilitarized camps" — is one of the most important facts in this cable. It refers to the events of Black September 1970, when the Jordanian Army's suppression of the PLO resulted in thousands of Palestinian casualties and the PLO's forced expulsion from Jordan. Khalaf's warning was not rhetorical; it was a statement of organizational survival doctrine. The Embassy took it seriously: "So do we."

[20]The cable's closing conditional — "predicated on the absence of any Israeli raids on Lebanon during the crisis" — would prove exactly relevant to the next explosion. On April 11, 1974, Israeli forces attacked the town of Kiryat Shmona in a Palestinian raid, prompting Israeli reprisals. More directly, on April 11, 1974, the DFLP attacked the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmonah. Israeli reprisals in Lebanon were constant triggers for Lebanese-fedayeen tensions. This cable, written in May 1973, explicitly anticipates this mechanism. The civil war that began on April 13, 1975, was in no small part the product of exactly the dynamic this cable lays out: a face-saving Lebanese solution, seeds of another explosion, and the underlying structural conditions unchanged.

SECRET

How to Cite

Annotated version:
Institute for Lebanon, “Situation in Lebanon” (1973BEIRUT05437), May 12, 1973. instituteforlebanon.com/cables/1973BEIRUT05437/

Original cable:
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, “Situation in Lebanon” (1973BEIRUT05437), May 12, 1973. Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD).

SECRET
Highest standard classification level — first such cable in this archive
LIMDIS
Limited Distribution — more restricted than standard classified distribution
XGDS
Exempted from General Declassification Schedule (EO 11652)
GOL
Government of Lebanon
FEDAYEEN
Palestinian guerrilla fighters (Arabic: فدائيين)
SARG
Syrian Arab Republic Government
PFLP/GC
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command
SA'IQA
Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War — Syrian-backed Palestinian faction
KATUSHA
Katyusha rocket — Soviet-designed unguided artillery rocket
IDF
Israel Defense Forces