Cable 1974BEIRUT05740 · May 22, 1974 · SECRET

Beirut, May 22, 1974

Trouble Ahead for Lebanon: The Embassy Warns Kissinger

Filed May 22, 1974 — nine days before the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement and addressed to Secretary Kissinger's traveling party in Jerusalem — this SECRET cable tells the U.S. government that Israeli retaliation against Palestinian targets in Lebanon is counterproductive: producing dead Lebanese children, radicalizing Fatah moderates, pushing even Maronite deputies to demand Soviet SAMs, and threatening the disengagement agreement itself. And warns what comes after disengagement: Iraq and Libya will work to derail it through Lebanon.

Based on cable 1974BEIRUT05740 SECRET → UNCLASSIFIED

On May 22, 1974 — one week after the Ma'alot attack, three days after the Israeli naval strike on Rachidiyeh camp, one day after Israeli air strikes killed three Lebanese children, and nine days before the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement was signed — the U.S. Embassy in Beirut filed a SECRET/LIMDIS cable addressed partly to Secretary Kissinger's travel party in Jerusalem. The message: Israeli retaliation policy is not working. It is producing civilian casualties, radicalizing Fatah moderates, strengthening Iraqi and Libyan hands, and creating a feedback loop in which every Israeli strike pushes the fedayeen toward inside-Israel operations that provoke the next Israeli strike. The cable warns that after disengagement, Iraq and Libya will work to derail it by creating Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese trouble. It recommends a U.S. conversation with the Government of Israel about its entire policy toward Lebanon. The cable is signed GODLEY — the ambassador who would be in post when the civil war began 11 months later.

What this document reveals

Israeli air strikes on May 21, 1974 killed three Lebanese children and wounded seventeen more Lebanese civilians, while producing few fedayeen casualties because the targets had been evacuated after Kiryat Shmona. The Embassy assessed the pattern as “counter-productive.”
Even Maronite deputies — Lebanon's most pro-Western political bloc — were publicly calling for acquisition of Soviet SAM air defense systems in response to Israeli overflights of Beirut.
The Embassy identified a feedback loop: Israeli retaliation → Palestinian radicalization (even within Fatah's moderate wing) → more inside-Israel operations → more Israeli retaliation → destabilization of Lebanon.
The cable explicitly warned that Iraq and Libya would try to derail the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement and Geneva Conference by fomenting Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese conflict.
The title — “Trouble Ahead for Lebanon” — is the cable's own word. And the recommendation, addressed implicitly to Secretary Kissinger, was: raise the entire question with the Government of Israel at an appropriate level.

Chronology

What happened, in sequence

Apr 11, 1974

Kiryat Shmona attack

PFLP-GC militants attack an apartment building in Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel. 18 Israelis killed. Triggers initial Israeli wide-ranging strikes in southern Lebanon; fedayeen begin evacuating known camp positions.

May 15, 1974

Ma'alot massacre

DFLP militants crossing from Lebanon take over 100 hostages at a school in Ma'alot. 22 students and 4 others die in the rescue. Triggers Israeli policy recalibration.

May 19, 1974

IDF naval attack on Rachidiyeh

Israeli naval forces attack Rachidiyeh Palestinian refugee camp near Tyre. Lebanese Army returns fire with all available artillery.

May 20, 1974

Meir, Dayan, Begin speeches

Israeli leadership publicly declares return to post-Munich policy of striking 'terrorists' wherever found. IDF wounds 5 Lebanese soldiers at Chebaa.

May 21, 1974

IAF strikes kill Lebanese children

Israeli air attacks on Arkub and Tyre areas kill 3 Lebanese children, wound 17 more civilians. Fedayeen targets largely evacuated after Kiryat Shmona.

May 22, 1974

This cable

Embassy files 'Trouble Ahead for Lebanon' — a SECRET assessment that Israeli policy is counterproductive. Addressed to Kissinger's Jerusalem travel party.

May 31, 1974

Israeli-Syrian disengagement

The disengagement agreement is signed on the Golan Heights. Israeli military resources freed from the Syrian front become available for Lebanese-border operations.

Key figures

Who was involved

G. McMurtrie Godley

U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, 1974–1976

Godley's signature appears on this May 1974 cable at the beginning of his Beirut tenure. Previously Ambassador to Laos during the peak U.S. covert operations there, Godley would be ambassador during the outbreak and first-year escalation of the Lebanese Civil War. His Embassy's reporting from 1974 through 1976 forms a continuous analytical record of Lebanon's slide into civil war.

Henry Kissinger

U.S. Secretary of State (addressee via Jerusalem)

This cable was sent, in part, to the Consul General in Jerusalem 'for Secretary's party' — meaning Secretary Kissinger's travel team. At this moment Kissinger was engaged in the shuttle diplomacy that would produce the May 31, 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. The Embassy's choice to address the cable to his traveling party, rather than only to Washington, indicates awareness that the issues raised here needed to be in front of the Secretary during his negotiations.

The Record

The week Lebanon changed

In the seven days before this cable was filed, the Lebanese situation was transformed. On May 15, Palestinian militants crossed from southern Lebanon into northern Israel and took over 100 hostages at a school in Ma'alot; 22 students died in the rescue. On May 19, Israeli naval forces attacked a Palestinian refugee camp near Tyre. On May 20, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and Menachem Begin publicly announced a return to the post-Munich policy of striking "terrorists" wherever they were found. On May 21, Israeli air strikes hit Arkub and targets near Tyre — killing three Lebanese children and wounding seventeen other Lebanese civilians. The fedayeen camps had been largely evacuated after the April 11 Kiryat Shmona attack.

On May 22, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut filed this cable. It was SECRET, LIMDIS, addressed to the Secretary of State, to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and — unusually — to the American Consul in Jerusalem "for Secretary's party." Secretary Kissinger was in the region conducting shuttle diplomacy; the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement was nine days away. The Embassy wanted Lebanon on the agenda.

What had shifted

The cable's structural insight is that the Israeli policy of retaliation against Palestinian targets in Lebanon was not producing its intended deterrent effect — and was producing unintended strategic consequences that would make the broader regional situation worse.

Specifically: Israeli strikes were producing few fedayeen casualties, because the fedayeen had evacuated after the April Kiryat Shmona attacks. They were producing substantial civilian casualties, including dead Lebanese children. They were producing Lebanese solidarity with the Palestinians — such that "many Lebanese now feel sorry for them," even among populations that retained basic antipathy toward the fedayeen. And they were producing a specific political signal: Maronite deputies, the most pro-Western bloc in Lebanese politics, were openly calling for acquisition of Soviet SAM air defense systems. A year earlier this would have been unthinkable.

The Fatah moderation problem

A crucial passage: the Embassy documented increased militancy on the part of fedayeen leaders "including those from the more moderate Fatah organization." The frame — Fatah as the moderate PLO faction, relative to DFLP, PFLP, PFLP-GC, and Sa'iqa — was the U.S. Embassy's operating assessment in 1974. The observation that Israeli attacks were pushing Fatah moderates toward militancy, not just the already-radical factions, identified a mechanism by which Israeli policy was actively strengthening PLO hardliners against the figures within Fatah most potentially amenable to negotiation.

The May 1973 contrast

The most important single sentence in the cable, analytically, is the one explicitly contrasting May 1974 with May 1973:

"The hostility of the local populace has not to date produced any sign that the GOL might be forced into armed confrontation with the fedayeen such as occurred in May 1973. Quite to the contrary we see signs of momentary improved fedayeen-Lebanese Army relations."

In May 1973, Palestinian provocations had driven the Lebanese Army into confrontation with the fedayeen. In May 1974, Israeli attacks on Palestinian camps and Lebanese villages were producing the opposite pattern: Lebanese-Palestinian solidarity and improved fedayeen-Army relations. The path to Lebanese state action against the armed Palestinian presence — fragile in 1973 — was closing in 1974. Israeli retaliation policy was, inadvertently, shutting off the one mechanism by which the Lebanese state might have been able to constrain the fedayeen.

After disengagement

The cable's second analytical insight is prospective. The Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement, to be signed May 31, would reduce the strategic demands on Israeli forces on the Golan front. More Israeli military attention and resources would become available for the Lebanese frontier. At the same time, radical Arab states — Iraq and Libya — would have motive and means to derail the agreement by fomenting Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese conflict. Their objective, the Embassy assessed, would be to threaten not just disengagement but the Geneva Conference framework.

The fedayeen, under pressure, would turn increasingly to inside-Israel operations — the cable uses exactly this phrase. And inside-Israel operations would produce further Israeli retaliation. The feedback loop was, by May 1974, self-reinforcing.

The recommendation

The Embassy's recommendation was measured. Not condemnation. Not a demand. A suggestion: that the United States Government, at an appropriate time and level, raise the entire question with the Government of Israel. Did the policy actually reduce terrorism inside Israel? The Embassy's judgment was that it did not — that it was likely to increase terrorism inside Israel — and that its harmful effects on Palestinians, Lebanese, and the broader Arab world outweighed the deterrent case for it.

The cable was addressed, in part, to Kissinger's party in Jerusalem because the Secretary was at that moment negotiating the regional peace architecture that the dynamics documented here would undermine. The Embassy's question, in diplomatic form, was whether the United States would use its leverage with Israel on Lebanon while it still had that leverage. The record of the subsequent 11 months — through April 13, 1975 — does not suggest that the question was pressed.

Key Locations

●

Rachidiyeh refugee camp — Palestinian camp near Tyre hit by Israeli naval attack May 19, 1974

●

Tyre — Southwest Lebanese city; area hit by IAF attacks May 21, 1974

●

Arkub — Southeastern Lebanese border region ('Fatahland') hit by IAF May 21, 1974

○

Chebaa — Arkub area where 5 Lebanese soldiers wounded by IDF May 20, 1974

○

Ma'alot, Israel — Site of May 15, 1974 DFLP attack that prompted Israeli policy recalibration

○

Kiryat Shmona, Israel — Site of April 11, 1974 PFLP-GC attack; origin of Israeli wide-ranging strikes

Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors · View in OpenStreetMap

Primary Source

This article is based entirely on U.S. Embassy Beirut cable 1974BEIRUT05740, dispatched on May 22, 1974 and originally classified SECRET. Declassified and released by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order Systematic Review, July 5, 2006. No facts have been added, removed, or altered.

View original on Wikileaks PlusD →

Topics

1974 pre-war SECRET LIMDIS Israel IDF Ma'alot Kiryat Shmona Rachidiyeh fedayeen Kissinger disengagement Fatah

SECRET

Origin	U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
To	Secretary of State, Washington D.C. (also Jerusalem for Secretary Kissinger's party)
Date	May 22, 1974
Cable ID	1974BEIRUT05740
Classification	SECRET → Declassified 2006

Trouble Ahead for Lebanon

Annotated version — all original facts and language preserved in full

SECRET
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05740 221423Z 66

ACTION NEA-06
INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01
     AF-04 SAB-01 SCCT-01 PRS-01 PM-03 SP-01 OMB-01 IO-03 DRC-01 /055 W

124805 R 221230Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
   SECSTATE WASHDC 7952
   DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
     USINT ALGIERS
     USINT BAGHDAD
     AMEMBASSY CAIRO
     USINT DAMASCUS
     AMEMBASSY JIDDA
     AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
     AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
     AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
     USCINCEUR

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5740
LIMDIS
JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, XF, LE
SUBJECT: TROUBLE AHEAD FOR LEBANON

SUMMARY: REPEATED ISRAELI ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN LEBANON IN CONTEXT
ANNOUNCED ISRAELI HARD LINE TOWARD PALESTINIANS HAVE CAUSED SIGNIFICANT
CASUALTIES AMONG NON-COMBATTANT PALESTINIANS AND LEBANESE CIVILIANS AS
WELL AS SOME LOSSES AMONG FEDAYEEN. RESULT TO DATE HAS BEEN TO INCREASE
PALESTINIAN ANGER TOWARD ISRAEL, AND INCREASE LEBANESE POPULAR RESENTMENT
VS. ISRAEL, AND GOL, AND INCREASE IN PROBLEMS FOR GOL BUT NOT RPT NOT TO
BRING ANY VISIBLE MOVEMENT BY GOL TOWARD POSSIBILITY OF ARMED
CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN. GOL ANTICIPATES FURTHER INCREASE IN ITS
PROBLEMS WITH PALESTINIANS AND ISRAEL AFTER ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT AND IS CONSULTING WITH OTHER ARAB GOVTS. IN SEARCH OF SUPPORT.
ALTHOUGH WE CAN UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR PRESENT ISRAELI POLICY RE
FEDAYEEN, PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL PROVE ANY
MORE EFFECTIVE THAN IT HAS IN PAST AND ITS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVITY WILL
INCREASE. THEREFORE WE SUGGEST THAT AT APPROPRIATE TIME USG MIGHT WISH
DISCUSS ENTIRE QUESTION WITH GOI. END SUMMARY.

1. ISRAELI NAVAL ATTACK ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP NEAR TYR ON MAY 19,
SPEECHES MAY 20 BY MRS. MEIR, DAYAN AND BEGIN AND ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS OF
MAY 21 APPEAR TO LEBANESE AS CLEAR SIGNAL THAT GOI, IN AFTERMATH OF
MA'ALOT, HAS TAKEN FIRM DECISION TO POLICY ADOPTED AFTER MUNICH BUT
ABANDONED BY MID-1973 OF STRIKING "TERRORISTS" WHEREVER THEY ARE FOUND,
USING VARIETY METHODS INCLUDING STRIKES ON REFUGEE CAMPS WHICH, AS IN
1972-73, ALMOST ALWAYS PRODUCE NO MILITARY RESULTS BUT LARGE NUMBER
INNOCENT VICTIMS AMONG PALESTINIANS AND OFTEN AMONG LEBANESE. AS RESULT
STRONG IMPRESSION LEFT WITH PALESTINIANS IS THAT ONLY GOOD PALESTINIAN
IS DEAD ONE. LEBANESE POPULATION ANGRY AT ISRAEL, AND GOL. WHILE BASIC
ANTIPATHY TOWARD FEDAYEEN REMAINS MANY LEBANESE NOW FEEL SORRY FOR THEM.

2. ALTHOUGH WE CAN UNDERSTAND WHY GOI LEADERS MAY BELIEVE THEY HAVE NO
CHOICE BUT TO MAKE STATEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE OF MAY 20, AND TO FOLLOW
AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF TAKING ATTACK TO FEDAYEEN, OUR DOUBTS AS TO EFFICACY
OF THIS SORT OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON AND GOL AND ARMY
REMAIN AS STATED BEIRUT 5573. THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO RATHER
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON REFUGEE CAMPS, LEBANESE BORDER VILLAGES AND
SOMETIMES FEDAYEEN ENCAMPMENTS NEAR VILLAGES.

3. NET SHORT-TERM EFFECT OF RECENT ISRAELI ATTACKS ON REFUGEE CAMPS AND
OTHER TARGETS AND OFFICIAL GOI STATEMENTS RE TERRORISTS APPEARS TO HAVE
BEEN INCREASED MILITANCY ON PART FEDAYEEN LEADERS, INCLUDING THOSE FROM
MORE MODERATE FATAH ORGANIZATION, DECLINE OF MODERATE INFLUENCE, AND
SOMEWHAT MORE AGGRESSIVE REACTION OF LEBANESE ARMY IN REPLYING TO IDF
ATTACKS AND/OR BORDER INCURSIONS. THIS REFLECTS PRESENT MOOD OF POLITICAL
LEADERS, SINCE EVEN MARONITE DEPUTIES ARE CALLING FOR ACQUISITION SOV SAM
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. RECENT ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS OF BEIRUT HAVE BEEN
REGULARLY GREETED BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE WHEN BEFORE THERE WAS USUALLY
NONE. SEA ATTACK ON RACHIDIYEH CAMP WAS MET BY RETURN FIRE FROM ALL
AVAILABLE LEBANESE ARTILLERY, APPARENTLY WITH INTENT HIT ATTACKING
VESSELS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. IDF PATROLS MOVING IN LEBANESE TERRITORY IN
ARKUB AREA ALSO SEEM BE RECEIVING MORE AND CLOSER FIRE FROM LEBANESE
ARMY WHOSE UNITS NOW APPEAR TO BE NEARER TO BORDER AND IN GREATER
STRENGTH THAN RECENT PAST. IDF, AS IS ITS CUSTOM WHEN FIRED UPON FROM
WHATEVER SOURCE, IS RESPONDING IN KIND AND TAKING CLOSER AIM, AND IN
MOST RECENT INCIDENT ON MAY 20 NEAR CHEBAA IN ARKUB, LIGHTLY WOUNDED
FIVE LEBANESE SOLDIERS.

4. IAF MAY 21 ATTACKS ON TARGETS WHICH APPARENTLY BELIEVED TO BE FEDAYEEN
CAMPS IN ARKUB AND NEAR TYR IN SOUTHWEST LEBANON CAUSED FEW CASUALTIES
AMONG FEDAYEEN AND PALESTINIANS (MOST OF WHOM HAVE MOVED FROM OLD HAUNTS
SINCE IAF BEGAN WIDE-RANGING STRIKES AFTER KIRYAT SHIMONA) BUT DID
RESULT IN DEATH OF THREE LEBANESE CHILDREN, WITH THREE CHILDREN AND TWO
OLD PERSONS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND FIFTEEN OTHER LEBANESE CIVILIANS LESS
SERIOUSLY WOUNDED. HOSTILITY OF LOCAL POPULACE, MANY OF WHOM HAVE ALSO
LEFT THEIR HOMES AS RESULT CONSTANT ISRAELI SHELLING AND AIR ATTACKS,
HAS NOT TO DATE PRODUCED ANY SIGN THAT GOL MIGHT BE FORCED INTO ARMED
CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN SUCH AS OCCURRED IN MAY 1973. QUITE TO THE
CONTRARY WE SEE SIGNS OF MOMENTARY IMPROVED FEDAYEEN LEBANESE ARMY
RELATIONS.

5. GOL IS AWARE OF LIKELIHOOD LEBANON WILL FACE STILL GREATER PROBLEMS
FROM ISRAEL, FEDAYEEN AND RADICAL ARAB STATES (I.E., IRAQ AND LIBYA)
FOLLOWING ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. GOVT. FEARS THAT UNDER
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES FEDAYEEN WILL FEEL THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO
STEP-UP ACTIONS VS. ISRAEL, CONCENTRATING WHERE POSSIBLE ON INSIDE
OPERATIONS. ISRAELI POLICY OF RETALIATION ALREADY TOUGHER THAN IT HAS
BEEN SINCE RIGHT AFTER MUNICH (AND LOD) TRAGEDIES. AND IRAQ AND LIBYA
WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY BE USING THEIR POLITICAL, HUMAN AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCES ENCOURAGE FEDAYEEN TO ATTACK ISRAEL AND TAKE INTRANSIGENT
ATTITUDE RE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THEIR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO CREATE
ENOUGH TROUBLE BETWEEN ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON TO THREATEN
DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND GENEVA CONFERENCE.

6. IN ANTICIPATION OF THIS ONSLAUGHT, GOL IS BEGINNING CONSULT CLOSELY
WITH OTHER ARAB GOVTS. TO SEE WHAT SUPPORT IT CAN FIND, BEGINNING WITH
MEETING OF ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH JUST ENDED
IN CAIRO. WE SHALL TRY KEEP ABREAST OF PROGRESS GOL CONSULTATIONS, AND
OF PROBLEMS WHICH DEVELOP INSIDE LEBANON. WE WOULD APPRECIATE INFO WHICH
OTHER ADDRESSEES MIGHT BE ABLE DEVELOP ON THIS, PARTICULARLY CAIRO,
DAMASCUS AND JIDDA.

7. VIEW FOREGOING RECOMMEND DISCUSSION AT APPROPRIATE TIME AND LEVEL
WITH GOI OF ITS INTENTIONS RE FEDAYEEN, PALESTINIANS AND LEBANON. AS
NOTED ABOVE, AND BORNE OUT IN PAST, APPARENT ISRAELI POLICY OF REPEATED
ATTACKS ON TARGETS IN LEBANON UNLIKELY HAVE ANY POSITIVE EFFECT ON WHAT
ARAB TERRORISTS DO INSIDE ISRAEL BUT IS LIKELY HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON
PALESTINIANS, LEBANESE AND PERHAPS OTHER ARAB STATES RESULTING IN
INCREASED TERRORISM IN ISRAEL.

GODLEY

SECRET NNN

Originally classified SECRET / LIMDIS · Declassified and released by U.S. Department of State under EO Systematic Review · Now UNCLASSIFIED · Jerusalem copy for Secretary Kissinger's travel party

Summary
Repeated Israeli attacks on targets in Lebanon, in the context of an announced Israeli hard line toward Palestinians, have caused significant casualties among non-combatant Palestinians and Lebanese civilians, as well as some losses among fedayeen.^[1] The result to date has been to increase Palestinian anger toward Israel, increase Lebanese popular resentment against Israel and the GOL, and increase the problems for the GOL — but not to bring any visible movement by the GOL toward the possibility of armed confrontation with the fedayeen. The GOL anticipates further increase in its problems with Palestinians and Israel after the Israeli–Syrian disengagement agreement,^[2] and is consulting with other Arab governments in search of support.

Although we can understand the reasons for present Israeli policy regarding the fedayeen, Palestinians and Lebanon, we do not believe it will prove any more effective than it has in the past, and its counter-productivity will increase. We therefore suggest that at an appropriate time the USG might wish to discuss the entire question with the GOI.

1. The Israeli signal
The Israeli naval attack on the Palestinian refugee camp near Tyre on May 19, the speeches of May 20 by Mrs. Meir, Dayan and Begin,^[3] and the Israeli air attacks of May 21 appear to the Lebanese as a clear signal that the GOI, in the aftermath of Ma’alot,^[4] has taken a firm decision to return to the policy adopted after Munich but abandoned by mid-1973 of striking “terrorists” wherever they are found — using a variety of methods including strikes on refugee camps which, as in 1972–73, almost always produce no military results but a large number of innocent victims among Palestinians and often among Lebanese. As a result, the strong impression left with Palestinians is that “the only good Palestinian is a dead one.”^[5] The Lebanese population is angry at both Israel and the GOL. While basic antipathy toward the fedayeen remains, many Lebanese now feel sorry for them.

2. Doubts as to efficacy
Although we can understand why GOI leaders may believe they have no choice but to make statements such as those of May 20, and to follow an aggressive policy of taking the attack to the fedayeen, our doubts as to the efficacy of this sort of action vis-à-vis the fedayeen in Lebanon and the GOL and Army remain as stated in Beirut 5573. This applies particularly to rather indiscriminate attacks on refugee camps, Lebanese border villages, and sometimes fedayeen encampments near villages.

3. Militancy up, moderation down
The net short-term effect of recent Israeli attacks on refugee camps and other targets, and of official GOI statements regarding terrorists, appears to have been: increased militancy on the part of fedayeen leaders, including those from the more moderate Fatah organization;^[6] decline of moderate influence; and somewhat more aggressive reaction of the Lebanese Army in replying to IDF attacks and/or border incursions. This reflects the present mood of political leaders, since even Maronite deputies are calling for acquisition of the Soviet SAM air defense system.^[7] Recent Israeli overflights of Beirut have been regularly greeted by anti-aircraft fire where before there was usually none.

The sea attack on Rachidiyeh camp^[8] was met by return fire from all available Lebanese artillery, apparently with intent to hit the attacking vessels if at all possible. IDF patrols moving in Lebanese territory in the Arkub area also seem to be receiving more and closer fire from the Lebanese Army, whose units now appear to be nearer to the border and in greater strength than in the recent past. The IDF, as is its custom when fired upon from whatever source, is responding in kind and taking closer aim; and in the most recent incident on May 20 near Chebaa in Arkub, they lightly wounded five Lebanese soldiers.

4. Civilian casualties and the absence of “May 1973” dynamic
IAF attacks on May 21, on targets apparently believed to be fedayeen camps in Arkub and near Tyre in southwest Lebanon, caused few casualties among fedayeen and Palestinians (most of whom have moved from their old haunts since the IAF began wide-ranging strikes after Kiryat Shmona) but did result in the death of three Lebanese children, with three children and two elderly persons seriously wounded and fifteen other Lebanese civilians less seriously wounded.^[9] The hostility of the local populace — many of whom have also left their homes as a result of constant Israeli shelling and air attacks — has not to date produced any sign that the GOL might be forced into armed confrontation with the fedayeen such as occurred in May 1973.^[10] Quite to the contrary, we see signs of momentary improved fedayeen–Lebanese Army relations.

5. What comes next
The GOL is aware of the likelihood Lebanon will face still greater problems from Israel, the fedayeen, and radical Arab states (i.e., Iraq and Libya) following the Israeli–Syrian disengagement agreement. The government fears that under present circumstances the fedayeen will feel they have no choice but to step up actions against Israel, concentrating where possible on inside operations.^[11] Israeli policy of retaliation is already tougher than it has been since right after the Munich (and Lod) tragedies. And Iraq and Libya will in all probability be using their political, human, and financial resources to encourage the fedayeen to attack Israel and take an intransigent attitude regarding political settlement. Their objective would be to create enough trouble between Israel, Palestinians and Lebanon to threaten the disengagement agreement and the Geneva Conference.^[12]

6. Arab consultations
In anticipation of this onslaught, the GOL is beginning to consult closely with other Arab governments to see what support it can find — beginning with the meeting of Arab League Defense and Foreign Ministers which just ended in Cairo.^[13] We shall try to keep abreast of the progress of GOL consultations, and of problems which develop inside Lebanon. We would appreciate information which other addressees might be able to develop on this, particularly Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

7. Recommendation
In view of the foregoing, we recommend discussion at an appropriate time and level with the GOI of its intentions regarding the fedayeen, Palestinians, and Lebanon. As noted above, and borne out in the past, the apparent Israeli policy of repeated attacks on targets in Lebanon is unlikely to have any positive effect on what Arab terrorists do inside Israel, but is likely to have a negative effect on Palestinians, Lebanese, and perhaps other Arab states — resulting in increased terrorism in Israel.^[14]

GODLEY^[15]

Editorial Footnotes

[1]This cable marks a shift in the Embassy's reporting frame. The 1973 cables were preoccupied with fedayeen/Syrian pressure on the Lebanese state. This May 1974 cable inverts the lens: the primary pressure on the Lebanese state is now coming from Israeli retaliation. The civilian casualty pattern — documented here with specific numbers — had altered Lebanese public sentiment toward the Palestinians from antipathy to sympathy, and toward Israel from baseline hostility to active anger. The cable's title, "Trouble Ahead for Lebanon," marks this shift.

[2]Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Agreement: signed May 31, 1974, nine days after this cable was filed, on the Golan Heights front. Brokered by Secretary Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy following the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. The agreement separated Israeli and Syrian forces, established a UN buffer zone (UNDOF), and reduced the risk of conventional war on the Syrian front. The cable anticipates — correctly — that Israeli military resources freed from the Syrian border would enable a more aggressive policy toward Palestinian armed activity based in Lebanon, and that radical Arab states (Iraq, Libya) would work to derail the agreement by provoking Israeli-Palestinian-Lebanese instability.

[3]The May 20 speeches by Golda Meir (Prime Minister), Moshe Dayan (Defense Minister), and Menachem Begin (Opposition Leader): coming two days after the May 18 IDF attack on Palestinian positions near Tyre and two days before the Ma'alot attack response. These speeches publicly articulated what the Embassy frames as a return to the post-Munich policy of striking Palestinian armed targets "wherever they are found." The cable's characterization — that this policy had been "abandoned by mid-1973" — is significant: it implies an Israeli strategic recalibration in mid-1973 that lasted approximately ten months before being reversed after Ma'alot.

[4]Ma'alot: the Ma'alot massacre of May 15, 1974. Three members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) crossed from Lebanon into northern Israel, entered a school in the town of Ma'alot where students were on an overnight field trip, and took 105 hostages. In the Israeli rescue operation, 22 students and four others were killed. The attack prompted an immediate Israeli military response against Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon, including the May 19 naval attack referenced here. Ma'alot is the direct proximate cause of the Israeli policy recalibration documented in this cable.

[5]"The only good Palestinian is a dead one" — the Embassy's stark characterization of the message that Palestinians (and, the cable implies, Lebanese observers) drew from the May 1974 Israeli posture. This is a quotation-marked phrase not attributed to a specific Israeli official; the cable is reporting the interpretive impression created by Israeli actions and statements. The quotation marks are doing the work of distancing the U.S. Embassy from endorsing the characterization while recording that this is how the actions were being received by their immediate audience.

[6]"Including those from the more moderate Fatah organization": this is a notable assessment from the U.S. Embassy in 1974, characterizing Fatah as "more moderate" relative to other PLO factions (DFLP, PFLP, PFLP-GC, Sa'iqa). The specific attribution of rising militancy even within Fatah — attributed to Israeli attacks rather than to internal radicalization — complicates the reading that Fatah was uniformly disposed to negotiation. It documents the mechanism by which Israeli retaliation strengthened PLO hardliners against moderates.

[7]"Even Maronite deputies are calling for acquisition of the Soviet SAM air defense system": this sentence captures a significant political shift. Maronite Christian deputies — typically the political bloc most aligned with Western powers and most hostile to the fedayeen — were, by May 1974, publicly calling for Soviet air defense missile systems as a response to Israeli overflights of Beirut. The request is doubly revealing: it documents the depth of Lebanese national feeling against Israeli airspace violations, and it documents how that feeling was transcending the normal sectarian political alignments. The Maronites were not abandoning their pro-Western posture in general, but the direct experience of Israeli overflights was producing policy preferences that would have been unthinkable a year earlier.

[8]Rachidiyeh camp: Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon, south of Tyre. The May 19, 1974 Israeli naval attack on Rachidiyeh is one of the Israeli actions this cable identifies as triggering the Lebanese Army's shift toward more aggressive return fire against IDF operations.

[9]The casualty figures — three Lebanese children killed, three children and two elderly persons seriously wounded, fifteen other Lebanese civilians less seriously wounded — are specific. The cable notes that fedayeen had "moved from their old haunts" after the IAF began wide-ranging strikes post-Kiryat Shmona (April 1974), meaning the May 21 strikes hit targets the fedayeen had already evacuated. The military effect was negligible; the civilian effect was substantial. This pattern — Israeli strikes on evacuated targets producing primarily civilian casualties — is the factual basis for the cable's judgment that the policy is "counter-productive."

[10]"Has not to date produced any sign that the GOL might be forced into armed confrontation with the fedayeen such as occurred in May 1973" — the cable explicitly contrasts May 1974 with May 1973. The key distinction: in 1973, fedayeen provocations led the Lebanese Army to confront them; in 1974, Israeli attacks on Palestinian camps and Lebanese villages were producing solidarity between Lebanese civilians and fedayeen, closing rather than opening the path to Lebanese state action against the armed Palestinian presence. This is a structurally important shift in the pre-war dynamic.

[11]"Inside operations": attacks on targets inside Israel itself, as distinct from cross-border raids or attacks on Israeli targets outside Israel. The cable anticipates — correctly — that the fedayeen would respond to intensified Israeli pressure by shifting toward more inside-Israel operations. The Kiryat Shmona attack (April 11, 1974) and Ma'alot attack (May 15, 1974) were both inside-Israel operations; more would follow. The pattern the cable identifies — Israeli pressure → increased inside-operations → more Israeli pressure → further destabilization of Lebanon — is a feedback loop the Embassy names in May 1974.

[12]The assessment that Iraq and Libya would try to derail the disengagement agreement and Geneva Conference by creating trouble between Israel, the Palestinians, and Lebanon is stated here as prospective. The Geneva Conference (held December 1973, suspended thereafter) was the framework through which Kissinger hoped to consolidate post-war Arab-Israeli diplomacy; Iraq and Libya opposed it as Arab "rejectionist" states. The cable documents the Embassy's understanding that Lebanon's internal stability was an instrument for radical Arab opposition to regional peace efforts — not an incidental casualty of Palestinian armed activity.

[13]The Arab League Defense and Foreign Ministers meeting in Cairo that "just ended" at the time of this cable was the precursor to the Arab Defense Council meeting documented in cable 1974BEIRUT07889 (July 9, 1974). The Lebanese diplomatic sequence — consult with Arab states in May, attend formal ADC meeting in July, manage the outcome — is the Lebanese state's attempt to construct Arab cover for its refusal to confront the fedayeen militarily, paired with its refusal to accept the terms under which other Arab states (particularly Kuwait) were prepared to provide support.

[14]The cable's recommendation that the U.S. raise the entire question with the Government of Israel is notable for what it does not say. It does not condemn Israeli policy. It explicitly concedes that Israeli leaders "may believe they have no choice." What it does is pose the efficacy question: does the policy actually reduce terrorism? The Embassy's answer is that it does not, and that its negative externalities — Palestinian radicalization, Lebanese state destabilization, threat to disengagement and Geneva — outweigh its deterrent value. The recommendation is measured: raise the question "at an appropriate time and level." This is a diplomatic hedge; the substantive judgment is that the policy is harmful.

[15]G. McMurtrie Godley: U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon from June 1974 to July 1976, succeeding Ambassador William Buffum (who had served briefly after Houghton's 1974 departure). Godley's signature on this May 22 cable — before his formal arrival in June 1974 — likely reflects his imminent posting. Godley had previously served as Ambassador to Laos during the peak of U.S. covert operations in Southeast Asia. His tenure in Beirut would span the full period of the outbreak and first-year escalation of the Lebanese Civil War, beginning April 13, 1975.

SECRET

How to Cite

Annotated version:
Institute for Lebanon, “Trouble Ahead for Lebanon” (1974BEIRUT05740), May 22, 1974. instituteforlebanon.com/cables/1974BEIRUT05740/

Original cable:
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, “Trouble Ahead for Lebanon” (1974BEIRUT05740), May 22, 1974. Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD).