Cable 1973BEIRUT05155 · May 7, 1973 · CONFIDENTIAL

Beirut, May 7, 1973 — 9:31 PM

The Night It Started: Emergency Cable from Beirut, 9:31 PM

This cable, dispatched at the highest urgency level as fighting broke out across Beirut on the night of May 7, 1973, is the U.S. Embassy's first report on a crisis that would produce the Lebanese Army's first use of aircraft and tanks against Palestinian camps. It was filed while the shooting was still audible. The Lebanese Army's contact named Syria — on record, that night.

Based on cable 1973BEIRUT05155 CONFIDENTIAL → UNCLASSIFIED

At 9:31 PM on May 7, 1973, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut dispatched a Night Action Immediate cable — the highest urgency designation available — as fighting erupted across the city. The Lebanese government declared martial law at 11:30 PM. Rockets were reported landing near the airport, the Military Governorate, and the presidential palace. The most serious fighting was in the Shatila camp area. The Embassy's contacts were brief: a Presidency aide and an Army officer named Kanaan. The GOL considered the situation 'not dangerous but very serious.' Kanaan told the Embassy that Syria was playing 'the most unhelpful role' — and had no time to say more. The full picture came in a cable filed eleven hours later.

What this document reveals

This cable was filed while the fighting was still underway — dispatched at 9:31 PM GMT as rockets were landing across Beirut. It is the Embassy's first-flash report, sent before a full picture was available.
Rockets were reported near the Presidency, the Military Governorate, and the airport simultaneously — indicating coordinated attacks on Lebanon's key state institutions, not random street fighting.
A Lebanese Army officer named Syria, on the record, that same night: 'the Syrian government appears to be playing the most unhelpful role' — before the Embassy had time to document the details.
The Lebanese government's official justification for martial law — 'subversive elements tampering with security' — attributed nothing to a specific party. The Army contact, speaking privately to the Embassy, was more direct.
The cable closes with: 'we will report further when we are able to obtain a clearer picture.' That fuller account is cable 1973BEIRUT05159, filed eleven hours later.

Chronology

What happened, in sequence

~10:00 PM, May 7, 1973

Fighting erupts

Scattered fighting breaks out on the outskirts of Beirut. The most serious engagement is in the Shatila camp area. Rockets are fired at the airport, Military Governorate, and vicinity of the Presidency.

~11:30 PM, May 7, 1973

Martial law declared

The Lebanese government formally declares a state of emergency, citing 'subversive elements tampering with the security of the country.' The army assumes authority over all security.

~Midnight, May 7–8, 1973

Situation calming

The Embassy notes the situation appears to be calming, while acknowledging its information is 'extremely spotty.' It promises a fuller report when the picture clears.

Key figures

Who was involved

Kanaan

Lebanese Army contact

The Army officer who briefed the Embassy that night named Syria as playing 'the most unhelpful role' in the crisis. He appears again in the morning-after cable (1973BEIRUT05159), confirming Arafat was trying to calm his troops. His full identity has not been confirmed from available sources.

Dib

Presidency contact

A Lebanese Presidency official who briefed the Embassy alongside the Army's Kanaan that night. The GOL's assessment relayed through Dib — 'not dangerous but very serious' — reflects official caution at the height of uncertainty.

The Record

9:31 PM, May 7, 1973

The cable was dispatched at the highest urgency level available to American diplomats: Night Action Immediate, requiring attention regardless of the hour. It ran to three paragraphs. The Embassy sent it while the shooting was still audible across the city.

What the Embassy knew at that hour

Fighting had broken out around 10:00 PM local time on the outskirts of Beirut, with the most serious engagement in the area of Shatila refugee camp. A large number of rockets had been fired across the city. Some, the Embassy reported, had been directed at the airport — one of Lebanon's most strategically and economically vital installations. Others had landed near the Military Governorate of Beirut, the headquarters of the army's authority over the capital. Still others had been reported in the general vicinity of the Presidency — the seat of Lebanon's head of state.

The simultaneous targeting of these three nodes — the airport, the military command, the Presidency — was not random. The cable does not say this explicitly, but the pattern it documents implies coordination.

