Cable 1973BEIRUT05776 · May 18, 1973 · SECRET / EXDIS

Beirut, May 18, 1973

The Promises They Made: The Melkart Arrangement in Real Time

Two SECRET/EXDIS cables filed 90 minutes apart on May 18, 1973 document the Melkart Protocol as it was happening: the specific commitments the fedayeen made, the Lebanese government’s own doubts about whether they would hold, and the critical gap that would doom the arrangement — Saʿiqa, Syria’s proxy force, never signed.

Based on cable 1973BEIRUT05776 SECRET / EXDIS → UNCLASSIFIED

On May 18, 1973, U.S. Embassy Beirut filed two classified cables 90 minutes apart documenting the conclusion of the negotiations that produced the Melkart Protocol. The first cable (1973BEIRUT05755) records the Lebanese Foreign Minister and Presidency Director-General briefing the U.S. Chargé on what had been achieved and what American diplomatic support was being requested. The second (1973BEIRUT05776) documents the specific commitments: a pullback from border areas, removal of heavy weapons from camps, no cross-border raids, Lebanese security force access to camps, and removal of non-Arab “foreign elements” — explicitly including Turks and Iranians. Both cables are marked SECRET/EXDIS. Together they confirm: the Lebanese government called these “unilateral promises,” not an agreement; Saʿiqa explicitly did not sign; the GOL’s own diplomats described fedayeen good faith as “suspect”; and Lebanese forces could enter camps only with fedayeen permission.

What this document reveals

The Lebanese government’s own framing, on the day after the commitments were made: the fedayeen concessions were unilateral promises, not an agreement — specifically to avoid the Cairo Accords framework. The Embassy predicted the fedayeen would nonetheless claim the arrangement was “within the context” of those same Accords.
Saʿiqa — Syria’s proxy faction — explicitly did not sign the Melkart commitments. Fatah, PFLP, and PDFLP representatives claimed they were speaking for all fedayeen. The GOL did not accept this. Syria’s armed proxy was thus entirely outside the arrangement from the moment it was made.
The GOL’s own summary of the arrangement, transmitted through the U.S. Embassy, states that “fedayeen good faith in this regard is suspect.” This is not an outside assessment. It is the Lebanese government’s own language, on record in May 1973.
Lebanese security forces were granted the right to enter the refugee camps “with permission of the fedayeen.” Sovereignty in name, with the party to be regulated retaining veto power over the act of regulation.
Non-Arab combatants in the Palestinian camps — required to leave under the Melkart terms — explicitly included Turks and Iranians, documented by U.S. Embassy reporting based on the Presidency Director-General’s direct briefing. This is in the diplomatic record as of May 18, 1973.
Foreign Minister Abou Hamad told the U.S. Chargé: “the only way to avoid another, more serious explosion in Lebanon” was full implementation. The Lebanese were predicting the next crisis while celebrating the resolution of the current one.

Chronology

What happened, in sequence

May 7–8, 1973

Fighting breaks out in Beirut

Palestinian factions open fire on Lebanese Army positions. The Army responds with aircraft and tanks. Prime Minister Hafez resigns at 5 AM on May 8. See cable 1973BEIRUT05159.

May 8–17, 1973

Ten days of negotiation

The Mixed Commission — Lebanese Army officers and fedayeen representatives — negotiates terms. The May 12 assessment cable (1973BEIRUT05437) predicts the likely outcome and its limits.

Evening, May 17, 1973

Fedayeen make their commitments

In the Mixed Commission, Fatah, PFLP, and PDFLP representatives present a list of specific promises. Saʿiqa and PFLP/GC do not directly participate. The commitments are made verbally and from memory — the Army has not yet written them up.

Morning, May 18, 1973

Cable 05755: GOL requests U.S. démarches

The Chargé meets with the Foreign Minister and Presidency Director-General. The GOL asks Washington to press Arab Gulf states, Iran, Jordan, and the USSR to back implementation. Saʿiqa’s non-acceptance is flagged as the critical gap.

13:15 Z, May 18, 1973

Cable 1973BEIRUT05755 filed

First of the two companion cables: the diplomatic conversation, the U.S. role requested, and the Saʿiqa problem. Marked SECRET/EXDIS.

15:00 Z, May 18, 1973

Cable 1973BEIRUT05776 filed

Second cable, 90 minutes later: the specific terms — border pullback, heavy weapons removal, camp access, foreign elements, propaganda restrictions. The Embassy notes the GOL’s own doubts about implementation.

Apr 13, 1975

The next explosion begins

The Lebanese Civil War starts. The Melkart commitments were not implemented. Saʿiqa never signed. The “more serious explosion” the Foreign Minister warned of, on May 18, 1973, arrives.

Key figures

Who was involved

Fonmin Abou Hamad

Lebanese Foreign Minister

The cable’s consistent designation for the Lebanese Foreign Minister throughout the May 1973 negotiations. He is the GOL’s most senior voice in these cables — the one who tells the U.S. Chargé that “the only way to avoid another, more serious explosion in Lebanon” is full fedayeen implementation. His prediction was accurate. His name as given in the cables (“Abou Hamad”) appears to be a kunya; the archival identification remains provisional.

Public domain / Wikimedia Commons

Suleiman Frangieh

President of Lebanon

Named in both cables as the driving force behind the demand for fedayeen compliance. The Foreign Minister’s objective to obtain Saʿiqa’s explicit commitment is described as “one of Frangie’s specific objectives.” The same Frangieh who said no to BSO blackmail in April 1973 (cable 1973BEIRUT04974) was now trying to hold Syria’s proxy force to an arrangement that Syria had not sanctioned.

Saʿiqa leadership

Syrian-backed Palestinian faction — non-signatory

Saʿiqa’s explicit non-acceptance of the Melkart commitments is the most consequential single fact in these two cables. As an arm of Syrian Ba’ath Party policy rather than an independent Palestinian organization, Saʿiqa’s position reflected Damascus’s decision not to be bound. The entire arrangement was therefore built on a foundation where Syria’s proxy force — the one with the most men and the deepest external backing — was formally outside it.

Presidency Director-General Dib

GOL senior official, key negotiating interlocutor

The official who briefed the U.S. Chargé on the specific terms of the fedayeen commitments — from memory, the morning after they were made, before the Army had written them up. Dib’s briefing is the primary source for the substantive content of cable 1973BEIRUT05776. His hedge — “these are reported as follows but may not be complete nor completely accurate” — documents the fragility of the arrangement even at the moment of its birth.

Dwight J. Houghton

U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, 1970–1974

Houghton’s name signs both cables, though it was his Chargé who conducted the May 18 meeting. His Beirut reporting across 1973 — from the April airport bomb plot through the May crisis and these Melkart cables — constitutes the most detailed contemporaneous U.S. documentation of the conditions that would produce the 1975 civil war. He left Beirut in 1974 and did not see what his cables had predicted.

The Record

Ninety minutes apart

At 1:15 PM Beirut time on May 18, 1973, the U.S. Embassy sent a SECRET/EXDIS cable to Washington. Ninety minutes later, it sent another. Together, the two cables document one of the most consequential diplomatic moments in modern Lebanese history: the day the Lebanese government believed it had secured the fedayeen’s commitment to respect Lebanese sovereignty.

It was the day of the Melkart Protocol.

The two cables are cross-referenced as SEPTELs — Separate Telegrams, the State Department’s standard method of directing a reader to a companion cable. They were filed 90 minutes apart because the meeting they document covered two distinct subjects that the Embassy judged required separate reporting: the diplomatic conversation (what the Lebanese government had achieved, what it was asking the U.S. to do) and the substance (the specific terms of the fedayeen commitments). Neither cable is fully intelligible without the other. They are archived here together.

What the Lebanese government said it had achieved

The morning of May 18, the U.S. Chargé met at the Lebanese Foreign Ministry with Foreign Minister Abou Hamad, Presidency Director-General Dib, and Foreign Office Secretary-General Sadaqa. The meeting had two purposes: to inform the Lebanese of Washington’s response to their earlier requests (including that the U.S. had again approached the Soviets in Moscow and had been in contact with the Israelis), and to hear the GOL’s account of what had been negotiated with the fedayeen the previous evening.

What Dib reported was framed with deliberate legal precision. The fedayeen — Fatah, PFLP, and PDFLP — had made a series of specific commitments the evening of May 17 in the Mixed Commission. But these were, in the GOL’s insistent framing, unilateral promises. Not a new agreement. Not a supplement to the Cairo Accords. Not a bilateral undertaking. Unilateral promises, from the fedayeen to the Lebanese Army, which the GOL would codify on paper and distribute to Arab governments and certain other governments so there would be no misunderstanding about the future relationship.

The distinction was not semantic. It was the entire point. Any “agreement” between the GOL and the fedayeen would implicitly operate within the framework of the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which had legalized Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon and given the fedayeen formal status. Unilateral promises, by contrast, could be presented as the Lebanese state receiving voluntary compliance from a subordinate party — without the reciprocal concessions that a bilateral agreement would imply.

The Embassy knew this framing would not survive contact with the fedayeen’s own public presentation. Paragraph 6 of cable 05776 says so directly: the GOL’s “unilateral promises” framing “is likely to be countered on the fedayeen side by the claim that it is all within the context of the Cairo Accords which are still in force.”

The gap that was already there

Before the Melkart Protocol had been written up, before its terms had been formally transmitted to Arab governments, before the implementation timetable had been agreed, the Lebanese government had already identified its fatal weakness.

Saʿiqa had not signed.

Saʿiqa — the Syrian Ba’ath Party’s Palestinian faction, effectively an instrument of Syrian state policy — was present in Lebanon in significant numbers. The PFLP/GC, also Syrian-aligned, had also not explicitly committed. Fatah, PFLP, and PDFLP representatives in the Mixed Commission claimed they were speaking for all fedayeen organizations. The GOL did not accept this. The cable is explicit: “GOL DOES NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT THIS AS NECESSARILY SO.”

The problem was structural, not diplomatic. Saʿiqa was not an independent Palestinian organization that could be reasoned with or pressured by Arab states. It reflected “the attitude of the Syrian government.” Frangieh’s specific objective — to obtain Saʿiqa’s explicit commitment — would depend on Damascus. And Damascus had given no sign that it intended to restrain its proxy.

This is why the Foreign Minister identified the Soviet Union as the top priority for U.S. démarches: not because Moscow controlled the fedayeen directly, but because Moscow had influence in Damascus, and Damascus controlled Saʿiqa. The chain of necessary diplomatic interventions was long, and each link was uncertain.

The terms themselves

Cable 05776 — the one filed at 1:15 PM, 90 minutes after the first — documents the actual content of what the fedayeen promised. Dib delivered this briefing from memory, the morning after the commitments were made, before the Army had written them up. The Embassy noted the limitations: “these are reported as follows but may not be complete nor completely accurate.”

The terms, as Dib remembered them, covered five areas. In the camps: cease all military training, remove heavy weapons, remove all non-Arab “foreign elements.” On camp control: Lebanese security forces would have checkpoints outside the camps and the right to enter — but only with the permission of the fedayeen. On information: all media to be consolidated under the PLO, no more attacks on the GOL through fedayeen outlets; Beirut no longer to be used as a base for communiqués — though WAFA, the Palestine News Agency, was explicitly carved out and allowed to remain. On the border: full adherence to the limits set after the September 1972 Israeli action, complete exclusion from the western sector near Ras Naqura, 8–10 kilometer pullback in the central sector near Bint Jbeil, and in the Arqoub — the southeastern zone historically used for cross-border operations — fedayeen to stay north of the Hasbaya-Shebaa road except for two or three specified spots.

On paper, this was a significant set of concessions. The Lebanese government had, in the Foreign Minister’s words, “come out very well in terms of what has been said.”

The problem was in what had not been said, and in who had not been in the room.

Sovereignty with permission

One phrase in cable 05776 encapsulates the fundamental problem with the Melkart arrangement: Lebanese security forces would have the right to enter the camps, “but with permission of the fedayeen.”

This is sovereignty in name, with the party to be regulated retaining veto power over the act of regulation. The Lebanese state’s right of access to territory within its own borders was formally contingent on the consent of the armed organizations occupying that territory. The right existed on paper. In practice, it would only be exercised when the fedayeen chose to allow it.

Dib and the Foreign Minister described the fedayeen’s good faith as “suspect.” They said the fedayeen would have to be watched “on every point, every step of the way.” They said the GOL intended to supervise implementation very closely. But the mechanism for that supervision — security force entry to the camps — was itself subject to fedayeen approval. The watchdog required the watched party’s permission to watch.

Foreign fighters in the camps

One of the Melkart commitments was the removal of non-Arab “foreign elements” from the camps. All “combatants” were to leave — with the sole exception of those engaged in medical work. The cable specifies that this “explicitly includes Turks and Iranians as well as a variety of others.”

This is a precise, contemporaneous, U.S.-sourced documentation of international fighters in the Palestinian camps of Lebanon in 1973. Pre-revolutionary Iran was at that time a U.S. ally, diplomatically recognized by Israel, and governed by the Shah. Yet Iranian combatants were present in the fedayeen camps in sufficient numbers that their removal required explicit mention in the commitments. Turkish fighters were similarly named. The Lebanese Army had been rounding up some of these individuals at checkpoints outside the camps in the two weeks preceding the cable.

This detail is in the diplomatic record as of May 18, 1973. It has not appeared in standard accounts of the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon.

Already predicting the next crisis

The meeting closed with the Foreign Minister and Dib thanking the United States for its support and making a prediction. The only way to avoid “another, more serious explosion in Lebanon,” Abou Hamad said, was for the fedayeen to actually honor their promises and not back away from them over time. Support from the governments the U.S. would approach would be vital.

The phrase “another, more serious explosion” is a reference to the May 7–8 fighting that had just been resolved. The Foreign Minister, sitting in the meeting that marked the resolution, was already predicting the next, worse crisis. He was saying, in diplomatic language: we do not think this will hold, and when it fails, the consequences will be worse than what we just survived.

The prediction was documented in U.S. cables on May 18, 1973.

The next explosion came on April 13, 1975.

What the Melkart Protocol was

Historians have sometimes described the Melkart Protocol as a genuine, if ultimately failed, attempt to regulate Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon. The cable record suggests a more precise characterization: it was an arrangement that the Lebanese government concluded was necessary to survive the immediate crisis, whose durability they doubted from the day it was made, and whose critical structural weakness — Saʿiqa’s non-participation, meaning Syria was not bound — was known to them and documented in real time.

The Melkart Protocol did not fail because anyone misunderstood what it was. It failed because everyone, including the Lebanese government, understood exactly what it was: a set of promises from parties whose good faith was suspect, excluding the party whose behavior mattered most, enforced by a mechanism that required the other party’s permission to operate.

The cables filed at 1:15 PM and 3:00 PM on May 18, 1973, document all of this — in real time, on the day it happened, in language the parties involved chose to put on the record.

Key Locations

●

Beirut — Site of the Mixed Commission negotiations; location of the Foreign Ministry meeting on May 18

○

Ras Naqura — Western Lebanon-Israel border point; fedayeen required to be completely absent under Melkart terms

○

Bint Jbeil — Central south Lebanon; fedayeen required to be 8–10 km back from the border

○

Arqoub — Southeastern border zone (“Fatahland”); subject to pullback north of Hasbaya–Shebaa road, with exceptions

··

Hasbaya — Town in southeastern Lebanon; the Hasbaya–Shebaa road defined the Arqoub boundary under the Melkart terms

○

Palestinian refugee camps (15 total) — Melkart commitments applied to all 15 camps across Lebanon, not only those in Beirut

··

Damascus — SARG capital; Saʿiqa reflected Syrian government policy. Soviet influence in Damascus was the GOL’s top priority for U.S. démarches.

Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors · View in OpenStreetMap

Primary Source

This article is based entirely on U.S. Embassy Beirut cable 1973BEIRUT05776, dispatched on May 18, 1973 and originally classified SECRET / EXDIS. Declassified and released by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order Systematic Review, July 5, 2006. No facts have been added, removed, or altered.

View original on Wikileaks PlusD →

Topics

1973 Melkart Protocol fedayeen Saʿiqa Cairo Accords Lebanese sovereignty refugee camps border PLO Syria EXDIS

SECRET / EXDIS

Origin	U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
To	Secretary of State, Washington D.C. (Immediate precedence)
Date	May 18, 1973
Cable ID	1973BEIRUT05776
Classification	SECRET / EXDIS → Declassified 2006

GOL-Fedayeen Arrangement / GOL Request for USG Assistance (Companion Cables: Melkart Protocol)

Annotated version — all original facts and language preserved in full

═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CABLE 1 OF 2: 1973BEIRUT05755
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

SECRET
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05755 181315Z

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

S E C R E T BEIRUT 05755

SUBJECT: GOL REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE
REF: STATE 94202

SUMMARY. GOL HAS OBTAINED FROM FATAH, PFLP AND PDFLP SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS
(SEPTEL) WHICH GO BEYOND MINIMAL DEMANDS REPORTED EARLIER. IT IS ON BASIS OF
FEDAYEEN ACCEPTANCE THESE SPECIFIC POINTS THAT GOL WOULD LIKE US TO MAKE
DEMARCHES DISCUSSED REFTEL. DEMARCHES WOULD BE IN SUPPORT OF FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROMISES MADE BY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH GOL INTENDS
PROVIDE ARAB AND CERTAIN OTHER GOVTS THROUGH ITS OWN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. USSR
STILL CONSIDERED TO BE TOP PRIORITY SINCE GOL CONSIDERS IT HAS GREATEST
POTENTIAL INFLUENCE ON ACTIONS OF FEDAYEEN AND OF SYRIA. THIS ALL MORE IMPORTANT
SINCE SAIQA HAS NOT RPT NOT EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED PROMISES MADE BY OTHERS AND SARG
POSITION REMAINS VERY UNCLEAR. CONCERNING ISRAEL, CHARGE INFORMED FONMIN AND DIB
OUR ESTIMATE OF ISRAELI POSITION RE LEBANON AND INDICATED WE HAD RECENTLY BEEN
IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS ON GENERAL PROBLEM. END SUMMARY.

1. CHARGE AND EMBOFF MET MORNING MAY 18 WITH FONMIN ABOU HAMAD, PRESIDENCY
DIRECTOR-GENERAL DIB AND FONOFF SEC-GEN SADAQA TO INFORM THEM SUBSTANCE
CONTENTS REFTEL. CHARGE ALSO SAID THAT SINCE LAST MEETING ON MAY 15 WE HAD
APPROACHED USSR AGAIN IN MOSCOW AND HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS RE GENERAL
PROBLEM WHICH GOL FACING AT PRESENT. CHARGE GAVE GROUP DEPT'S ESTIMATE RE
ISRAELI INTENTIONS ALONG LINES PARA 6 REFTEL. SADAQA ASKED WHAT USG WOULD DO
SHOULD SITUATION CHANGE (E.G., SYRIAN INTERVENTION) AND ISRAEL FELT OBLIGED TAKE
MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON. CHARGE REPLIED THAT OUR BASIC POSITION REMAINS ONE
OF SUPPORTING LEBANESE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, BUT THAT
IT NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY WHAT ACTION WE WOULD TAKE IN VAGUE HYPOTHETICAL
CIRCUMSTANCES SADAQA HAD MENTIONED. FONMIN APPEARED WELL SATISFIED WITH OUR
POSITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL.

2. AFTER INFORMING GOL OF OUR WILLINGNESS MAKE DEMARCHES REQUESTED OF US, CHARGE
ASKED FONMIN IF HE COULD NOT BE CLEARER RE SORT OF DEMARCHE GOL HAS IN MIND AND
WHEN THEY SHOULD BE MADE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF REPORTS THAT GOL AND FEDAYEEN
HAD REACHED AGREEMENT IN MIXED COMMISSION EVENING OF MAY 17. FONMIN ASKED DIB TO
EXPLAIN JUST WHERE GOL STOOD WITH FEDAYEEN SINCE THIS ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND FOR
DETERMINING HOW TO PITCH DEMARCHE. DIB'S REPORT BEING SENT SEPTEL, BUT IN
SUMMARY GOL HAS OBTAINED FROM FEDAYEEN GREATER CONCESSIONS THAN THOSE LISTED AS
MINIMAL DEMANDS. FEDAYEEN CONCESSIONS ARE IN FORM OF UNILATERAL PROMISES UNDERTAKE
CERTAIN ACTIONS AND NOT RPT NOT IN FORM OF NEW GOL-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT. ARMY IS TO
PREPARE PAPER INCORPORATING THESE PROMISES WHICH GOL WILL PROVIDE TO ARAB GOVTS
AND CERTAIN OTHER GOVTS IN ORDER THAT THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO SUBSTANCE
OF FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, NOW THAT FEDAYEEN HAVE
ACCEPTED, THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM BEGINS OF BRINGING ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION OF
PROMISES AND ASSURING THAT THERE NO BACKSLIDING BY FEDAYEEN. ARMY AND FEDAYEEN
WORKING ON MODALITIES AND TIME-TABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION AT PRESENT TIME. ANOTHER
OUTSTANDING PROBLEM IS FACT THAT SAIQA AND PFLP/GC HAVE NOT DIRECTLY AND
EXPLICITLY AGREED TO COMMITMENTS MADE BY OTHERS. FATAH, PFLP AND PDFLP REPS ON
MIXED COMMISSION STATE THEY SPEAKING FOR ALL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, BUT GOL DOES
NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT THIS AS NECESSARILY SO. PROBLEM OF PFLP/GC IS OF LESSER
MAGNITUDE THAN THAT OF SAIQA, SINCE LATTER REFLECTS ATTITUDE OF SYRIAN GOVERNMENT
AND OF COURSE HAS MORE MEN.

3. ABOUHAMAD SAID HE THOUGHT USG DEMARCHES TO SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI AND
IRAN (AND ANY FURTHER TALKS WE MIGHT HAVE WITH JORDAN) SHOULD STRESS VITAL
IMPORTANCE TO LEBANON AND ENTIRE REGION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDAYEEN PROMISES,
SINCE GOL FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ITS SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY AND THOSE
LIVING THEREIN (AS OTHER ARAB GOVTS HAVE DONE) WOULD SURELY RESULT IN ULTIMATE
DESTRUCTION OF PRO-WESTERN, DEMOCRATIC, FREE-ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH
LEBANESE SYSTEM RESTS, AS WELL AS CREATE NEW SOURCE OF MAJOR TENSION IN AREA
WHICH NONE OF COUNTRIES TO BE APPROACHED WOULD WANT. GOL HAS NO RPT NO INTENTION
OF "LIQUIDATING" FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND WISHES PRESERVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM
WITHIN LIMITATIONS DICTATED BY LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. GOL HAS ALREADY SPOKEN TO
ARAB GOVTS, EXPLAINING ITS CASE, AND WILL DO SO AGAIN EARLY NEXT WEEK WHILE
PASSING ALONG COPY OF FEDAYEEN PROMISES. SUBSEQUENT SUPPORTING DEMARCHE BY USG,
AND IF POSSIBLE BY OTHER GOVTS (WE ASSUME HE MEANT FRANCE AND ENGLAND AND PERHAPS
OTHER WESTERN EUROPEANS) WOULD ADD CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO GOL DEMARCHE. IMPORTANT
THING IS TO ENSURE THAT FEDAYEEN KEEP THEIR PROMISES IN FACT AND THAT AS TIME
GOES ON THEY NOT BE ALLOWED BACKSLIDE. GOL INTENDS SUPERVISE THIS VERY CLOSELY
BUT WILL NEED SUPPORT FROM GOVTS WHICH CONTRIBUTE MOST TO FEDAYEEN COFFERS.

4. CONCERNING SOVS, ABOU HAMAD SAID THEY CONTINUE BE MOST IMPORTANT GOVT IN TERMS
OF ABILITY INFLUENCE SITUATION FOR GOOD OR BAD. THEY HAD DIRECT INFLUENCE ON
FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON AS WELL AS ON THEIR LEFT-WING ALLIES SUCH AS LEBANESE
COMMUNIST PARTY AND KAMAL JUMBLATT. THEY ALSO HAVE MAJOR INDIRECT INFLUENCE
THROUGH THEIR STRONG POSITION IN DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD WHICH ARE MAJOR SOURCES
OUTSIDE TROUBLE FOR LEBANON. ONE OF FRANGIE'S SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES IS TO OBTAIN
EXPLICIT COMMITMENT BY SAIQA TO PROMISES MADE BY OTHER FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND
THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON ATTITUDE OF SARG. USSR COULD BE VERY HELPFUL ON THIS
SPECIFIC POINT AS WELL AS IN COUNSELLING MODERATION GENERALLY ON SARG AND OTHERS.

5. ABOUHAMAD AND DIB CLOSED MEETING BY THANKING US FOR ALL SUPPORT USG HAS
ALREADY PROVIDED AND FOR WHATEVER MORE WE CAN DO. THEY REPORTED THEIR CONVICTION
THAT ONLY WAY TO AVOID ANOTHER, MORE SERIOUS EXPLOSION IN LEBANON IS FOR FEDAYEEN
TO ACTUALLY MAKE GOOD ON PROMISES AND THEN TRY NOT BACK AWAY FROM THEM WITH
PASSAGE OF TIME. SUPPORT FROM VARIOUS OUTSIDE GOVTS WHOM USG WILL APPROACH WILL
BE VITAL IN THIS PROCESS.

HOUGHTON

═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CABLE 2 OF 2: 1973BEIRUT05776
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

SECRET
PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05776 181500Z

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

S E C R E T BEIRUT 05776

SUBJECT: GOL-FEDAYEEN ARRANGEMENT
REF: STATE 94202

SUMMARY: FEDAYEEN REPS IN MIXED COMMISSION CAME UP WITH LIST OF SPECIFIC PROMISES
EVENING MAY 17 ON ACTIONS THEY WOULD TAKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S
DEMAND THAT GOL SOVEREIGNTY HENCEFORTH BE FULLY RESPECTED. LIST COVERS COMMITMENT
NOT TO UNDERTAKE CROSS-BORDER RAIDS, TO STAY WELL BACK FROM SENSITIVE BORDER
AREAS, TO CEASE USING BEIRUT AS INFORMATION/PROPAGANDA HEADQUARTERS, TO REMOVE
HEAVY WEAPONS FROM CAMPS, TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUPREMACY LEBANESE LAW OVER PALESTINIANS,
TO REMOVE ALL "FOREIGN ELEMENTS" (I.E., NON-ARABS) AND TO ALLOW LEBANESE SECURITY
FORCES ACCESS TO CAMPS. GOL FULLY AWARE THAT FEDAYEEN PROMISES MUST BE IMPLEMENTED
AND THEN BE RESPECTED OVER TIME TO BE WORTHWHILE, AND THAT FEDAYEEN GOOD FAITH IN
THIS REGARD IS SUSPECT. ARMY PRESENTLY WORKING OUT DETAILED AGREEMENT WHEREBY
FEDAYEEN WILL BE SUPPOSED TO IMPLEMENT THEIR PROMISES. THESE COMMITMENTS BY
FEDAYEEN APPLY TO ALL 15 REFUGEE CAMPS NOT ONLY THOSE IN BEIRUT AREA. END SUMMARY.

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN REPORTED SEPTEL, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY
(DIB) BRIEFED CHARGE AND EMBOFF MORNING MAY 18 ON STATUS OF GOL-FEDAYEEN TALKS
WHICH CONCLUDED EVENING MAY 17. DIB AND FONMIN BOTH STRESSED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS
THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO AGREEMENT OR EVEN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN.
RATHER, LATTER HAD MADE SERIES OF COMMITMENTS OR PROMISES TO ARMY NEGOTIATORS
WHICH GOL HAS ACCEPTED AS BASIS FOR NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITSELF AND ALL
FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. COMMITMENTS MADE EVENING OF MAY 17 WILL BE DRAWN UP ON PIECE
OF PAPER BY ARMY AND WE CERTAIN OTHER GOVTS WILL RECEIVE COPIES. ARMY TALKING
RIGHT NOW TO FEDAYEEN REPS ABOUT MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION, INCLUDING TIMETABLE.
DIB THEN SUMMED UP (FROM MEMORY) ESSENTIAL POINTS OF FEDAYEEN COMMITMENTS. (THESE
ARE REPORTED AS FOLLOWS BUT MAY NOT BE COMPLETE NOR COMPLETELY ACCURATE. WE SHALL
OBTAIN FURTHER INFO AND PRECISION WHEN AVAILABLE.)

2. ACTIVITY IN CAMPS: FEDAYEEN HAVE AGREED TO CEASE ALL TRAINING IN CAMPS, TO
REMOVE "HEAVY WEAPONS" FROM CAMPS, AND TO CLEANSE CAMPS OF ALL "FOREIGN ELEMENTS"
(I.E., NON-ARABS). ARMY AND FEDAYEEN WORKING OUT DETAILED AGREEMENT ON MEANING OF
HEAVY WEAPONS WHICH WILL BE BASED ON CALIBER, RANGE AND WHETHER OR NOT WEAPON IS
CREW-SERVED OR HANDLED BY SINGLE MAN. TIME-TABLE FOR REMOVAL ALSO BEING ESTABLISHED
SINCE FEDAYEEN ARGUE THAT FOR LOGISTIC REASONS AND TO ALLOW FEAR AND SUSPICION OF
LEBANESE ARMY TO DIE DOWN, REMOVAL OF HEAVY WEAPONS CANNOT TAKE PLACE ALL AT ONCE
AND RIGHT AWAY. IN REMOVAL OF FOREIGNERS, FEDAYEEN MADE ONE EXCEPTION AND THAT IS
THOSE WHO ENGAGED IN MEDICAL WORK. ALL "COMBATTANTS" WILL GO AND THIS EXPLICITLY
INCLUDES TURKS AND IRANIANS AS WELL AS VARIETY OF OTHERS (SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN
ROUNDED UP BY LEBANESE ARMY AT CHECKPOINTS OUTSIDE OF CAMPS IN PAST TWO WEEKS).
DIB AND FONMIN AGREED THAT SO-CALLED MEDICAL PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO BE WATCHED
CAREFULLY AND SAID THAT FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE TO BE WATCHED CAREFULLY ON EVERY POINT,
EVERY STEP OF THE WAY.

3. CONTROL OF CAMPS: LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES (ARMY AND CIVILIAN) WILL HAVE
CHECKPOINTS JUST OUTSIDE CAMPS IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS FROM WHICH THEY CAN OBSERVE
INTERIOR OF CAMPS ON COMINGS AND GOINGS. THERE IS TO BE NO MORE MILITARY TRAINING
IN CAMPS AND CAMPS ARE NO LONGER TO SERVE AS SHELTERS FOR FUGITIVES FROM LEBANESE
JUSTICE. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM SEPARATE RELIABLE SOURCE THAT PALESTINIAN ARMED
STRUGGLE COMMAND WILL STILL HAVE AUTHORITY WITHIN CAMPS BUT WILL COOPERATE CLOSELY
WITH LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES WITH RESPECT TO FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.) FONMIN AND
DIB SAID THAT LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES WILL HAVE RIGHT TO ENTER CAMPS BUT WITH
PERMISSION OF FEDAYEEN. FEDAYEEN HAVE NO RIGHT TO CIRCULATE WITH ARMS OUTSIDE OF
CAMPS AND MUST USE ONLY VEHICLES WITH SPECIAL PLATES.

4. INFORMATION/PROPAGANDA: ALL INFO MEDIA SUPPOSED TO BE CONSOLIDATED UNDER PLO
AND THERE IS TO BE NO MORE ATTACKS ON GOL BY FEDAYEEN MEDIA, EVEN VIA VOICE OF
PALESTINE IN BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS. BEIRUT NO LONGER TO BE USED AS BASE FOR
RELEASING FEDAYEEN COMMUNIQUES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS ALTHOUGH WAFA (PALESTINE NEWS
AGENCY) WILL BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN LEBANON. WHERE TRACTS AND OTHER
"WILDCAT" FEDAYEEN PUBLICATIONS CONCERNED, GOL FREE TO ACT UNDER LEBANESE LAW AS
IT WOULD AGAINST ANY OTHER SUCH PUBLICATION.

5. BORDER AREAS: FEDAYEEN HAVE AGAIN AGREED TO RESPECT LIMITS DRAWN UP BY ARMY
FOLLOWING SEPT 16-17, 1972 ISRAELI ACTION. THERE ARE TO BE NO RPT NO CROSS-BORDER
ACTIONS OF ANY KIND, FEDAYEEN TO BE ABSENT COMPLETELY FROM WESTERN AREA (VICINITY
RAS NAQURAH) AND AT LEAST 8-10 KMS BACK FROM BORDER IN CENTRAL AREA (VICINITY
BINT JBEIL). IN ARKUB, FEDAYEEN TO BE NORTH OF ROAD FROM HASBAYAH TO CHEBAA
EXCEPT FOR TWO OR THREE SPECIFIED AND CAREFULLY CONTROLLED SPOTS.

6. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE MANY DETAILS STILL TO BE WORKED OUT IN ARRANGEMENTS
BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. ARMY IS BEING VERY WARY AND VIGILANT. PUBLIC PRESENTATION
OF ARRANGEMENTS BY GOL AS UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS IS LIKELY BE COUNTERED ON FEDAYEEN
SIDE BY CLAIM THAT IT IS ALL WITHIN CONTEXT CAIRO ACCORDS WHICH STILL IN FORCE.
THIS IS NOT CASE BUT ON OTHER HAND THERE IS A MUTUAL -- ALBEIT ONE-SIDED --
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. GOL APPEARS TO HAVE COME OUT VERY WELL IN
TERMS OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID. BIG TEST WILL BE IN IMPLEMENTATION, AS GOL AND ARMY
SEEM UNDERSTAND.

HOUGHTON

Originally classified SECRET / EXDIS (Exclusive Distribution) · Declassified and released by U.S. Department of State under EO Systematic Review · Now UNCLASSIFIED

Archival Note — Merged Entry

This is a merged archival entry combining two companion cables filed 90 minutes apart on May 18, 1973. Cable 1973BEIRUT05755 (181315Z) documents the diplomatic conversation: what the GOL had achieved and what U.S. support was being requested. Cable 1973BEIRUT05776 (181500Z) documents the substance: the specific fedayeen commitments that formed the basis of the Melkart Protocol. The two cables are explicitly cross-referenced as SEPTEL companions in the original texts. They are presented together here because neither is fully intelligible without the other.

Cable 1 of 2 — 1973BEIRUT05755 — 181315Z May 73

Subject: GOL Request for USG Assistance — Ref: State 94202

Summary
The GOL has obtained from Fatah, PFLP, and PDFLP specific concessions (SEPTEL)^[1] which go beyond the minimal demands reported earlier. It is on the basis of the fedayeen acceptance of these specific points that the GOL would like us to make the demarches^[2] discussed in the reference cable. The demarches would be in support of full implementation of promises made by the fedayeen organizations, which the GOL intends to provide to Arab and certain other governments through its own diplomatic channels. The USSR is still considered the top priority, since the GOL considers it to have the greatest potential influence on the actions of the fedayeen and of Syria. This is all the more important since Sa’iqa^[3] has not explicitly accepted the promises made by the others, and the SARG position remains very unclear. Concerning Israel, the Chargé^[4] informed Fonmin and Dib of our estimate of the Israeli position regarding Lebanon and indicated we had recently been in touch with the Israelis on the general problem.

1.
The Chargé and Embassy officer met the morning of May 18 with Foreign Minister Abou Hamad,^[5] Presidency Director-General Dib,^[6] and Foreign Office Secretary-General Sadaqa to inform them of the substance of the reference cable. The Chargé also said that since the last meeting on May 15 we had approached the USSR again in Moscow and had been in contact with the Israelis regarding the general problem the GOL is currently facing. The Chargé gave the group the Department’s estimate of Israeli intentions along the lines of paragraph 6 of the reference cable. Sadaqa asked what the USG would do should the situation change — for example, if there were Syrian intervention and Israel felt obliged to take military action in Lebanon. The Chargé replied that our basic position remains one of supporting Lebanese political independence and territorial integrity, but that it is not possible to say what action we would take in the vague hypothetical circumstances Sadaqa had mentioned. The Foreign Minister appeared well satisfied with our position vis-à-vis Israel.

2.
After informing the GOL of our willingness to make the requested demarches, the Chargé asked the Foreign Minister if he could be clearer about the sort of demarche the GOL had in mind and when they should be made, particularly in view of reports that the GOL and the fedayeen had reached agreement in the Mixed Commission^[7] the evening of May 17. The Foreign Minister asked Dib to explain just where the GOL stood with the fedayeen, since this was essential background for determining how to pitch the demarche. Dib’s report is being sent SEPTEL, but in summary the GOL has obtained from the fedayeen greater concessions than those listed as minimal demands. The fedayeen concessions are in the form of unilateral promises to undertake certain actions, and not in the form of a new GOL-fedayeen agreement.^[8] The Army is to prepare a paper incorporating these promises, which the GOL will provide to Arab governments and certain other governments so that there will be no misunderstanding as to the substance of the future relationship between the GOL and the fedayeen. However, now that the fedayeen have accepted, the most important problem begins: bringing about implementation of the promises and assuring there is no backsliding. The Army and fedayeen are working on modalities and a timetable for implementation at the present time. Another outstanding problem is the fact that Sa’iqa and PFLP/GC have not directly and explicitly agreed to the commitments made by the others. Fatah, PFLP, and PDFLP representatives on the Mixed Commission state they are speaking for all fedayeen organizations, but the GOL does not accept this as necessarily so. The problem of PFLP/GC is of lesser magnitude than that of Sa’iqa, since the latter reflects the attitude of the Syrian government and of course has more men.

3.
Abou Hamad said he thought USG demarches to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Iran (and any further talks we might have with Jordan) should stress the vital importance to Lebanon and the entire region of the implementation of the fedayeen promises — since GOL failure to establish its sovereignty over its own territory and those living therein (as other Arab governments have done) would surely result in the ultimate destruction of the pro-Western, democratic, free-enterprise principles on which the Lebanese system rests, and would create a new source of major tension in the area which none of the countries to be approached would want. The GOL has no intention of “liquidating” the fedayeen movement and wishes to preserve good relations with them within the limitations dictated by Lebanese sovereignty. The GOL has already spoken to Arab governments explaining its case, and will do so again early next week while passing along a copy of the fedayeen promises. A subsequent supporting demarche by the USG — and if possible by other governments (we assume he meant France and England and perhaps other Western Europeans) — would add considerable weight. The important thing is to ensure that the fedayeen keep their promises in fact and that as time goes on they are not allowed to backslide. The GOL intends to supervise this very closely but will need support from governments that contribute most to fedayeen coffers.

4.
Concerning the Soviets, Abou Hamad said they continue to be the most important government in terms of their ability to influence the situation for good or ill. They had direct influence on the fedayeen in Lebanon as well as on their left-wing allies such as the Lebanese Communist Party and Kamal Jumblatt.^[9] They also have major indirect influence through their strong position in Damascus and Baghdad, which are the major sources of external trouble for Lebanon. One of President Frangieh’s specific objectives is to obtain an explicit commitment by Sa’iqa to the promises made by other fedayeen organizations — and this would depend upon the attitude of the SARG. The USSR could be very helpful on this specific point as well as in counselling moderation generally on the SARG and others.

5.
Abou Hamad and Dib closed the meeting by thanking us for all the support the USG has already provided and for whatever more we can do. They reported their conviction that the only way to avoid another, more serious explosion in Lebanon is for the fedayeen to actually make good on their promises and then try not to back away from them with the passage of time.^[10] Support from the various outside governments to be approached by the USG will be vital in this process.

HOUGHTON

Cable 2 of 2 — 1973BEIRUT05776 — 181500Z May 73

Subject: GOL-Fedayeen Arrangement — Ref: State 94202

Summary
Fedayeen representatives in the Mixed Commission came up with a list of specific promises on the evening of May 17 on actions they would take in accordance with President Frangieh’s demand that GOL sovereignty henceforth be fully respected. The list covers: a commitment not to undertake cross-border raids; to stay well back from sensitive border areas; to cease using Beirut as an information/propaganda headquarters; to remove heavy weapons from camps; to acknowledge the supremacy of Lebanese law over Palestinians; to remove all “foreign elements” (i.e., non-Arabs); and to allow Lebanese security forces access to camps. The GOL is fully aware that the fedayeen promises must be implemented and then be respected over time to be worthwhile, and that fedayeen good faith in this regard is suspect.^[11] The Army is presently working out a detailed agreement whereby the fedayeen will be supposed to implement their promises. These commitments by the fedayeen apply to all 15 refugee camps, not only those in the Beirut area.

1.
In the conversation with the Foreign Minister reported SEPTEL, Director General of the Presidency Dib briefed the Chargé and Embassy officer the morning of May 18 on the status of the GOL-fedayeen talks that concluded the evening of May 17. Dib and the Foreign Minister both stressed on several occasions that there was no agreement or even understanding between the GOL and the fedayeen. Rather, the latter had made a series of commitments or promises to Army negotiators, which the GOL has accepted as the basis for a new relationship between itself and all fedayeen in Lebanon. The commitments made on the evening of May 17 will be drawn up on paper by the Army, and we and certain other governments will receive copies. The Army is talking right now to fedayeen representatives about the modalities of implementation, including a timetable. Dib then summed up (from memory) the essential points of the fedayeen commitments. (These are reported as follows but may not be complete nor completely accurate. We shall obtain further information and precision when available.)

2. Activity in Camps
The fedayeen have agreed to cease all training in the camps, to remove “heavy weapons” from the camps, and to cleanse the camps of all “foreign elements” (i.e., non-Arabs).^[12] The Army and fedayeen are working out a detailed agreement on the meaning of “heavy weapons,” which will be based on caliber, range, and whether or not the weapon is crew-served or handled by a single man. A timetable for removal is also being established, since the fedayeen argue that for logistic reasons — and to allow fear and suspicion of the Lebanese Army to die down — removal of heavy weapons cannot take place all at once or right away. In the removal of foreigners, the fedayeen made one exception: those engaged in medical work. All “combatants” will go, and this explicitly includes Turks and Iranians^[13] as well as a variety of others (some of whom have been rounded up by the Lebanese Army at checkpoints outside of the camps over the past two weeks). Dib and the Foreign Minister agreed that so-called medical personnel would have to be watched carefully, and said that the fedayeen would have to be watched carefully on every point, every step of the way.

3. Control of Camps
Lebanese security forces (Army and civilian) will have checkpoints just outside the camps in strategic locations from which they can observe the interior of the camps and monitor comings and goings. There is to be no more military training in the camps, and the camps are no longer to serve as shelters for fugitives from Lebanese justice. (We understand from a separate reliable source that the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command will still have authority within the camps but will cooperate closely with Lebanese security forces with respect to fugitives from justice.) The Foreign Minister and Dib said that Lebanese security forces will have the right to enter the camps but with permission of the fedayeen.^[14] The fedayeen have no right to circulate with arms outside of the camps and must use only vehicles with special plates.

4. Information/Propaganda
All information media are supposed to be consolidated under the PLO, and there are to be no more attacks on the GOL by fedayeen media, even via the Voice of Palestine in Baghdad and Damascus. Beirut is no longer to be used as a base for releasing fedayeen communiqués and announcements, although WAFA^[15] (Palestine News Agency) will be allowed to continue to operate in Lebanon. Where tracts and other “wildcat” fedayeen publications are concerned, the GOL is free to act under Lebanese law as it would against any other such publication.

5. Border Areas
The fedayeen have again agreed to respect the limits drawn up by the Army following the September 16–17, 1972 Israeli action. There are to be no cross-border actions of any kind. The fedayeen are to be absent completely from the western area (vicinity of Ras Naqura) and at least 8–10 kilometers back from the border in the central area (vicinity of Bint Jbeil). In the Arqoub, the fedayeen are to remain north of the road from Hasbaya to Shebaa, except for two or three specified and carefully controlled spots.^[16]

6. Comment
Obviously there are many details still to be worked out in the arrangements between the GOL and the fedayeen. The Army is being very wary and vigilant. The GOL’s public presentation of the arrangements as unilateral concessions is likely to be countered on the fedayeen side by the claim that it is all within the context of the Cairo Accords,^[17] which are still in force. This is not the case — but on the other hand there is a mutual, albeit one-sided, agreement between the GOL and the fedayeen. The GOL appears to have come out very well in terms of what has been said. The big test will be in implementation, as the GOL and the Army seem to understand.

HOUGHTON^[18]

Editorial Footnotes

[1]SEPTEL (Separate Telegram): Standard State Department cable shorthand directing the reader to a companion cable filed under a different subject heading and cable number. The two cables in this merged entry are explicitly cross-referenced as SEPTELs: 1973BEIRUT05755 mentions "DIB'S REPORT BEING SENT SEPTEL," referring to 05776; while 05776 opens with "IN CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN REPORTED SEPTEL," referring back to 05755. Filed 90 minutes apart on May 18, 1973, neither is fully intelligible without the other — which is why they are archived here as a merged entry.

[2]Démarche (French: “step” or “move”): A formal diplomatic approach in which one government makes a direct, official representation to another. A démarche is more weighty than an informal contact but does not necessarily carry the force of an ultimatum. What the GOL was requesting here was a coordinated diplomatic campaign by the United States to press Arab Gulf governments, Iran, Jordan, and — above all — the Soviet Union to use their financial and political influence to ensure the fedayeen kept the commitments they had just made. The GOL was, in effect, asking Washington to function as a guarantor of an arrangement the Lebanese themselves doubted would hold.

[3]Saʿiqa (الصاعقة, “Thunderbolt”): Palestinian armed faction founded in 1966 under the direct sponsorship of the Syrian Ba’ath Party. Unlike Fatah, the PFLP, or the PDFLP, Saʿiqa was not an independent Palestinian movement: it was effectively an instrument of Syrian state policy. This is why the GOL’s inability to obtain Saʿiqa’s explicit acceptance of the Melkart commitments was so significant: it meant that Syria’s proxy force — and by extension, Syria — was not bound by any of the arrangements being negotiated. The cable makes this explicit: Frangieh’s specific objective was to get Saʿiqa to sign on, and this “would depend upon the attitude of the SARG.” Syria’s non-commitment was not a gap that could be negotiated around.

[4]Chargé d’Affaires (or simply “Chargé”): The acting head of a diplomatic mission when the Ambassador is absent. The use of “Chargé” rather than “Ambassador” here indicates that Dwight Houghton was not present for the May 18 meeting, with his deputy acting in his stead. Houghton’s name still appears on the cable as the responsible officer. This is standard practice: cables are signed by the Ambassador regardless of who conducts the actual meeting.

[5]Foreign Minister Abou Hamad: The cable uses “Abou Hamad” as the standard rendering of the Lebanese Foreign Minister’s name. Some diplomatic records from this period suggest this is a reference to Fouad Butros (Fuad Butros), who served as Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Takieddine Solh from July 1973. If this meeting took place on May 18, 1973, the incumbent Foreign Minister may have been someone else in the transitional period after the May 1973 crisis — or “Abou Hamad” may be a rendering of a different minister. The cable is consistent in using “Abou Hamad” throughout, suggesting this is a kunya (Arabic patronymic form of address) for a specific individual whose given name is not provided. This uncertainty is noted; the archival identification is provisional.

[6]Presidency Director-General Dib: The recurring GOL interlocutor throughout the May 1973 crisis cables. The Presidency Director-General was the senior official of the Lebanese Presidential Palace, functioning as the head of the presidential administration and a key channel between President Frangieh and foreign diplomats. “Dib” appears in several cables as the GOL’s senior briefing officer on the fedayeen negotiations. His role here — summing up from memory the full terms of the fedayeen commitments — indicates he was at the center of the negotiation.

[7]Mixed Commission: The joint body of Lebanese Army officers and fedayeen representatives established to manage the practical implementation of agreements governing Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon. The Mixed Commission operated under the framework of the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which had created a formal structure for GOL-PLO relations. By May 1973, the Mixed Commission had been the venue for ten days of intensive negotiations following the outbreak of fighting on May 7–8. The evening of May 17 — when the fedayeen made their commitments — was the concluding session of this round of talks.

[8]This is the central legal and political framing of the entire Melkart arrangement, and it was chosen deliberately by the Lebanese government. By insisting the fedayeen commitments were “unilateral promises” rather than “a new GOL-fedayeen agreement,” the Lebanese were attempting to sidestep the Cairo Accords framework. Any new “agreement” would implicitly have operated within that framework — which the fedayeen would use to argue their presence and operations were legitimized under the 1969 accords. Unilateral promises, by contrast, were not framed as bilateral contractual obligations with reciprocal GOL concessions; they were simply undertakings the fedayeen made. This distinction mattered enormously on paper. In practice, the fedayeen would interpret the arrangements as a supplement to the Cairo Accords — exactly as the Embassy predicted in paragraph 6 of 05776.

[9]Kamal Jumblatt (1917–1977): Leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and paramount chief of the Lebanese Druze community. In 1973, Jumblatt was the leading figure of the Lebanese left-wing political coalition that aligned itself with the Palestinian fedayeen and maintained close ties to Syria and the Soviet Union. The Foreign Minister’s identification of Jumblatt as a Soviet “left-wing ally” and thus an indirect channel of Soviet influence on Lebanon documents the GOL’s 1973 threat assessment. Jumblatt would go on to lead the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) — the leftist-Palestinian alliance — during the 1975–76 civil war. He was assassinated in March 1977, almost certainly by Syrian agents, after President Assad turned against him.

[10]This sentence is the Foreign Minister’s own prediction, delivered at the moment of apparent diplomatic success, that the agreement would fail and a worse explosion would follow. The phrase “another, more serious explosion” acknowledges that the May 7–8 fighting was the first such explosion. The GOL is predicting the next one while still sitting in the meeting that resolved the current one. The historical record shows the prediction was correct: the fedayeen did not fully implement the Melkart commitments, the Lebanese Army’s capacity to enforce them degraded, and the “more serious explosion” came in April 1975. Abou Hamad’s words were in the diplomatic record in May 1973.

[11]The GOL’s own summary document for the arrangement that would become known as the Melkart Protocol contains an explicit statement of doubt about the other party’s good faith. This is not an external skeptical assessment — it is the Lebanese government’s own framing, transmitted through U.S. Embassy reporting, on the day after the commitments were made. The Melkart Protocol has sometimes been described in secondary literature as a genuine attempt to regulate Palestinian armed presence. The cable record suggests the GOL itself regarded it as an instrument whose value depended entirely on enforcement — and already doubted the good faith of the party making the promises.

[12]“Foreign elements” (non-Arabs) in the camps: This term is used as a euphemism for international volunteers and fighters who had joined the Palestinian armed organizations — individuals from outside the Arab world who had come to Lebanon to participate in the fedayeen cause. The cable makes clear that the category includes “Turks and Iranians as well as a variety of others,” some of whom had already been rounded up by the Lebanese Army at checkpoints in the preceding two weeks. This documents, from a 1973 U.S. Embassy source, that Palestinian camps in Lebanon housed non-Arab combatants including Turks and Iranians. The international composition of the fedayeen forces was therefore documented in the diplomatic record 50 years before it became a matter of historical dispute.

[13]The explicit naming of “Turks and Iranians” as “combatants” in the Palestinian refugee camps is among the most historically specific details in these cables. Pre-revolutionary Iran (1973) under the Shah was not generally associated with Palestinian armed factions. The Iranian government was a U.S. ally and the Shah had diplomatic relations with Israel. Yet the Embassy’s reporting — drawn from Dib’s direct briefing — names Iranians among the non-Arab combatants whom the fedayeen themselves committed to remove from the camps. This detail is in the U.S. diplomatic record as of May 18, 1973. It has not appeared in standard accounts of the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon.

[14]The phrase “with permission of the fedayeen” qualifies the entire clause about Lebanese sovereignty over the camps. Formally, Lebanese security forces were being granted the right of access. Practically, they would need to ask the fedayeen for permission to exercise that right. The GOL and Dib were apparently satisfied with this formulation — or at least accepted it as the best that could be obtained. The Embassy’s Comment paragraph (para. 6) implicitly registers skepticism: “the big test will be in implementation.” A right of entry that requires the consent of the party being entered is, in practice, not a right of entry.

[15]WAFA (وكالة أنباء فلسطين, Wikalat Anbaʼ Falastin — Palestine News Agency): The official PLO news wire service, founded in 1972. The Melkart commitments required the fedayeen to cease using Beirut as a base for propaganda releases. WAFA was explicitly carved out of this prohibition — it was allowed to continue operating in Lebanon. This carve-out for the PLO’s official news agency, while nominally modest, preserved a key institutional presence in Beirut. WAFA still operates today as the official Palestinian news agency.

[16]The geographical specifics here document the military geography of the Melkart Protocol in a level of detail not generally available in secondary sources. Ras Naqura (also known as Rosh HaNikra) is the Mediterranean coastal point on the Lebanese-Israeli border; total fedayeen exclusion there. Bint Jbeil, in the central south, required an 8–10 km pullback. The Arqoub (العرقوب) — the southeastern corner of Lebanon where the Lebanese, Syrian, and Israeli borders converge, historically the most active base for cross-border fedayeen operations — was subject to the most permissive terms: fedayeen to remain north of the Hasbaya-Shebaa road except for “two or three specified and carefully controlled spots.” The Arqoub had been known informally as “Fatahland” since the late 1960s. The gap between the formal commitment (north of Hasbaya-Shebaa road) and the exceptions (“two or three spots” to be specified) left substantial room for contested interpretation.

[17]Cairo Agreement (November 3, 1969): The foundational document governing PLO–GOL relations, signed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Lebanese Army Commander General Emile Bustani under Egyptian mediation. The Agreement formally legalized the PLO’s armed presence on Lebanese soil and granted Palestinian organizations authority within the refugee camps. The GOL insisted the Melkart commitments were “unilateral promises” rather than a new agreement specifically to avoid the implication that they operated under the Cairo Accords framework. The Embassy predicted in para. 6 that the fedayeen would nonetheless frame the Melkart arrangement as “within the context of the Cairo Accords” — which is exactly what happened.

[18]Dwight J. Houghton: U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon 1970–1974. These two cables, filed on May 18, 1973, represent Houghton’s reporting on the moment of apparent resolution of the May 1973 crisis — the fedayeen commitments that would be formalized as the Melkart Protocol. Read together with the earlier cables in this archive (1973BEIRUT04974 documenting the April 30 bomb plot; 1973BEIRUT05155 and 1973BEIRUT05159 documenting the May 7–8 fighting; and 1973BEIRUT05437 assessing the likely terms), the Melkart cables are the conclusion of a crisis that was, in the Embassy’s own terms at the time, unlikely to resolve the underlying structural problem. Houghton left Beirut in 1974. He did not see the war that his cables had predicted.

SECRET / EXDIS

How to Cite

Annotated version:
Institute for Lebanon, “GOL-Fedayeen Arrangement / GOL Request for USG Assistance (Companion Cables: Melkart Protocol)” (1973BEIRUT05776), May 18, 1973. instituteforlebanon.com/cables/1973BEIRUT05776/

Original cable:
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, “GOL-Fedayeen Arrangement / GOL Request for USG Assistance (Companion Cables: Melkart Protocol)” (1973BEIRUT05776), May 18, 1973. Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD).

GOL
Government of Lebanon
FONMIN
Foreign Minister
EXDIS
Exclusive Distribution — more restrictive handling than LIMDIS; limited to named recipients only
SEPTEL
Separate Telegram — cross-reference to a companion cable filed under a different subject
SARG
Syrian Arab Republic Government
FEDAYEEN
Palestinian armed fighters (فدائيين, “those who sacrifice themselves”)
SAʿIQA
Syrian Ba’ath Party-sponsored Palestinian faction (الصاعقة, “Thunderbolt”) — NOT a signatory to the Melkart commitments
PFLP/GC
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command; Ahmad Jibril’s Syria-aligned faction
PDFLP
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (later DFLP)
WAFA
Wikalat Anbaʼ Falastin — Palestine News Agency (official PLO wire service; allowed to remain in Beirut under the Protocol)