The Army's verdict, that night

In brief contacts with a Presidency aide named Dib and an Army officer named Kanaan, the Embassy obtained one assessment that stands out. Kanaan told the Embassy that the Lebanese government considered the situation "not dangerous but very serious" — and that Lebanese officials were "especially concerned at deliberate, widespread efforts to prevent GOL-fedayeen relations from stabilizing."

Then: the Syrian government, Kanaan said, "appears to be playing the most unhelpful role in this regard." He had no time to elaborate.

This attribution — Syria identified as the most disruptive external actor, on record, at the moment the crisis was unfolding — appears in no standard account of the May 1973 events. It is documented in this cable, filed before midnight on May 7, 1973.

The limits of the moment

The cable is honest about what it does not know. The Embassy's information is "extremely spotty." The government's information, Houghton notes, is also extremely spotty. The cable closes with a direct acknowledgment: "We will report further when we are able to obtain a clearer picture of the situation."

That clearer picture arrived in two cables filed the following morning. Cable 1973BEIRUT05159, dispatched at 8:08 AM on May 8, reported that the Lebanese Army had by then expended aircraft and tank fire against Sabra/Chatila, Bir Hassan, and Borj el Brajne camps. The Prime Minister had resigned at 5:00 AM. A ceasefire came into effect at 8:00 AM. And the Army's G-2 named the specific Palestinian factions responsible for the night's fighting: PDFLP, PFLP/GC, and possibly Sa'iqa — precisely the Syrian-aligned factions Kanaan had pointed toward the night before without being able to say more.

Key Locations

●

Shatila camp — Most serious fighting of the night; Palestinian camp in Beirut's southern suburbs

○

Beirut airport — Reported target of rocket fire

○

Military Governorate — Army headquarters in Beirut; reported target of rocket fire

○

Presidential Palace — Rockets reported in general vicinity of the Presidency

Map data © OpenStreetMap contributors · View in OpenStreetMap

Primary Source

This article is based entirely on U.S. Embassy Beirut cable 1973BEIRUT05155, dispatched on May 7, 1973 and originally classified CONFIDENTIAL. Declassified and released by the U.S. Department of State under Executive Order Systematic Review, July 5, 2006. No facts have been added, removed, or altered.

View original on Wikileaks PlusD →

Topics

1973 pre-war NIACT martial law Shatila Beirut airport Syria fedayeen Lebanese Army

CONFIDENTIAL

Origin	U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
To	Secretary of State, Washington D.C.
Date	May 7, 1973
Cable ID	1973BEIRUT05155
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL → Declassified 2006

Lebanese Internal Security

Annotated version — all original facts and language preserved in full

Originally classified CONFIDENTIAL · Declassified and released by U.S. Department of State under EO Systematic Review · Now UNCLASSIFIED

1.
The government announced at 11:30 PM local time a state of emergency (martial law)^[1] because “subversive elements tampering with the security of the country.” At approximately 10:00 PM local time, outbreaks of scattered fighting began on the outskirts of the city, with the most serious engagement in the Shatila camp area.^[2] A large number of rockets have been fired in and around the city. We have reports that some have been fired at the airport, the Military Governorate of Beirut,^[3] and in the general vicinity of the Presidency.^[4] The situation seems to be calming down as of midnight, although our information — and that of the GOL — is extremely spotty.^[5] We have no reports of any American casualties.

2.
Based on brief talks with the Presidency (Dib^[6]) and the Army (Kanaan^[7]), the GOL considers the situation “not dangerous but very serious.” They are especially concerned at deliberate, widespread efforts to prevent GOL–fedayeen^[8] relations from stabilizing. Kanaan stated that the Syrian government appears to be playing the most unhelpful role in this regard, although he had no time to provide details.^[9]

3.
We will report further when we are able to obtain a clearer picture of the situation.^[10]

HOUGHTON^[11]

Editorial Footnotes

[1]State of emergency (martial law): The Lebanese government's declaration of a state of emergency transferred effective authority from civilian police and courts to the military. Under this authority, the army could impose curfews, censor the press, and arrest individuals without normal judicial process — all of which are documented in the follow-up cable 1973BEIRUT05159, filed the following morning. The formal justification — "subversive elements tampering with security" — is a government formulation that does not attribute the fighting to a specific party, though the Embassy and Army sources had already identified specific Palestinian factions as the instigators.

[2]Shatila camp: one of the largest Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, located in the southern suburbs. As the site of the most serious fighting on the night of May 7, Shatila appears here as it would again, nine years later, as the site of the 1982 massacre carried out by Lebanese Forces militiamen while Israeli forces controlled the surrounding area. This cable documents Shatila as an active combat zone in May 1973 — the Lebanese Army engaging Palestinian forces in and around the same camp. This context does not appear in standard accounts of the camp's history.

[3]Military Governorate of Beirut: the headquarters of the military authority governing greater Beirut, a significant institutional target. Rocket fire directed at the Military Governorate — alongside the airport and the vicinity of the Presidency — indicates that the May 7 attacks were not random but targeted the Lebanese state's key security and political nodes.

[4]The Presidency (Baabda Palace) is located in the hills southeast of Beirut. Rocket fire in the general vicinity of the Presidency — the seat of Lebanese executive power — in addition to the airport and military governorate constitutes a direct attack on Lebanese state authority. The cable reports this without attribution at this hour; the follow-up cable (1973BEIRUT05159) identifies the instigating factions as PDFLP, PFLP/GC, and possibly Sa'iqa.

[5]"Our information and that of GOL is extremely spotty": a notable admission of the Embassy's limitations in real-time. Filed at 9:31 PM GMT on May 7 — while the crisis was still unfolding — this cable is the Embassy's immediate dispatch under the NIACT IMMEDIATE protocol, sent before a full picture could be assembled. The subsequent cables (1973BEIRUT05159) were filed when the picture clarified.

[6]Dib: likely a reference to a Lebanese Presidency official or aide who served as an Embassy contact. The name Dib (Arabic: ضيب) appears in the context of the Presidency rather than the army — distinguishing this source from the army contact Kanaan cited in the same sentence.

[7]Kanaan: a Lebanese Army contact who appears in both this cable and the subsequent cable 1973BEIRUT05159. In this cable, Kanaan identifies Syria as "playing the most unhelpful role" in the crisis — one of the earliest explicit on-record attributions of Syrian responsibility that evening. In the follow-up cable filed the next morning, Kanaan confirms that Arafat is trying to calm his troops after the ceasefire.

[8]Fedayeen (Arabic: فدائيين, "those who sacrifice themselves"): Palestinian armed fighters. In the Lebanese context, the term refers collectively to the armed members of PLO constituent organizations operating from bases in Lebanese refugee camps under the framework of the 1969 Cairo Agreement.

[9]"Syrian government appears to be playing the most unhelpful role... although he had no time to provide details": the brevity here is itself a historical fact. Kanaan identified Syria at the moment of the crisis — presumably because the factions involved (PFLP/GC, Sa'iqa) were known to operate with Syrian backing — but the conversation was too brief for elaboration. The fuller picture of Syrian involvement is documented in the subsequent cable (1973BEIRUT05159), where the U.S. Embassy records Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's deliberate misrepresentation of negotiating terms and notes Lebanese government suspicion of "a Syrian hand working behind the scene."

[10]The cable's final paragraph — "we will report further when we are able to obtain a clearer picture" — is characteristic of a first-flash emergency dispatch. The NIACT IMMEDIATE designation required immediate transmission regardless of the hour and regardless of informational completeness. The Embassy sent what it had. The fuller account followed at 8:08 AM the next morning in cable 1973BEIRUT05159.

[11]HOUGHTON: the same signatory as cables 1973BEIRUT04974 (April 30, 1973) and 1973BEIRUT05159 (May 8, 1973). Likely the Deputy Chief of Mission or senior duty officer at the Embassy, filing under the Night Action protocol.

CONFIDENTIAL

How to Cite

Annotated version:
Institute for Lebanon, “Lebanese Internal Security” (1973BEIRUT05155), May 7, 1973. instituteforlebanon.com/cables/1973BEIRUT05155/

Original cable:
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, “Lebanese Internal Security” (1973BEIRUT05155), May 7, 1973. Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD).